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This dissertation explores the strategic communications of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa) intergovernmental platform. BRICS is a recent addition to the 
growing array of international organisations. Though BRICS consists of significant 
emerging and re-emerging states, it remains poorly perceived and obscure. Previous 
analyses that have examined BRICS as an aggregation of its member states or 
distinguished it simply as a slogan designed by Goldman Sachs have failed to discern it for 
the rhetorical, strategic entity that it is. This dissertation focuses on BRICS’ essence and 
intent, its strategic communications. It analyses BRICS’ narrative and scenario, examining 
its rhetorical appeals, its strategies and tactics of persuasion.   
The study employs a critical rhetorical analysis to explore publically available 
primary documentation emanating from high-level BRICS meetings. Three analytical 
chapters assess this corpus, conceptually distinguished as programmatic (Memoranda of 
Understanding, agreements and treaties), organic (summit Declarations) and 
opportunistic (Statements) documents. This analysis expediently takes from disciplines 
and schools of thought to qualitatively and inductively assess strategic style and agency. It 
applies theoretical and conceptual tools to examine claims that emerge from the texts. 
BRICS’ documents present organisational strategy and articulate its appeals. These are 
rhetorically explored to discern BRICS, per se. BRICS’ rhetoric motions towards its aims. Its 
strategic means, ways and ends are closely assessed.      
The dissertation finds that BRICS is an informal intergovernmental regime towards 
engendering reform inside of the normative international order. Its claims indirectly shape 
global governance according to its interests. BRICS is a process-driven advocacy 
mechanism that brings states together as nodes in a state-centric intergovernmental style. 
It rhetorically steers towards its aspired outcomes without taking considerable action. It 
does so to avoid responsibility. It rhetorically performs the principles and norms of the 
legitimate international order under the United Nations, in order to substantiate its form 
of multilateralism; to actualise reform while maintaining structure. By employing its 
principles and norms, BRICS embodies and therefore territorialises the multilateral order. 
BRICS’ strategic communications develop an alternative narrative towards steering 
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international cooperation and exchange. Its articulation of the international order 
confronts dictated hegemonic conceptions, asserting that no unilateral interpretation 
holds an absolute truth. Sovereign states are not circumscribed by other states but only by 
legitimate international law and order. In doing so BRICS pursues international recognition 
for its member states, disrupts what it perceives to be hegemonic inertia and redefines 
global governance. 
BRICS illustrates a significant modality to assess the contemporary international 
order and the recent developments in global power. Its indirect form, a procedural and 
fluid platform for extra-Western sovereign states to pursue influence and execute wills, 
proposes the evolution of international power in the 21st century. BRICS actively employs 
a hybrid (both-and) strategy to lead toward a reformed global order based on a greater 
balance of powers (multipolarity). The development of BRICS and BRICS Plus presents 
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“In the course of the next several decades, a functioning structure of global cooperation, 
based on geopolitical realities, could thus emerge and gradually assume the mantle of the 
world's current ‘regent’”.      
       Zbigniew Brzezinski (Brzezinski, 1997: 215)  
“There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global 
economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen 
multipolarity...we would like to interact with also independent and responsible partners 
with whom we can work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order, that 
would ensure security and prosperity not only for a select few, but for all”.       
                                                 Vladimir Putin (Putin, 2007) 
“As BRICS we need to be very, very clear and cogent about what we want. We are a forum 
that intends to put onto the world stage progressive ideas and we must use our 
collaboration to influence the direction of institutions such as IMF, the policies of the 
World Bank, our presence in the United Nations, the kinds of programmes that the UN 
adopts and we actually should insist on democratising that institution that has remained 
in structure and mechanism largely the same as when it was initiated in 1948. So if BRICS 
begins to partner in a way that really unites us powerfully on what we bring into the global 
stage I think we will have a collaborative partnership of great influence...BRICS stands in a 
very good position to be a major initiator of change”.  






The Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) intergovernmental regime 
presents an avenue that leads from the present international order to that which is to 
come. It is the collaborating design of divergent states to push global organisational 
reform, while avoiding revolution. The purpose of this dissertation is to explore BRICS. To 
examine how it informs of the contemporary global, power-political moment. The 
sustained interactions of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), since 2006, and BRICS, 
since 2011, forming a distinguishable intergovernmental organisation, has been a 
significant geopolitical development of the 21st century. The cooperation between these 
emerging and re-emerging states into a consolidated entity has had a direct impact on 
global power and order. Its development transcends previous extra-Western formations 
due to its acute strategic perceptions and formulations. BRICS performs an evolving, 
process-driven global governance1 forum. Together member states form an authoritative, 
alternative claim of how global power should function. BRICS advances the actualisation of 
its vision through persuasion and dissuasion. It introduces a new global narrative and 
scenario found around the principles and norms of the international order. In 2017 the 
group commenced its “second golden decade of BRICS cooperation and solidarity” (BRICS, 
2017c), re-establishing its multilateral position and signalling its maturing presence as an 
advancing constituent within international affairs. This evolving formation of regional 
powers presents a paradigm through which to comprehend the global zeitgeist, especially 
its changing dynamics.  
BRICS displays modern, networked power. States are its primary nodes of power. 
Its development of state-to-state exchanges returns power from international institutions 
to state-centrism. BRICS demonstrates a complex, integrated structure of power. It 
carefully evolves, not replaces, established logics. To do so it requires recognition and 
influence. Its hybrid model builds cooperative power in, through and with other states. 
This model necessitates hybrid strategies, suited to the evolving flows and spaces of 
power; allowing states to advance their independent interests.   
                                                          
1
 Global governance refers both to the norms upheld and the processes undertaken by global organisations 
in their coordination of actions (Duggan, 2015: 12). 
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BRICS engages state leaders, ministries and representatives to produce a 
consolidated intergovernmental regime. This is a strategic construct; it develops and 
advances understanding of itself, its member states, of other states, of hegemonic powers 
and of the world. The BRICS unit, not the individual states, represents its functions. BRICS 
thereby forms a separate agent of international affairs. BRICS communicates through its 
cumulative Declarations and Statements, released at its meetings. These strategic and 
tactical representations produce an independent narrative, indirectly informing the 
prevailing international order. 
Despite its actual significance, BRICS remains poorly distinguished in academic 
analysis and public discourse. Discernment of this consolidated intergovernmental forum 
remains lost among the broad range of conceptual inferences that fluctuate between 
earlier hype and recent dismissal. The majority of work undertaken to distinguish BRICS 
focuses on the individual member states and their particulars, not on the significance and 
strategic ambitions of the group.   
BRICS is a nascent organisation, without a constituting agreement or 
administration. Beyond its Declarations and Statements it has few institutions and 
platforms through which to convey its strategic intentions. Its significance is greatly 
pursued through its rhetoric. Instead of commencing examination here, assorted 
inferences have produced misguided comprehension by elevating BRICS into the global 
consciousness as something it is not. It has done so by affixing instead of pursuing 
signification. 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
This dissertation presents an exploration of BRICS. Previous studies of BRICS make up the 
bulk of the literature reviewed, thereby producing the state of the art. BRICS, first as BRIC, 
has been studied across a wide range of fields and through many different lenses. It has 
broadly been analysed according to three orientations.  
The first body of research narrowly and often dismissively appraises BRICS upon 
the artificial assessment that it comprises an economic bloc. It follows the original 
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conception of BRIC by Goldman Sachs, as an investment slogan2. These assessments avoid 
the group’s agency and strategy, often rejecting it in toto, proposing acronymic formations 
of other countries that would produce better investment returns (Goldstone, 2011). Pesek 
(2015) is one such example. The author discusses BRICS’ political existence, based solely 
on an investment assessment. These studies often appraise BRICS as an inappropriate 
alliance with great differences among members (Alessi, 2012), incoherence in United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting patterns (Hooijmaaijers, 2011), or simply as 
having no reason to exist (Sparks, 2013; Ünay, 2013). Some analysts (Armijo and Roberts, 
2014; Brütsch and Papa, 2012) suggest that for BRICS to be effective its member states 
must directly ally through common interests. Others suggest that “to be able to form a 
counter-hegemonic coalition necessary to challenge the current liberal international order 
led by the overly powerful US, some coherence in foreign policy preferences among them 
is essential” (Peitz, 2015). These views adopt false assumptions. They do not probe BRICS’ 
approach, nor do they assess its strategic intent.   
Various studies reject BRICS based on divergence among member states. Sharma 
(2012) dismisses any extensive consideration of BRICS, instead concluding that “no idea 
has done more to muddle thinking about the global economy than that of the BRICs” 
(Sharma, 2012: 4). Stephens (2011) advises that “it’s time to bid farewell to the Brics” due 
to its states having different political systems. Some argue that despite its potential 
(Deguat, 2015; Käkönen, 2013) internal differences, such as trade and policy 
differentiation (Cameron, 2011; Pant, 2013) are too great to amount to any real 
international force. Laïdi (2012) argues that historical distrust among members stands in 
BRICS’ way. The common line among analyses dismissing BRICS, apart from their Western 
origin, is a point of departure that avoids assessing the claims of the group, its rationale 
and determinations. Instead, these conclude upon what BRICS is not: an economic bloc 
that has growth in common (Armijo, 2007; Sparks, 2013); unable to modify international 
order due to its weak institutionalisation (Käkönen, 2013). Furthermore, BRICS is often 
simply dismissed as a feeble antagonist to the West. Pant’s (2013) titular designation is 
                                                          
2
 Discussed on page 37. 
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that BRICS is a “fallacy”, concluding that it is no more than an “artificial construct – merely 
an acronym coined by an investment banking analyst” (Pant, 2013: 103).  
The second analytical orientation is to discern BRICS according to individual 
member states. These deliberate upon similarities and differences, aggregating the whole 
from the parts. These studies provide limited insight of BRICS, as a whole, offering 
simplified appraisals. Peitz (2015) prompts BRICS’ collective importance to be based upon 
its internal policy cohesion. Ferdinand (2014a; 2014b) suggests outright foreign policy 
coherence among the states, based upon voting at the UNGA. Adriana (2013) simply sees 
BRICS as an economic club, justified by the economic growth of individual states, while Lo 
and Hiscock (eds., 2014) examine economic developments as bringing BRICS together in a 
time of geopolitical change. There has been an increased appreciation of BRICS consisting 
of diverging states seeking united goals. Thies and Nieman (2017) use role theory to assess 
change in the international arena and theoretical realism to conduct their analysis. The 
authors assess identity and behaviour, producing a useful theoretical contribution of 
emerging powers, their roles and interplay. Stuenkel (2013) offers a concise account of 
how BRICS transformed itself from an investment category into a political entity, stating 
that members opportunely used economic clout at a time of global recession to launch 
the group.  
Papa’s (2013) compelling claim that there is a perception gap between what BRICS 
is and how it has been projected, assesses BRICS as a feature of global governance. 
Petropoulos (2013) suggests that BRICS emerged as a multiplier of power in global 
governance based on the increased economic strength of member states at the time of 
the 2008 global financial crisis. This view sees power translated as subsequent influence 
on regional and global governance (Armijo and Roberts, 2014), with individual states 
together shaping the balance of power. BRICS’ strategic convergence has evolved and 
redefined the transnational order, ensuring a new paradigm for global governance (Shaw, 
2015). BRICS’ cooperation functions as a multiplier of power, its individual states are 
increasingly emerging as global and regional leaders, combining to form a leadership bloc 
(Kingah and Quiliconi (eds., 2016). De Coning et al (eds., 2015) look at the member states 
to assess their influence on global order. They conclude that BRICS, through collaboration 
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and diffusion, constrains hegemony. BRICS brings divergent states together in common 
action as an alternative vision of maintaining order, while ensuring stability in the global 
system (De Coning et al, 2015; Kornegay and Bohler-Muller, eds., 2013).  
Laïdi (2011) provides a historical rationalisation of BRICS through an appraisal of 
individual states. BRICS is presented as a centrally disaggregated geopolitical coalition, 
employing globalisation to promote the objective of sovereign power. Nye’s (1990) 
concept of soft power3 has broadly been applied to assess individual states’ persuasive 
capacities. Chatin and Gallarotti (eds., 2018) bring together comparative analyses on 
individual states’ soft power, assessing the changing international system. In this volume 
Stuenkel (2018) concludes that though the group is systematically developing its soft 
power institutionalisation, there is little parity between member states. They are also far 
from rivalling the soft power of Western powers. The volume concludes with a useful 
theoretical contribution of how BRICS’ collective soft power manifests as compounded, 
from the organisation to the states. This exposé is however restricted by its discussion, not 
of group endeavours, but of national examples. The study resolves that the BRICS platform 
expediently shapes the image and power of member states. Diversity in the group 
produces influence, but soft power is problematic as its meaning is applied from a narrow 
understanding (Gallarotti, 2018).  
Bond and Garcia’s (2015) systematic critical analysis of BRICS is next to none. The 
study warns that BRICS is an elitist formation. That BRICS is replicating the neo-liberal 
features of power in a sub-imperialist fashion, usurping power from below. This book 
holds much value in critically discerning BRICS and guides analytical study of the 
implicated countries.  
The final category of literature is the most consequential. It examines BRICS as a 
unit. These studies generally recognise BRICS as a poorly defined intergovernmental 
political platform that seeks reform (Chardell, 2015), purposed to advance state interests 
(Käkönen, 2013) and to systematically (soft) balance unilateral hegemony (De Souza 
                                                          
3
 “when one country gets other countries to want what it wants, might be called co-optive or soft power in 
contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants” (Nye, 1990: 166). 
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Almeida, 2015). Soft balancing4 is expediently used by Besada and Tok (2014) to advance 
BRICS as an economic, not political, forum, while Skak (2011) looks at BRIC countries 
individually, concluding that soft balancing is ineffective to discern the group. 
Stuenkel (2015) provides an expanded overview of BRICS. His book achieves its 
goal of delivering “a definitive reference history of the BRICS as a term and as an 
institution – a chronological, fact-focused narrative and analytical account of the BRICS 
concept from its inception in 2001 to the political grouping it is today” (Stuenkel, 2015: xi). 
Stuenkel’s account delivers an authoritative introduction to discerning BRICS, per se.  
BRICS is submitted as an oppositional force to international hegemony, advancing 
a contemporary model for international exchange. It is presented as increasingly 
converting into a progressive force towards equitable intergovernmental interaction 
(Haibin, 2013), not in opposition to the established international order. It seeks global 
reform (Kornegay and Bohler-Muller, eds., 2013). This counters Brütsch and Papa’s (2013) 
appraisal of BRICS as a revisionist threat to international order, lacking strategy and 
cohesion. BRICS’ consolidation into a significant geopolitical entity has already contributed 
to a shift in the world system (Naik, 2016). Mudunuru (2013) discusses BRICS’ historical 
foundation, its development and implication on global governance, suggesting the 
unipolar world ended with BRICS’ emergence.  
The diffusion of power has however not been resolved. Though Schweller (2011) 
does not address BRICS as such, his discussion on the role of emerging states in the 
transition towards multipolar world order is instructive. Rewizorski’s (2015) perception of 
a budding Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty (G20), BRICS triad, driven non-
institutionally by trans-governmental summit diplomacy accords post unipolar thinking of 
global governance. Herein the G7’s power projection is mirrored by BRICS, with the G20 
playing an overlapping, middle ground; each pole performing an interdependent, yet 
external role from the other; intimating the performance and relationship of an ascending 
                                                          
4
 Soft balancing relates to “actions that do not directly challenge…but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, 
frustrate, and undermine” unilateral policies by “using international institutions, economic statecraft, and 




intergovernmental global order. BRICS is presented as a pole and catalyst to post-Western 
international order; increasingly having a potent impact on global governance evolution, 
not revolution.  
Baracuhy (2012) asserts that the geopolitical transition from a unipolar to a 
multipolar order is assured. Of import is whether “established powers” will “accept the 
institutionalized reform” (Baracuhy, 2012: 13). The “real issue arising from this shift in the 
global balance of power”, says the author, “concerns the relationship between power and 
international order” (Baracuhy, 2012: 1). This relationship is definitively steered by the 
different parties; in order to comprehend the evolution of power, the strategies of 
different parties must be understood. BRICS’ shared political objective is to transcend 
allied behaviour and liberal idealism, returning real power to the sovereign state (Laïdi, 
2012). Such interests and relationships between emerging powers show strategies and 
intent of shaping international order (Hurrell, 2006). BRICS activities question the 
legitimacy5 of international institutions and decision making, demanding a re-evaluation of 
the relationships between state actors in constructing norms. BRICS doesn’t present 
revolutionary aspirations; it pursues being a compelling force in the reconfiguration of 
global order (Noesselt, 2016).  
BRICS’ presentations help comprehend the direction the world is heading (Armijo 
and Roberts, 2014). It has great potential, but in order to understand change, Chardell 
(2015) stresses the need to first thoroughly delineate and discern the bloc, per se.  
The articulation that BRICS forms a bloc is widely spread (Lo and Hiscock, eds., 
2014; Hulbert and Brütsch, 2012; Gallarotti, 2018; Kingah and Quiliconi, eds., 2016; 
Stuenkel, 2015). This has led to the perception that for BRICS to be successful it must act 
as a bloc, “overcome their differences” and “minimize economic and political differences 
within the group, leading to a real sense of co-operation and co-ordination”; it needs to 
institutionalise (Singh and Dube, 2013). These articulations are often expanded, conceiving 
of BRICS as an alliance; seeking to replace the established Western apex alliance. Yet, this 
is in contradiction to its own proclaimed state realism. Instead, says Tudoroiu (2012) BRICS 
                                                          
5
 Legitimacy is the property or virtue of being recognised and appraised as genuine or authoritative.  
9 
 
can be best discerned in comparison to the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). This conceptualisation advances BRICS as an international regime, a 
platform where members cooperate to increase influence of self and group but do not 
ally. In this view, their limited coherence is of little regard, as their shared international 
interest plays a substantiating role to their cooperation.  
Studies that examine BRICS’ behaviour and actions inform centrally on how these 
interests are advanced. Through an investigation of Russian and Chinese television 
coverage, Grincheva and Lu (2016) offer an insightful look at BRICS summit diplomacy. 
This analysis demonstrates the media’s framing of summits, but does not discuss the 
summits as primary sources of state-centric summit diplomacy. 
Rather than mediated accounts, BRICS’ Statements reveal the group’s collective 
motion to instructively stabilise, not upset, the international order, ensuring effective 
execution (Chatin and Gallarotti, eds., 2018). Its Statements emphasise the United 
Nations’ (UN) role in international relations and world order based on established 
international law (Bohler-Muller, 2014). BRICS’ brand emerges from the selected themes 
of its summit Declarations (De Kock, 2015). 
Kirton and Larionova (eds., 2018) focus on political transitions, as well as great 
power politics. They offer a historical understanding of BRICS development, detailing the 
mechanisms of BRICS’ cooperation, based on countries’ interests and priorities. The book 
builds on Larionova and Shelepov (2015), as well as Kirton’s (2015) quantitative 
presentation of BRICS countries’ positive compliance to summit commitments, informing 
upon state dynamics and priorities. The authors argue that global governance is 
increasingly decided by the range of agents involved. These relations are playing out at a 
growing number of intergovernmental institutions; BRICS develops a multilateral summit 
institution within the established international system. Larionova (2018) assesses the slow 
pace of reform at existing institutions, suggesting that the diffusion of global governance 
institutions would breathe new life into global strategic power shifts6. Through 
                                                          
6
 The text offers a potentially useful outline of BRICS’ role in global governance. However, the full text is 
inaccessible as it is only available in Russian. 
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quantitative as well as qualitative analyses Shelepov (2015) finds that instead of impairing, 
BRICS favourably operates together with established institutions. Its own 
institutionalisation has not resulted in its Statements producing fewer references to 
established institutions. Instead of working against anyone, the study proves that BRICS 
seeks broader collaboration. 
Pashentsev (2015) remarks that national strategic communications produce 
signification of blocs and transgovernmental associations. The author suggests that 
summit Statements and high profile meetings construct persuasive institutional 
narratives. Wu and Alden (2014) view BRICS’ persuasion through a public diplomacy lens. 
The authors provide insightful comment on BRICS attraction, suggesting that it focuses on 
public perception and intergroup trust, transcending state centrality and the limited soft 
power concept. Soft power is shown to be greatly misappropriated. Critically, it is a 
concept “to forge a new US narrative of international affairs to give meaning to the post-
Cold War era and help foreign policy makers navigate their way through this new order” 
(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle, 2013: 3). Nye’s concept has itself become an 
appliance of soft power: it invariably advances American foreign policy. It should not be 
misappropriated nor simply applied at random, where persuasion is involved. This is 
especially true for BRICS, which fundamentally pursues extra-Western influence; the 
development of its own applicable abstraction would assist in its interpretation.  
Bohler-Muller (2014) suggests the use of multilateral diplomacy, in lieu of soft 
power. This is instructive. As is Van Noort’s (2017) use of Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and 
Roselle’s (2013) strategic narratives: representations of meaning, tools to achieve political 
influence. She writes that “in the battle of narratives to give meaning to the international 
system in the twenty-first century, emerging powers are actively engaged” (Van Noort, 
2017: 121). This study examines BRICS summit Declarations to provide keen insight into 
the contest of narratives; how BRICS attempts to reshape the international order. Van 
Noort suggests that due to its “partial compliance with the narrative grammatical rules, 
the BRICS group may not effectively influence and gain public support” (Van Noort, 2017: 
121). Her study of BRICS employs a rigorous theoretical codification. The application of 
strategic narratives is instructive, but meaning is confined by method, little emerges 
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organically from the texts assessed. While strategic narratives provide a useful alternative 
design to soft power, its confined theoretical application remains confounded by the 
construct itself. 
Peitz’ (2015) simplistic dichotomy: “The BRICS: Rhetoric or Reality?” affirms that 
BRICS “should be taken serious” as “a meaningful group”, through policy cohesion and a 
soft balancing strategy (Peitz, 2015). While the author approves BRICS’ potential impact 
on global order, her separation between ‘rhetoric’ and ‘reality’ produces a false 
dichotomy. Similarly, Brütsch and Papa (2013), discern that for BRICS to be persuasive it 
must form a traditional alliance. The authors decry BRICS’ “rhetoric of coalitional 
behaviour”, saying that without manifest material alliance “BRICS’ geopolitical play will be 
defeated by their own tactical ploys” (Brütsch and Papa, 2013: 299). Interestingly, Kahn’s 
(2018) investigation of BRICS’ science, technology and innovation cooperation finds that 
member states collaborate more with Western partners than among each other. His 
findings illuminate that instead of material cooperation BRICS’ inter-group strategy is 
more about the rhetoric of cooperation.  
Kahn’s is a useful insight, as it emerges from the literature that instead of receiving 
the appropriate appraisal, BRICS’ rhetoric is mostly neglected or rejected. To distinguish its 
approach and strategy it is clear that its rhetoric requires closer examination. These 
practical assessments transcend theoretical application. Schweller and Pu (2011) discuss 
rhetoric centrally in their study of changing world order. The authors examine China 
(rather than BRICS) and its resistance discourse, or delegitimating7 rhetoric. They suggest 
that the shift from unipolarity is a complex procedure and that rhetoric is central in 
achieving reform while maintaining stability. Balancing global power structures can quickly 
be seen as revisionism or revolution. “Hence, concentrated power within the unipole is 
not the only obstacle that states seeking a balance must overcome; they must overcome 
the revisionist label attached to any state seeking to restore global equilibrium” (Schweller 
and Pu, 2011: 44). These conditions potentially make BRICS’ rhetoric all the more 
sophisticated. 
                                                          
7
 In this dissertation the words legitimating/delegitimating and legitimation/delegitimation are preferred to 
its synonyms legitimising/delegitimising and legitimisation/delegitimisation, respectively. 
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Naik’s (2016) study is one of the few that points to communication being key to 
BRICS’ strategy. Its “efforts to raise its status and create a multipolar world” says the 
author, indicate that “member countries have raised an alternative common voice at the 
Global fora. The members’ zest in organizing a common platform for addressing several 
common issues proves the possibility of a world order that is not dictated by single player” 
(Naik, 2016). Duggan (2015) uses constructivist role theory to locate BRICS as an effective 
force towards a new global governance agenda, resolving that BRICS have joined to form a 
new narrative. Gallarotti’s (2018) assessment is that this narrative is broad and elusive. 
“The language tends to be general in its prescriptions and resolutions” (Gallarotti, in 
Chatin and Gallarotti, eds., 2018: 149).  
Among the various examinations of BRICS, few explore its strategic persuasions. 
Few discuss BRICS’ rhetoric, thereby providing a rationale and basis for this dissertation. 
De Souza Almeida provides a fitting point of departure for this study. The author 
concludes:  
“BRICS’s political policy is to soft balance the US, or in other words, to 
conduct a systematic strategy of external balance…Political rhetoric has 
been an important instrument to unite the BRICS. In the short run, the BRICS 
aim at soft balancing US power…through some sort of new smart power 
politics that has not been well understood and investigated by most scholars 
world wide. If the alliance is successful soft balancing the US, the BRICS will 
gain an unprecedented political power” (De Souza Almeida, 2015: 10). 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The state of the art conveys the clear need for scholarly signification of BRICS strategies, 
per se. BRICS has been conceptualised and discussed broadly. Yet, its raison d’être, its 
strategic actuality, rendered through its communications, remain largely unexplored. 
Examination of the constituent states is limiting; the forest cannot be seen for the trees. 
Discerning BRICS requires a systematic and comprehensive exploration of its essence; its 
claims, acumen and purpose. Its rationale materialises through its own transmissions; its 




This dissertation contributes to filling the analytical gap concerning BRICS’ strategic 
communications. It explores BRICS’ persuasive strategies and strategic persuasions. BRICS 
is a networked intergovernmental regime. Through it member states pursue interests of 
increased power through actualising reform while ensuring stability in the international 
order.  
BRICS engenders the reform it seeks by embodying the normative international 
order through its rhetorical performances. These public diplomacy performances inspire 
confidence and influence. BRICS displays the standards and values of the international 
system, in order to occupy the territory of international governance, the strategic 
environment. To mould and then achieve its ends BRICS articulates the status quo through 
its own claims, disturbing the hegemonic inertia and launching its own narrative 
interpretation into the global consciousness. BRICS does not present the manifestation of 
a new world order or leadership under a new Consensus. Instead, through expressing its 
desires it performs the concepts and maxims of the established order. In doing so it 
reshapes and reforms it according to the interests of its member states.  
BRICS’ initiatives move the global order towards greater power diffusion, resulting 
in a system where its members occupy greater, more equitable, international authority. It 
does not propose new international norms, nor does it greatly construct the institutions 
through which to do so. None of its instruments or formations directly challenges 
established institutions. Instead, as an agent of global power its actions complement 
existing infrastructure and contribute to evolutionary reform. It proposes that the 
embodied networked order between its members represent a version of equitable, 
multilateral order. Its congenial interactions, agreements and formulations display a 
pluralist international arrangement based on mutual benefit. The member states present 
their interaction in BRICS as a fair model for international exchange, suggesting this to be 
an alternative to the current system; BRICS forms an avenue between the current and 
succeeding international reality.  
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BRICS’ decentralised position affords member states a supplementary terrain to 
advance its shared interests and execute its independent wills, external to the obligation 
of the state. Member states assume no external authority. BRICS strategically advances its 
aims of global reform by rhetorically embodying the order it aspires; it uses rhetoric as a 
technology of power. Its strategic communication both motivates as well as actualises its 
desired reform. 
Central to BRICS and this dissertation is how perception is steered and shaped. 
BRICS seeks recognition for its member states as powerful and legitimate. To do so it 
introduces and advances a systematic reset. It re-embodies the UN-led international order 
that emerged after the Second World War; a space where no singular state occupies 
global hegemonic power. BRICS opposes the current order, indirectly challenging the 
unipolar, core-periphery modality; where a few states linked to the United States of 
America (US) dominate the international realm.  
BRICS instead presents an alternative, extra-Western global narrative, seated in 
established norms and principles. From within the legitimate international domain, it 
produces an independent scenario. It advances a cordial modality of 
intergovernmentalism, based on cooperation and exchange between sovereign states. Its 
emphasis on sovereignty manifests it outside of external influence and returns agency 
(away from international institutions) to the states as authoritative and legitimate power 
centres. Its’ diffused, apportioned system of governance is an execution of a networked 
intergovernmental order, an evolution of strategic realism, and a modern balance of 
powers where states pursue regions of influence. It remains in BRICS’ central interest that 
the stable, networked order through which its member states have developed remains. 
This is the fundamental foundation for its strategy. 
SIGNIFICANCE 
The value of studying BRICS as a modern formation is to allow for a new understanding of 
the formations that shape the present and future global condition. As a product of the 
current global order BRICS offers a mirror reflection to global matters that are often 
difficult to see through conventional theoretical lenses or those that keep singular, 
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disaggregated states as their focus. This study is aimed towards adding conceptual clarity 
of BRICS as a significant and possibly decisive component of contemporary global 
relations. To date there is no critical assessment of how BRICS constructs and 
communicates its means and ways towards its strategic goals. This topical study allows 
conceptualisation of an increasingly important global forum. By exploring and evaluating 
BRICS’ strategic communications, this dissertation significantly contributes to explaining 
what BRICS actually is; discernment of its reach for political influence and its attempt to 
produce global reform. It offers an original, analytical exploration.  
Instead of espousing or bestowing annotative theoretical underpinnings, the 
research assesses BRICS documentation in order to inform its impact on the nexus of 
evolving geopolitical, structural, legal, organisational, ideological and hemispherical power 
relations. BRICS is used by its member states as a supplementary mechanism while 
actively sustaining their obligations within established institutions. It functions in the 
geostrategic domain of governance, where control of perception and persuasion are 
paramount. Accordingly, BRICS’ strategies illuminate how it wishes to be perceived and 
what role it plays in transforming the present; shaping and actualising that which is to 
come. While various studies view changes in relations, few focus on emerging states’ 
collective strategic attempts to bring about a reformed order. 
Member states, through BRICS, significantly conceive the global South not in lieu of 
the North, but in and of itself; transcending its perceived inequitable positions by claiming 
independence and power. BRICS’ documentation offers its own voice, an approach that 
transcends Western conventions and lenses. BRICS significantly shapes itself external to 
Western involvement, producing a paradigm of post-unipolar materiality. This dissertation 
contributes to an extra-Western and by implication de-Westernising academic lens. It 
adds to the navigation of global power relations in an era of increasing geopolitical flux. 
The maturation or development of BRICS will take the international order into uncharted 
territories. BRICS not only plays a substantiating role in shifting the power arrangement 
but through it this shift can be understood: it provides a paradigm through which to 
perceive of the nature of global power in the 21st century. BRICS may not be an end in this 
regard, but the ways through which the ensuing arrangement comes about. Discerning 
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BRICS contributes to the emerging geopolitical realism. It informs the evolution of great 
power politics, the challenges faced by both established and emerging powers, the control 
of international organisations and the utility of institutions.  
Finally, though BRICS membership is only a constituent of members’ larger foreign 
policies, it does offer compelling complementary insight of their strategies, significantly 
the ostensible assumption and projection of Chinese power. China’s unfamiliar embrace of 
global responsibility, its increasing championing of the universal, networked approach 
under President Xi vis-à-vis the inward national design of US president Trump, lays bare an 
unfolding modern strategic reality. 
LIMITATIONS 
This study is strictly limited to, as well as by, BRICS’ documented communications. The 
restriction to primary source analysis is done to allow an authoritative and definitive 
description. This is also due to there being no foundational examination of its rhetorical 
formulations to work from. Focus on primary, track one (official government diplomacy) 
documents provide for analysis of authoritative communication. It results in other aspects, 
such as function and organisation only being examined when it features textually. 
Furthermore, track two formations such as the BRICS Business Council, Academic Forum 
and Civil Forum have been averted, yet these could produce valuable insight to separate 
rhetorical studies.  
The discussion of BRICS persuasion entails a positive determination to descriptively 
interpret results. This may ensue in an overconcentration on qualifying reasoning and a 
lack of counterposing critique. BRICS’ strategy is determined as such, there is no official 
external measure or comparison to it. The dissertation does not adopt measurable 
methodologies to establish internal performance and success. The primacy of BRICS 
ensures that inconsistencies and tensions among member states are not assessed. The 




The focus on publically propagated documents serves an explicit assessment. It 
evaluates the components used to materialise its strategy in the mind of global publics. 
Though this circumscribed view is substantial, a broader analysis of the fora that produce 
the outcome documents would prove valuable. Furthermore, a reciprocating study that 
examines how BRICS is perceived would inform upon strategic practice and effect.  
Though all official public communications are released in English, policymakers and 
scholars from BRICS and other states produce research that could be of value to this 
study. However, due to their use of languages unfamiliar to this author they are 
inaccessible here. 
Though the selected methodology assists in the establishment of criteria for 
evaluation, the dissertation does not produce models that can be repeated or generalised, 
nor do these methods produce completely unbiased statistically verifiable results. The sole 
qualitative approach results in no direct quantification of the findings; the study is 
confined to the researcher’s reading and application of critical tools. While it is 
inappropriate for this particular study, a mixed methods and even a quantitative approach 
could contribute to further analyses.   
ANALYTICAL CONTENT 
The state of the art indicates that BRICS proper has broadly been studied as a reaction to 
the current state of global affairs. Logos and motif, which have thus far greatly been 
neglected, are central in this research. BRICS’ documents produce significant indicators 
and afford a valuable lens through which it, within the contemporary international 
situation, can be understood. Critically, global power contentions are increasingly engaged 
through persuasion and influence, rather than kinetic forms of warfare. BRICS 
communication forms the foundation of what it wants for itself and the world; it 
generates organisational strategy. The texts exemplify the norms, laws, principles, 
behaviours, structures and intentions that BRICS promotes, advancing other international 
bodies to accordingly adopt. Through these, it presents and executes international 
leadership. The texts function as rhetorical transfer, projecting praise and blame, shaping 
attitudes and evoking a response.  
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The scope of the dissertation emerges from relevant meetings and subsequent 
documentation. The first official meetings to produce publically available records took 
place in 2008, the most recent to be included in this study come from 2017. English is the 
organisational language of BRICS meetings. It is therefore that official BRICS 
documentation is composed and released in English, providing for an expanded global 
audience.  
This study examines the primary documentation to emerge from track one 
discussions among high-level national leaders; examining how it projects and composes 
itself at the highest level of diplomacy. These documents are all publically available and 
widely distributed. This study sourced the majority of relevant materials directly from the 
website of the BRICS Information Centre at the University of Toronto8. The corpus of 
BRIC/BRICS documentation is parted into three conceptual categories: 1) programmatic; 
2) organic; 3) opportunistic. 
Programmatic documents (Memoranda of Understanding, agreements, treaties 
and Action Plans) establish a step by step course of action. These are systematic, 
foundational formations; they establish and therefore advocate a definitive, structured 
process to be followed. These documents claim common ground, presenting a tangible 
formation that composes BRICS’ as a legitimate arrangement. This is a display of 
leadership, influencing and exemplifying exchange among international bodies. These are 
ways to demonstrate favourable relationships. Programmes are canvasses for strategic 
means. These are the norms and principles that BRICS espouses. Hereby it projects itself 
as norm and principle-oriented, prompting others to follow its lead. Programmatic 
documents develop meaning and reflect order, setting out a specific undertaking and 
timeframe. These are appeals to logic and reason, establishing standards. 
Organic documents (summit Declarations) signify the functioning of BRICS. These 
documents legitimate BRICS’ value and significance, rejecting opposing international 
forces. Here BRICS establishes and shapes itself, reflecting its properties and thought; 
pursuing its strategies. These form part of BRICS’ permanent organisation and are 
                                                          
8
 Available at www.brics.utoronto.ca 
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instrumental in achieving its ends. These are often appeals to values and character, using 
summit diplomacy to signify BRICS’ embodiment of preferred international order.   
Opportunistic documents (Finance Ministry Joint Communiqués, Statements from 
Foreign Ministers meetings on the sidelines of the UNGA and Statements from informal 
meetings of BRICS leaders ahead of G20 Summits) are structured to seek and seize 
benefit. These texts exploit the fact that all member states are participants of these 
multilateral gatherings. As unit BRICS opportunistically responds to the event, shaping and 
framing it through releasing joint responses. Through mutual recognition of legitimate, 
legal proceedings and concepts BRICS pursues influence, attains recognition and channels 
perceptions. These texts construct a voice in a sphere of influence outside its own; 
maximising interest while bearing no responsibility. They capitalise on the international 
makeup with appeals to emotion and obligation, boosting its own credibility. 
METHODOLOGY 
Methodology regards how knowledge is gained. It encompasses the techniques used to 
ensure the research goal is attained (Mouton, 1996). This dissertation offers a critical 
rhetorical analysis. Rhetorical analyses are inductive and innovative; crossing disciplines 
yet are always located in context (space and time). It is therefore of practical insight and 
relevance. Rhetorical criticism goes further than modern articulations such as discourse 
analysis; it directly looks at the agent and its power, eclipsing pure discourse analysis, 
which assesses how language builds perspective. Rhetorical analyses assess the strategies 
behind stylistic and linguistic choice; they look at broader processes, seeing the world 
shaped by discourses and vice versa (Andrus, 2013: 1). As rhetorical analyses are 
pragmatic so too this dissertation applies concepts and tools from political 
communication, strategic studies, public diplomacy and international relations, among 
others, making it more robust. The dissertation assesses BRICS’ styles, appeals and 
constructions, but does not apply a set type of analysis. Instead, meaning and relevance 
are discovered, emerging from the text. The texts are assessed through context and 
timing, but also borrows from disciplines such as law, political science and international 
studies. The dissertation applies realist concepts throughout. It does so in response to the 
texts. The study is not simply situated in the realist school of thought. Instead, it 
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recognises an evolving, interconnected web of actors. A system where not only the nodes 
(state and non-state actors), but the networks and linkages are increasingly 
interconnected and empowered. 
The art of rhetoric assesses how communication is used to further and achieve an 
aim. The investigation commences with philosophical observations that regard the nature 
of persuasion in specific situations. Such contextual interpretations indicate the transfer of 
concepts and constructs across space and time. A rhetorical assessment is suitable to 
explore BRICS, itself a rhetorical unit. Rhetoric is strategic: it defends an answer. In order 
to discern BRICS, it is imperative to examine its persuasive strategies; strategy is regarded 
in terms of means, ways and ends. To do this the research looks at the different ways in 
which rhetorical persuasion is used, how language makes ideas operational (means) and 
what organisational purposes it serves (ends). Rhetorical analysis is applicable here as it 
facilitates the exploration of BRICS’ strategy. The direct investigation of primary literature 
identifies and describes its characteristics, contributing to comprehensive and original 
research.  
The dissertation commences with an introduction and orientation of international 
strategy. It outlines the modern strategic environment and briefly discusses China and 
Russia accordingly. This chapter then presents an overview of how BRICS came about, its 
foundations, history and formation. Leading into the broader analysis BRICS is expanded 
as rhetorical and strategic formation; both these concepts are discussed here.  
This orientation is followed by three substantial analytical chapters, assessing the 
three conceptual categories of the documentary corpus. All three analytical chapters 
introduce and adapt their own methodologies to focus on BRICS’ approach. 
The first chapter, on programmatic documentation, assesses BRICS schematic 
formation. Programmes are assessed as building illustrative scenarios, establishing 
positions, orientations and aspirations. The construction of scenarios is closely associated 
with that of organisational narratives. The study uses narrative to locate BRICS in the 
competition for global influence. The grounding in international law, its norms and 
concepts are assessed due to its demonstrable value in BRICS’ foundations. In order to 
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assess how these scenarios and narratives are built BRICS agreements are critically 
analysed for stylistic operation. BRICS’ legitimating and delegitimating tactics towards 
reform, such as disruption, cooperation, leadership, its latent multi-institutional approach 
and multipolarity are appraised as programming its vision and purpose.  
Organic documentation is systematically assessed for their constructive aspects. 
International relations theories such as regime theory and network theory are applied, as 
are other realist aspects to appraise its summit diplomacy; national interests, legitimacy 
and sovereignty are central to understand BRICS. Theory on leadership and international 
law expound BRICS’ approaches to hegemony, independence and reform. Furthermore, 
global governance, intergovernmental network theory and soft balancing further help 
discern BRICS as a geostrategic forum. 
The final analysis, of opportunistic documents, thoroughly employs rhetorical 
concepts. Here BRICS reacts, seeking benefit. The chapter looks at the tools used to secure 
influence. Recognition indicates BRICS’ desire to belong, establishing influence as insiders 
and in turn seeking identification. Recognition is closely related to political 
territorialisation, the process of displacing power and order. Timing (kairos) and exigency 
contribute to assessing BRICS’ Statements as rhetorical situations. Opportunistic 
documents are seen as displays, for this reason mimesis and the epideictic are considered 











AN ORIENTATION OF STRATEGY AND BRICS  
“At its essence, strategy is an intellectual construct linking where you are today with 
where you want to be tomorrow in a substantive, concrete manner”.  
           Gordon Sullivan and Michael Harper (Sullivan and Harper, 1996: 99) 
INTRODUCTION 
BRICS is a rhetorical and strategic formation. This chapter proposes an orientation of how 
the strategic nexus underlying BRICS’ communication is analysed. It also explains and 
details how central concepts are understood and applied in the dissertation. The chapter 
is presented as two, interlinked parts. The first section composes a perception of strategy, 
detailing how strategy is employed here. It defines and discerns the relevant concepts and 
contexts. It does so by sketching the prevailing international strategic realm9, via a 
constituting exposé of two leading BRICS states: China and Russia. The second part offers 
an overview of BRICS’ historical origins. It discusses the strategic circumstances and 
proceedings which led to its formation. While its form is new, its goals are not. 
Background and structure of the realm into which BRICS is incorporated then provide the 
context for the subsequent analyses.    
STRATEGY 
i) DISCERNING STRATEGY 
Strategy regards how (ways) power is applied (means or resources) to achieve desired 
objectives (ends) (Yarger, 2006a). Values and norms underpin these ways, means and 
ends. Strategy requires conscious consideration and judgment, it is the realm of 
                                                          
9
 According to Salazar (2017) realm “refers to the political meaning of ‘rule’: A ‘ruler’ traces the perimeter 
within which the ‘realm’ coheres and thus provides ‘direction’ to its citizens so that they interact ‘rightfully’ 
under the ‘rule of law’” (Salazar, 2017).  
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leadership; warfare is its ancient home. While the agent is often located in a broader 
domain, strategy is not mere management or reaction, but the proactive application of 
power to steer towards the control and then the maintenance of the strategic 
environment. This environment is the domain in which states and other leaderships 
interact, where interests are advanced; “strategy is subordinate to the nature of the 
strategic environment” (Yarger, 2006b: 7). It is the composite context “that influence the 
success of the state in relation to the physical world, other states and actors, chance, and 
the possible futures…To be successful, the strategist must comprehend the nature of the 
strategic environment and construct strategy that is consistent with it, neither denying its 
nature nor capitulating to other actors or to chance” (Yarger, 2006b: 17).  
 The strategic environment is closely related to the strategic territory or simply 
territory. The environment is the space but also the conditions, components and 
circumstances which shape the space. The environment is broader than the territory. To 
shape the environment one must first occupy territory; a place to motion from. A territory 
is a space occupied by an authority, a space under control becomes a territory. Territories 
are spaces where agents execute their rule. In this dissertation, the agents are the 
sovereign nation-states. A strategy is, therefore, a plan of action, directing persuasion or 
coercion, to occupy territory and to achieve interests. While interests may be permanent, 
the space and environment in which interests are pursued changes. Effective strategy 
evolves and adapts in order to occupy the territory.  
Arguably the first recorded contemplations on what today is called strategy were 
that of the ancient Chinese military scholar Sun Tzu. His musings on strategy have inspired 
the thought which later became known as the Taoism; the ideal life is lived in harmony 
with the Tao, or the appropriate way. The Tao (the harmonious, dynamic path) is 
discovered through the reflection of all circumstances and possibilities. The means, ways 
and ends interact holistically, with the natural condition of each not being stable, but in 
constant flux. The superior path flows in and towards balance; the natural order of things. 
It is pursued by the systematic application of whatever ensures this preferable outcome. 
Sun Tzu described the ideal strategist as one enlightened accordingly; one who is able to 
act through inaction, distilling complexity, returning to harmony. Through poetic 
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suggestion, Sun Tzu evokes meaning without clear instruction (Horwath, 2006). His 
meditations sketch scenarios which indicate the superiority of minimum force and 
psychological persuasion. The supreme art of war, he said, was to subdue the enemy 
without coercion; the war should already be won before the physical battle is invoked. To 
him victory does not arise from fighting for the establishment of a fixed outcome. Such a 
stable form cannot be constructed as change is constant. Superior strategy guides the 
preferable flow of events. 
As Sun Tzu did in ancient China, the military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz did in 
19th century Prussia. He illuminated strategy as the psychological and political aspects of 
war. However, differing from Sun Tzu’s evocation of the path least active, of minimum 
force and persuasion, the fellow scholar-executive Von Clausewitz was a realist of the 
Hegelian dialectical approach. His synthesis was one of all-out-war; ends achieved by force 
and direct subjugation, vis-à-vis Sun Tzu’s indirect approach. Von Clausewitz’ thesis was 
that war is the act of force, compelling an enemy to one’s will. To this his antithesis and 
famed aphorism: “war is the continuation of politics by other means”, found that war is 
politics, configured (Horwath, 2006). To Von Clausewitz strategy is the direct use of the 
battle to win the war. He concluded that the key to success is to always present a 
campaign built on strength and surprise, the latter will expose the enemy, allowing the 
former to prevail through maximum force (Von Ghyczy, von Oetinger and Bassford, 2001). 
ii) THE MAKING OF THE MODERN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT  
The illustration of Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz respectively demonstrate the expression of 
persuasion (indirect action) and coercion (direct action). While not exclusive to the other 
these are the central ways in which resources are applied to achieve interests. One is not 
necessarily better than the other. More than anything choice depends on the strategic 
environment. The modern strategic environment has been shaped by technological 
advance. These developments, primarily the Mutually Assured Destruction10 of nuclear 
warfare, usurped the direct, kinetic approach. In the nuclear age, direct international 
                                                          
10
 Mutually Assured Destruction is the doctrine suggesting that two opposing nuclear-enabled powers would 
both be deterred from deploying their weapons. The use by one would be responded to in turn by the other, 
causing complete annihilation. 
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confrontations between major (nuclear) states have been obviated. Their and their 
affiliates’ strategies have since been greatly indirect. British military theoretician Basil 
Henry Liddell Hart (1967) transcended the Clausewitzian coercive battle for the physical 
terrain by proposing that superior strategy works not towards winning the battle, but 
“looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace” (Liddell Hart, 1967: 335). In the age of 
Mutually Assured Destruction, it is strategically imperative to be central, first in the 
production and then in the leadership of the strategic environment; determining the 
values and norms that underpin and guide the realm. Simply put: deciding on and then 
shaping a ‘truth’. In the period following the World Wars, the UN in affiliation with 
international organisations has been legitimated by member states to shape and steer the 
strategic environment. This realm is collectively mandated as the global authority for 
multilateral peace and harmony. 
While the UN has pursued order through its security and diplomacy mechanisms, 
international powers have continued their own pursuit for influence. The singular 
authority of the UN has ensured that the indirect approach to steering the international 
strategic environment has become central to aspiring superpowers; the competition 
between powers ensuing in a struggle for the leadership of international norms and 
principles, as well as multilateral international organisations. The last great power 
antagonism, known as the Cold War for the very reason that its leading protagonists did 
not directly confront each other, was a confrontation for appropriating the terrain and 
steering the strategic environment. 
The end of the bifurcated world of two competing blocs has effectively ensured 
the singular leadership of the global strategic environment under US hegemonic 
unilateralism. Its truth, its national values and principles, what it regards as legitimate, has 
become the international standard, the universal truth. On account of there being no 
direct independent contender, the global strategic environment has been 
comprehensively dominated from one side; the majority of states have been inculcated 
into Western Liberal Capitalism. Under US leadership the norms and principles of the 
international order have increasingly become understood as those internal to the US. 
These ideal types have been spread, imposed and naturalised globally in an effort to 
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legitimate Western norms as international norms, a grand strategy of capturing the global 
strategic environment.  
A true strategy is only there where true independence is expressed; commanding 
territory and challenging for apportioned control of the strategic environment. Under a 
hegemonic global power, states must claim and act upon its independence; true 
independence is seized by occupying sovereign territory and determining sovereign truth. 
In order to do so, states must employ strategy towards its interests. This, however, does 
not hold for the hegemon. When there is a separate competition for the strategic 
environment the hegemon does not employ strategy but instead uses tactics to defend 
and manage the situation, the environment. As long as no opponent expressly claims 
international territory through independent power, there is no true strategy.  
Subsequent to the Cold War there has been no clear great power struggle for 
global leadership. While Soviet belligerence has folded, nuclear weapons in Russia and 
around the world remain potent. Realism and realpolitik may have sunk into a slumber, 
but history did not end, as prophesied by Francis Fukuyama (1992). Member states 
employ BRICS to shape the modern strategic reality; it is an attempt by the individual 
states to claim their independence and terrain. These motions indirectly challenge global 
leadership and dominance over the global strategic environment. In order to assess BRICS’ 
strategy to disrupt US hegemony and claim power11, it is first imperative to perceive the 
agent that steers the global realm. 
In effect the present US strategy and tactics approach, of leading the global 
strategic environment at all costs, have at least been pursued since the end of the Second 
World War. The tactical imperative of containing Soviet Marxism, and Communism in 
general, as articulated in the 1947 X Article12, was exclaimed by Defence Secretary Robert 
                                                          
11
 See page 45 for details. 
12
 The Sources of Soviet Conduct, better known as the X Article, appeared in the July 1947 edition of Foreign 
Affairs. Written by George Kennan the article proposed that the Soviet and Communist world does not 
consider it possible to peacefully coexist with the Capitalist world and must, therefore, be effectively 
opposed and contained (Kennan, 1947).  
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McNamara, not as strategy but as crisis management (Dobbs, 2008). Instead, US strategy 
has consistently been to project leadership.  
Global leadership has been its exceptionalist13 mission; global leadership in the 
post-War era has been its existential sine qua non. It has built authoritative international 
influence by projecting compelling values and virtues. It has led by the principles of 
individual justice and material prosperity, advancing Western liberalism as superior to 
alternative modalities, such as Communist collectivism. It has steered the global ship, 
while quelling any attempt against its dominance, containing or curtailing the interests 
and independence of others. When others did not follow its leadership it has tactically 
moved to impede upon the construction and exercise of their ideological and conceptual 
formations; preventing nations their actionable independence, forestalling ability to 
choose. The American scholar Noam Chomsky (2012) suggests this reveals itself when 
Western discourse refers to Chinese independence in 1949, as the “loss of China” 
(Chomsky, 2012). Consequentially, American campaigns in Indochina were waged to 
tactically control the region. This was done out of concern for the ‘domino effect’ or as 
Henry Kissinger advanced “a region that falls out of control can become a ‘virus’ that will 
‘spread contagion’” (Kissinger in Chomsky, 2012). Tactical assaults such as the one on 
Indochina was to prevent the ‘virus’ of independence from ultimately spreading to the 
‘super-domino’: Japan. Were it to become truly autonomous, US influence over Japan 
would be obviated. Such an order could not be tolerated. To the US it was “clear: destroy 
the virus and ‘inoculate’ those who might be infected…destroy any hope of successful 
independent development” (Chomsky, 2012).   
While the US maintains its tactical dominance, the global condition has changed 
since the end of the Cold War, towards a deeply integrated, networked order. It is within 
this incorporated new system that BRICS states have united to form an indirect pursuit of 
‘successful independent development’, beyond the reaches of US tactical power. Within 
the integrated global order direct belligerence has largely given way to achieving interests 
through internal persuasion. 
                                                          
13
 Exceptionalism refers to the perception of a society or country as unique or extraordinary; that it occupies 
an exceptional position among others. 
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To stave off attempts for control of the contemporary strategic environment the 
subsequent 2006 Y Article has advanced the development of a National Strategic 
Narrative. It illustrates the importance of indirect, persuasive tactics and forms a way to 
ensure the preservation of its international leadership. In the preface to a later publication 
of the Narrative the American international law scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter (2011) 
states that it is imperative that the US remains “the strongest competitor and most 
influential player in a deeply inter-connected global system, which requires that we invest 
less in defense and more in sustainable prosperity and the tools of effective global 
engagement” (Slaughter in Mr Y, 2011). Slaughter’s prompt to ensure the victory of the 
‘global engagement’ suggests that it is there that the US will face its toughest challenge.  
In the indelibly networked world competition will increasingly be about who 
directs the comprehensive engagement, the battle for persuasion; who will lead the 
discursive realm, the global narrative. The development of the Narrative recognises this 
change in the strategic environment: “from control in a closed system to credible 
influence in an open system”; “from containment to sustainment”; “from deterrence and 
defense to civilian engagement and competition”; “from zero sum to positive sum global 
politics/economics” (Mr Y, 2011: 3). In light of the US tactical management (vis-à-vis 
strategy), these measures present its conceived focal area to constrain and prevail against 
aspirant opponents.   
The US defence doctrine through its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) illustrates 
the tactics needed to maintain its supremacy. Corresponding to the “shift of emphasis to 
meet the new strategic environment”, the QDR motions “from major conventional combat 
operations – to multiple irregular, asymmetric operations”; “from an emphasis on ships, 
guns, tanks and planes – to focus on information, knowledge and timely, actionable 
intelligence” (United States of America, 2006: vii). This focus confirms that its tactical 
operations are directed at managing the international realm, ensuring that “no foreign 
power can dictate the terms of regional or global security”, nor can any state be allowed 
to influence the international order (United States of America, 2006: 30). Such campaigns 
by other states are referred to as Irregular Warfare (IW): “a violent struggle among state 
and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors 
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indirect and asymmetric approaches…in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence 
and will...people not platforms and advanced technology, will be the key to IW success” 
(United States of America, 2007: 1). While IW is described as the terrain of the belligerent, 
the US advances hybrid warfare, to “secure improved normalcy”, to dominate the 
“nuanced human terrain” of “the conventional battleground; the conflict zone’s 
indigenous population battleground; and the home front and international community 
battleground” (McCuen, 2008: 107). Hybrid warfare acknowledges the ascendency of 
persuasion in the modern strategic environment. It implies “conceptual dimensions…a 
wider struggle for control and support of the combat zone’s indigenous population, the 
support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the 
international community” (McCuen, 2008: 107).  
These battles for persuasion are campaigns to influence the global strategic 
environment. The 2017 National Security Strategy, the guiding document of the US 
Executive, proposes that “revisionist powers…China and Russia challenge American power, 
influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity” (Trump, 
2017: 2). In order for a state to execute influence beyond its borders it must, upon 
securing domestic security and stability, possess an independent foreign policy, shaped by 
internal and external strategic realities. China and Russia’s recognition in the National 
Security Strategy point to their possession of independent policies. In order to achieve 
national interests, their strategies have to proactively shape the international 
environment. To influence the global domain they must enact independence and 
international reform; the pursuit of the latter requires the achievement of the former. 
Both China and Russia predate the modern nation-state. Both employ political 
infrastructures in order to advance their civilisational, even exceptionalist, ambitions. 
These states are strategic adaptations, formations to satisfy the dominant international 
structure, employed to ensure their internal, sovereign integrity and to afford them 
legitimate international engagement.   
The following two sub-sections briefly examine Chinese and Russian strategy in 
light of independence and international reform. This exploration exhibits their cohering 
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international pursuits. It demonstrates that while member states are constitutionally 
different, participation in BRICS serve their individual and shared interests.   
iii) STRATEGIC INDEPENDENCE AND REFORM: CHINA 
China’s strategy is based on maintaining internal supremacy (true independence). Its 
modern bivalent power configuration of ruling Communist Party and State works to 
maintain its singular autonomy, legitimacy in and security from foreign intervention and 
determination. China’s Tianxia or all under heaven unitary system lasted for 2000 years 
without the institution of a state. Instead, the Chinese imperial court or the Party today, 
placed itself at the centre, everything beyond the centre existed in relation to it (Qin, 
2007: 9). This holism, refusing dichotomy, is a foundational and philosophical feature, 
without which China cannot be perceived. Within Tianxia everything exists towards 
consolidation. This total understanding holds that, given territorial domination and 
international recognition, nothing and no-one external needs to be directly conquered or 
be brought under dominion. Holism is already the natural order of things – with the 
Chinese court or Party, at the core. Its inward preponderance means that only in the 
modern era, after crumbling under dynastic collapse and external intervention, was it 
forced into adopting an outward orientation and foreign policy.  
According to official doctrine, it was only in 1949, through the founding of 
Communist China, that it was again independent of interventionist forces. Revolution 
definitively brought an end to the preceding era, restoring true sovereignty. The 
maintenance of singular independence is China’s authoritative and definitive strategy. It 
assays independence by pursuing neutrality and non-intervention in international affairs14; 
it also opposes the perception of the China Threat15 by promoting Peaceful 
                                                          
14
 China rarely vetoes and consistently abstains from UNSC (United Nations Security Council) voting, thereby 
not “interfering in the domestic affairs of countries or undermining their sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity” (Shichor, 2006).  
15
 The China Threat is a theory suggesting that China poses a threat to global order. It has centrally been 
employed by the Chinese as the target of its own Peaceful Development campaign. 
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Development16, among other tactics. Its assurance of national interests while progressively 
engaging the world is summed up in Deng Xiaoping’s realist 24 Character Strategy: 
“Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and 
bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership” (Deng, 
2013). The 24 Character Strategy emerged in 1990, in response to the global disintegration 
of Communist regimes and as pressure mounted on government at the Tiananmen Square 
protests17. It maintained the centrality of domestic command and gave China the space to 
develop itself, towards assuring self-reliance. 
Modern China’s international strategy has largely been indirect. Instead, it has 
focused domestically on accomplishing economic recovery and national rejuvenation. The 
recently popularised Chinese Dream is used as a deliberative slogan towards the 
restoration of its superior historical position of Zhongguo18, the central state (Kotzé, 
2017). The Chinese Dream grand narrative is explained by President Xi: “the goal of 
building China into a modern Socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, 
culturally advanced and harmonious can be achieved by 2049, when the PRC (People’s 
Republic of China) marks its centenary; and the dream of the rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation will then be realized” (Xi, 2014).  
Today China is undergoing a shift in foreign policy towards obtaining external 
influence, pursuing greater direction over the global strategic environment. Increased 
international engagement under President Xi is exemplified by his World Economic Forum 
(WEF) speech in 2017, in which he boldly committed China to the centre of global 
exchange (Xi, 2017). Xi’s replacement of the “period of strategic opportunities”19 for the 
                                                          
16
 To ensure its domestic security it has constructed an international narrative of Peaceful Development, 
assuring the world that its ambitions for growth will be harmonious and non-aggressive. 
17
 The Tiananmen crackdown refers to the Chinese government’s violent suppression of pro-democratic and 
other protests in and around Tiananmen Square in central Beijing, 1989. 
18




 Congress of the CPC in 2002 proposed that “the first two decades of the 21st century is a period 
of important strategic opportunity for development, which we must seize tightly and which offers bright 
prospects”. The 18
th
 Congress in 2012 held that “both the current international and domestic environments 
shows that China remains in an important period of strategic opportunities for its development, a period in 
which much can be achieved” (Wang, 2018).   
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“period of historic opportunities”20 further commits to stimulating and guiding global 
affairs. In order to do so, it requires the international architecture to reform, allotting it 
greater agency over global responsibilities. China’s pursuit for increased power accords to 
Sun Tzu’s maxim of achieving one’s goal through minimum direct force; moving with the 
circumstances.  
While its posture is relatively new, its charge for international reform, according 
equitably apportioned authority, thereby diffusing over-concentrated power and 
reflecting modern realities, has been steadfast. In the forty years since Deng Xiaoping 
came to power, reform has been China’s second revolution. In his direction giving 2017 
WEF speech Xi proposed that international exchange between states and organisations 
should follow the Chinese practice of continuous reform. China, he said, “has become the 
world’s second largest economy thanks to 38 years of reform and opening-up” (Xi, 2017). 
China’s call for international reform is strategic: it achieves influence from directly 
engaging other states through economic cooperation and mutually beneficial interaction, 
thereby presenting itself as an improvement upon the Western domination of the terms 
of trade.  
Beyond its bilateral exchanges with other states, China views an authoritative and 
reformed UN as cardinal in the governance of global relations. China’s message has been 
consistent: “a just and rational new international and economic order” that “conform to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter”, must give rise to and sustain 
“the development of the trend toward multipolarity”, contributing “to world peace, 
stability and prosperity” (Jiang, 1997). In his 2005 statement to the UNGA President Hu 
Jintao charged the UN to “actively and prudently” promote and “carry out rational and 
necessary reform to maintain the authority of the United Nations” (Hu, 2005). Xi has 
maintained this message by stating that: “We should advance multilateral diplomacy, 
                                                          
20
 In a January 15
th
 2018 article in the People’s Daily Xi transcends the “period of strategic opportunities” to 
instead refer to a “period of historic opportunities”, affording urgency and moving China into a more active 
position (Cui, 2018). The former maintained China’s strategic imperative to focus on internal development 
and growth, while the latter acknowledges the global change and advances active involvement in 
international relations, illustrated by Xi’s 2017 Declaration: “It is time for us to take centre stage in the world 
and to make a greater contribution to humankind” (Xi in Clover, 2017).  
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work to reform the international system and global governance, and increase the 
representation and say of China and other developing countries” (Xi, 2014). These 
substantial contributions, involving the ‘what’, motions towards the ‘how’ that President 
Hu advanced when he said: “We will actively participate in multilateral affairs, support the 
United Nations, the G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS and other 
multilateral organizations in playing an active role in international affairs, and work to 
make the international order and system more just and equitable” (Hu, 2012). While the 
UN holds the central position, there is space for further international organisations to play 
auxiliary roles in achieving reform.  
iv) STRATEGIC INDEPENDENCE AND REFORM: RUSSIA 
While China sees the world in terms of itself, Russia conceives of itself through the 
broader international reality. China’s perceived position at the centre of the world 
precedes international exchange. Russian independence is a product of its own toil, a 
result of its contribution to world history. Its international politics has functioned as 
balancing or constituting factor to global relations. 
 Modern Russia perceives itself as central to the creation and therefore to the 
leadership of the global political architecture. Russia’s greatest and most celebrated 
achievement remains its Victory Day, commemorating its World War Two victory. What it 
calls the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Russia sees itself through its relations with 
others, through the picture the world reflects back at it.  
Russia regards itself as truly sovereign when it can exert influence outwards. 
“Russia perceives itself not as a nation but as a cause, beyond geopolitics, impelled by 
faith, and held together by arms” (Kissinger, 1994: 143). “Paradox”, extols Kissinger, is 
“Russia’s most distinguishing feature. Constantly at war and expanding in every direction, 
it nevertheless considered itself permanently threatened…security had become 
synonymous with continuous expansion” (Kissinger, 1994: 141).  
Russia’s projection of great power is central to its perceived assurance of domestic 
stability; power and security come from and result in pushing outwards. This strategy of 
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projecting power tactically prevents antagonists from dislodging its internal stability. Its 
strategic bottom line is to defend its territorial integrity, its borders, but also its identity 
and nationhood, from foreign interference; its entire political edifice rests thereupon. This 
historic centralisation of the state is succinctly put by national poet Alexander Pushkin: “in 
Russia there is no law. There is a pillar, and on that pillar sits the crown” (Pushkin in Lo, 
2015: 3). 
The modern state, which followed the demise of the Soviet Union, has, under 
President Vladimir Putin, utilised the imperial ideology of Official Nationality (Orthodoxy, 
Autocracy and Nationality). Its modern articulation is centred on sovereign democracy, 
bridging historic, autocratic and independent Russia to being a member of the modern 
family of nations. Herein democracy is not the ends, but the way through which the 
sovereign proceeds, independently. Sovereign democracy, therefore, needs to set 
parameters; it has to be the means to deal with the internal and external world.  
Antithetical to China, Russia’s domestic security depends on its external strategy, 
its influence in the region and on the international system. True independence, ensuring 
self-determination through defence, according to Putin, had become unrealisable in “a 
world in which there is one master, one sovereign” (Putin, 2007); Russia’s “desire for 
independence and sovereignty...is an integral part of our national character…either we 
remain a sovereign nation, or we dissolve without a trace and lose our identity” (Putin in 
Zevelev, 2016: 9). In order for it to be independent, no dominant, external state could be 
allowed to singularly command the global strategic environment. To establish that capable 
states are accorded their equitable power the international architecture should function 
appropriately and multilaterally.  
To ensure itself greater representation in the global strategic domain, Russia 
promotes international reform. Its tactics seek to disrupt US dominance. In pursuit of a 
balance of power between competing states, it seeks a fair contest through multipolarity, 
where no singular hegemon maintains absolute power to restrain the interests of capable 
players. Russia pursues such a terrain by ensuring that the UN undergoes “rational 
reform...(to) adapt itself to the changing global political and economic realities” (Russian 
Foreign Policy Concept, 2008). This reconfigured UN alone should guide the relations 
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between sovereign entities; “the United Nations…should serve as clearing-house for the 
coordination of international relations and world politics in the 21st century” (Russian 
Foreign Policy Concept, 2008).  
v) STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION: RHETORIC 
In the international strategic context, described above, sovereign states must execute 
independence in order to displace hegemony. This is complicated by a multilateral system 
which integrates states as able (voting) members, but where a hegemon can lead and 
stem reform. BRICS has emerged as a lobby group; a platform for member states to enjoin 
their separate agency to pressure towards equity, towards reform.   
BRICS states diverge in many regards. Yet, all share the interest of ensuring its 
national integrity (sovereignty) and the interest of securing regional and international 
influence through an independent foreign policy. The pursuit of exerting influence in the 
international political environment is to do so in contradiction to hegemonic Western 
(Wilsonian21) idealism, which determines the universal truth, thereby automatically 
dispelling any alternative configuration. Through its strategic communication BRICS 
confronts this order with its version of affairs; subordinating ideas to politics.  
Among BRICS each state configures its own truth; the form that advances interests. 
BRICS provides its member states with an expedient forum to advance and consolidate 
these differing versions in a space external to Western influence. In China “seeking truth 
from facts is the ideology, the organizational line, the core values, and the paramount 
principle that the CPC (Communist Party of China) adheres to in its policy-making 
activities” (Angang and Jie, 2013). It holds that policy will fail when not based on what is 
true for China. In order to be independent, to execute its strategy, each state must pursue 
its own understanding, its own truth; merely complying with external ‘facts’ maintains 
subservience and thwarts autonomy. According to Mao Zedong ‘seeking truth from facts’ 
is best understood as ‘facts’ referring “to all things that exist objectively in the world; 
                                                          
21
 Wilsonianism refers to the ideological (liberal internationalist) positions on foreign policy held by US 
President Woodrow Wilson and those following him.  
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‘truth’ refers to the intrinsic links that exist between objective things” (Angang and Jie, 
2013).  
The Russian ideologue Aleksandr Dugin advances the exigency of autonomous 
comprehension by stating that “we in Russia could use postmodernity in order to explain 
to the West that any truth is relative. We have our special Russian truth, that you need to 
accept as something that maybe is not your truth…absolute truth, one for all, does not 
exist” (Dugin, 2016). Putin further explains that all states should pursue their own truths, 
dissipating global dominance and “bring balance to the international state…protect the 
diversity of the world” (Putin, in Zevelev, 2016:10).  
BRICS is used as a platform to canvass a united message of resistance. It does not 
present a new ‘truth’ but purports that each state should be accorded the actionable right 
to determine on its own, separate ‘truth’. These powers, it holds, should inexorably be 
guided and bound by established norms and values, as established and overseen by the 
UN.  
For these purposes BRICS advances enabling reform; effecting equitable 
multilateralism, opposing unilateralism. The collaborative expression towards reform is 
the form that BRICS adopts. Its cooperative diplomacy is the strategic means and ways. 
Reform, as an end, cannot be accomplished by coercive means and ways. Instead, BRICS 
performs a tactical platform, formed to present agreeable relations, aimed to pressure 
and persuade.  
BRICS is a deliberate collective. It employs communication to achieve its strategic 
goals. Strategic communication is a discipline that is currently receiving significant 
attention in the contemporary context. It analyses the “intentional and purposeful 
communicative relationships between organizations and publics” (Hallahan et al, 2007: 3). 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines it as "the coordinated and 
appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities - Public Diplomacy, 
Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations, as 
appropriate - in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to 
advance NATO's aims" (NATO, 2009: 1). The World Bank provides a definition that is 
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relevant in regard to international reform. It describes strategic communication as the 
employment of “tools of persuasion and negotiation - rather than the power of laws, 
coercion, or incentives - to identify involved parties’ underlying interests and promote 
their understanding of and support for a proposed reform. The goal of strategic 
communication is to change behavior, to prompt people to do something in a manner that 
differs from how they are doing it when the communication effort begins” (Cabanero-
Verzosa and Garcia, 2009: 2). Strategic communication can thus be seen as functioning 
internal to and between given political spheres; it relates to the process of persuading an 
audience of a specific truth.  
Previous definitions serve to contextualise BRICS and its strategic communications. 
However, instead of adopting and applying external formulations this dissertation 
explores BRICS’ rhetoric, the communication it strategically employs towards its aims. 
Rhetoric, says Aristotle, is the art or capacity of observing the available means of 
persuasion (Aristotle, 2007: 36). A rhetorical examination explores the artistry and forms 
through which an agent seeks to motivate audiences in particular directions. Such a study 
is not bound to theoretical or disciplinary prescripts; rhetoric does not have its own 
subject matter, it explores the given subject: “it does not include technical knowledge of 
any particular defined genus (of subjects)” (Aristotle, 2007: 38). 
This dissertation, through its varied, yet centrally rhetorical analyses, seeks to 
uncover and assess the communication BRICS tactically employs to attain its goals. These 
are rhetorical appeals advancing a claim, they are strategic persuasions. The 
communication released by BRICS both creates the space and induces the form of its 
collective claims. It is the manifest avenue through which member states opportunistically 
advance its consolidated version of affairs. While individual states remain dedicated 
members of the international order, BRICS is constructed as a strategic terrain external to 
Western hegemony. It performs externally while persuading internally.  
Member states artistically use BRICS as a rhetorical body to infiltrate, occupy and 
motion the international domain accordingly. It is a tool that is used to emphasise matters 
that states are cautious to make alone or that pursues a broader cause and is more 
effective when made as a collective. Unlike the claims of individual states, BRICS’ 
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Declarations and Statements entail no obligations. Its rhetorical claims create 
international realities, motioning towards its strategic ends. Rhetoric is a technology of 
power; it is instructive and produces meaning. It is not a two-way (dialectical) process 
producing a separate compound. It is formative and strategic; it sets the ground and 
occupies the territory. To assess BRICS’ strategic communication in this dissertation it is 
dispassionately appraised. In order to explore BRICS’ productions, it is first needed to 
establish its history, the motives and materiality of its formation.    
BRICS: HISTORICAL ORIGINS 
i) COINING OF THE TERM 
The term BRIC was coined by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill, in a 2001 paper titled 
Building Better Global Economic BRICs. The paper first considers the remarkable economic 
growth of Brazil, India, China and Russia, discussing BRIC states as investment 
opportunities for international capital. Bourne (2015) fittingly refers to the creation of 
Goldman Sachs’ BRIC as a project of thought leadership: “a trust production strategy”; an 
“important strategic communications tool through which firms in global markets can build 
trust and expertise”; “intellectual firepower assembled and published in communications 
material designed to transform the way we think” (Bourne, 2015: 322).  
Beyond the potential returns associated with engaging BRIC states through 
investment, the second, more consequential point made by Goldman Sachs, which is also 
mostly neglected, warns of the insurmountable costs associated were these states not 
entangled into (Western) corporate power. Goldman Sachs advances the incorporation of 
BRIC states in order to ensure that these increasingly powerful states do not operate 
independently to established international infrastructure; their sovereign execution of 
power posing a palpable threat to the realm of global economic power. The function of 
BRIC’s praise was to strategically ensure Western power and influence is maintained, 
averting BRIC states’ ability to reshape the international system. In order to incorporate 
BRIC states the Goldman Sachs paper charged the reform of the global economic core: “In 
line with these prospects, world policymaking fora should be re-organised and in 
particular, the G7 should be adjusted to incorporate BRIC representatives… it seems quite 
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clear that the current G7 needs to be ‘upgraded’ and room made for the BRICs in order to 
allow more effective global policymaking” (O’Neill, 2001: 1-9). This charge indicates that 
the document which first focused attention on BRIC was instead a strategic 
recommendation, for global economic power architecture to reform and include the BRIC 
states. These actions would maintain central control while ensuring both the stability and 
legitimacy of the prevailing order. 
ii) TOWARDS A REFORMED G-BLOC? 
An expanded Group or ‘G’ model was explored under the Outreach Five (O5)22 dialogue, 
from 2005. The participation of the O5 at the G823 meetings was formulated under the 
Heiligendamm Process, two years later. The reform of the G8, becoming the Group of 
Thirteen (G13), was advanced by French President Sarkozy, who said that the appropriate 
proceedings “should be institutionalized…I hope that bit by bit, the G8 becomes the G13” 
(Cooper and Antkiewicz, 2008). In a joint Statement indicating agreeable relations and 
conditions for closer cooperation, the G8 and O5 declared that their interactions marked 
“an important step towards an equal and enduring partnership for building the framework 
conditions of a globalized and competitive world economy. In a globalizing world, we have 
to look beyond national and regional boundaries and work together” (G8, 2007a). Though 
it did not offer definitive illustration, their positive engagement under the Heiligendamm 
Process did suggest an affirmative answer to Goldman Sachs’ question: “would the BRICs 
want to be in” an expanded G-bloc? (O’Neill, 2001: 10).  
The G8’s consensus was however not to expand towards a G13, but to continue 
including the O5 countries, among others, in an ongoing discussion. Instead of a singular, 
equitable G-bloc, the G20 was empowered beyond its earlier mandate as an economic and 
financial discussion group to occupy (mostly display) broader authority. It too commenced 
a yearly leader summit. This tiered system of both G8 and G20 emerged in 2008. This 
expansion, beyond the O5, inculcated a broader, attenuated collective; strategically 
minimising the influence of the O5 among the inclusion of others. This decision partially 
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 The O5 consisted of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. 
23
 Between 1997 and 2014 Russia formed part of an extended G7+1 or G8. 
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conforms to Goldman Sachs’ notion that incorporation would not be simple and that 
“existing G20 meetings are arguably an extended club version of this proposal” (O’Neill, 
2011: 10). The continued existence of the G8, following the G20’s reflexive declaration 
that it forms the “premier forum for our international economic cooperation”, created 
tension and proved the global elite’s opposition to equitable reform (G20, 2009). This 
bifurcation shifted global power from a singular core and opened to broader articulations 
of power.  
In June 2009, a month before the G8 produced its Concluding Report of the 
Heiligendamm Process, effectively rejecting a singular expanded G-bloc, a first BRIC 
leaders’ summit took place in Russia. The timing of these events suggests that BRIC’s24 
formation is a reaction to not being included into the powerful, decision-making core. 
BRICS’ similar form and function to that of the G725, further proposes that it was formed 
as a counter-body, occupying an adjacent position to that of the G7. Both form and 
reasoning can be seen through previous historical endeavours occupying similar positions, 
discussed below.   
The multilateral exchange between BRICS states did not commence at the G8’s 
invitation. BRICS members all form part of the original G20, as well as other major 
international organisations. Member states have also coordinated at various extra-
Western platforms. Russian, Indian and Chinese foreign ministers have been meeting 
regularly to discuss regional and global issues, in the RIC format. The three states have 
also been developing closer relations through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO).  
South Africa’s accession has afforded the group a broader outlook and significance. 
Its inclusion merged existing bodies into BRICS. The IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) 
Dialogue Forum which promotes closer South-South cooperation and understanding was 
launched in 2003, while the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) Group has acted 
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 BRIC was officially expanded to BRICS in 2010. South Africa’s inclusion ensured global representation and 
increased political gravitas.  
25
 Discussed on page 96. 
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together in climate change negotiations. A year before the 2007 Heiligendamm Process 
commenced the first BRIC meeting took place on the margins of the UNGA. 
 The exclusion of Western influence has been core to its meetings and 
performances. BRICS is a formation that springs from, operates in and aspires to the global 
strategic environment. This space of meta-power is greatly complex and concealed. BRICS 
lends member states a shared platform to express and claim their independence. Their 
interactions have been centred on shared interests, cooperation and reciprocal gain of 
influence. Their exercise of influence outside the realm of established international 
infrastructure, or at the margins of international events, has produced external 
configurations of power that have challenged the international power formation. 
iii) NEW FORM, OLD GOALS  
BRICS presents a new configuration of global power; advancing international reform. To 
these ends its first summit Declaration in 2009 stated that “emerging and developing 
economies must have greater voice and representation in international financial 
institutions” (BRICS, 2009). These goals are not new. While the group situates itself under 
the authority of the UN, it also emerges to advance the goals of previous, similar 
platforms, such as the Group of Seventy Seven (G77) and the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM)26. NAM is an associative group of states which collaboratively advances state 
sovereignty and effective multilateralism. It was set up in 1961 to advance the interests of 
independent states and counter the centripetal forces which pulled states into the 
erstwhile bi-polar world order. Though the end of the Cold War practically made NAM 
defunct it continues to pursue influence through internal developmental policies; seeking 
hands-on empowerment through the UN, an essentially diplomatic and therefore hands-
off organisation. Its expression through advancing UN resolutions, such as establishing the 
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 Neither has a secretariat nor a constitution. Both exist non-hierarchically among equal members, chaired 
on a rotational basis, where states remain the units of relation and power is pooled at the centre. 




New International Economic Order (NIEO)27 and New World Information and 
Communication Order (NWICO)28 sought to oblige the UN to activate its infrastructure, 
setting up and executing what these weaker states did not have the capacity to do. Its 
actions avoided direct confrontation with the power blocs. As such NAM wished to ‘de-
bloc’ the world by emphasising the UN as a singular arbiter of power.   
NAM’s establishment gave form to the Declaration on the Promotion of World 
Peace and Cooperation, adopted in the Final Communiqué of the 1955 Asian-African 
(Bandung) Conference. Many of the participating states were newly independent. The 
Conference addressed political, cultural and economic co-operation as methods to oppose 
indirect colonialism, promoting actual independence (Bandung Conference, 1955). The 
Declaration, was directed as response to the “present state of international tension”, 
advising that “all States should co-operate, especially through the United Nations”; “all 
nations should have the right freely to choose their own political and economic systems 
and their own way of life, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations” (Bandung Conference, 1955). The Declaration significantly concludes 
by listing ten enabling principles, advancing independent and multilateral cooperation. 
These principles are taken from the UN Treaty 4307 between China and India, as well as 
certain core values of the UN Charter29.  
The 1954 Treaty 4307 is based on a set of principles known in China as Peaceful 
Coexistence and in India as Pancheel. They are: 
“(1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
                                                          
27
 The Declaration for the Establishment of a New World Economic Order was adopted in 1974 through UN 
Resolution 6/3201 to promote the interests of developing countries, ensuring increased developmental 
assistance and ameliorating terms of trade. 
28
The New World Information and Communication Order is a concept that emerged under the Many Voices 
One World report in 1980 which was tasked by the UN to recommend ways to improve global media 
representation.  
29
 UN principles are featured in the Declarations as: “Respect for fundamental human rights and for the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”; “Respect for the right of each nation to 
defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations”; and “Settlement of 
all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial 
settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties’ own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the 
United Nations” (Bandung Conference, 1955: 9). 
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  (2) mutual non-aggression, 
  (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 
  (4) equality and mutual benefit, and 
  (5) peaceful co-existence”                 (United Nations, 1954). 
Both China and India claim the authoring of the principles; they remain the core of 
their policy towards each other. While the content of the Treaty relates to the promotion 
of trade and cultural intercourse, specifically between the Tibetan regions held by China 
and India, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence has formed the normative backbone 
governing Chinese foreign policy, first with fellow Socialist countries, following the 1956 
Polish and Hungarian crises and later with all states. The Chinese argue for an indirect 
approach, suggesting that the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence are diametrically 
opposed to power politics which have been in dominance in international relations over 
the last few centuries” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
2014).  
To India Pancheel is inscribed in cultural tradition. To former Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru the principles would produce peace in a specific area, whereupon its 
enabling successes would be extended to the rest of the world. To him these principles 
would allow mutually beneficial cooperation among truly independent states (Nehru, 
1963). Nehru would uphold the principles of Pancheel as the central component for post-
colonial states to develop themselves independently from, but also in cooperation with, 
all other states. Nehru was a central founder of the NAM. He wove the concepts together 
with the UN Charter principles to establish their legitimacy. In upholding these principles 
members claim their autonomy; “if I join any of these big groups I lose my identity” 
(Nehru, 1955).  
Significantly, under Nikita Khrushchev the Soviet Union’s pursued its own version 
of Peaceful Coexistence30. Following Joseph Stalin’s death, Khrushchev sought a thaw in 
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 The split between China and the Soviet Union in the late 1950’s was greatly due to China’s loss of faith in 
the Soviet’s ideological leadership. Mao felt that Peaceful Coexistence was only to be had between Socialist 
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relations with the US, de-escalating international tensions and advancing a singular, open 
strategic environment wherein the Soviets could pursue influence over allied, Western 
and independent states. In a letter to Foreign Affairs Magazine Khrushchev set out to 
persuade the West to work together with the Soviet Union, prompting the US to cease its 
containment policies and to commit to “non-aggression” and the “renunciation of 
interference in the internal affairs of other countries” (Khrushchev, 1959: 3). “Peaceful 
coexistence”, he said, “can and should develop into peaceful competition” (Khrushchev, 
1959: 4). Khrushchev’s pursuit of open relations between Capitalist and Socialist states 
sought recognition and persuasion; benefiting from open engagement with Capitalist 
proxy parties, while maintaining control over Socialist proxy and client states. Admitting 
reciprocal independence would avoid the “situation by interferences from without, by 
means of war”; “there is only one way to peace, one way out of the existing tension: 
peaceful coexistence” (Khrushchev, 1959: 18). To the Soviet Union peaceful coexistence 
would be used to shore up power in its bloc, not advance the true independence of states. 
NAM’s principles entailed actual multilateral independence, taking away privileges 
of association from superpowers. The end of the Cold War practically changed the 
geopolitical and strategic environment. When Soviet belligerence ended, giving way to 
Western unipolarity, competing blocs, presenting competing truths, gave way to a singular 
Western universalism. Instead, of coercive hegemony, power has since been performed 
through funded and managed international organisations, such as the World Bank or 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). These organisations have been structured and 
capacitated to obviate the (direct) interference of superpowers in the inner workings of 
sovereign states. Instead, all states are incorporated into a singular universal system, 
presented as multilateral, but actually steered by the West. Herein international 
organisations have resisted real reform towards greater equity, corresponding to the 
growth of emerging and re-emerging states. This tension remains unresolved. The US 
steers international institutions, while the UN maintains its status as definitive arbiter of 
relations among states. Its autonomous authority and legitimacy afford all states nominal 
independence.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
states, while Khrushchev sought to use it to find rapprochement and strategic vantage over the United 
States and its allies. 
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While NAM failed to structurally activate the agency of the UN, it did substantially 
contribute by successfully lobbying for the uptake of independent states as members of 
the UNGA, thereby achieving greater parity and near universal membership; affording 
further legitimacy. NAM’s goals of UN reform correspond to those of BRICS, while its ways 
and means differ. NAM petitioned the UN to develop weaker states through proposals 
such as the NIEO. For BRICS the independent state, not international organisations, is the 
central agent of executive power. Its members turn to the UN to activate its Charter, to 
ensure these powers; BRICS is used as a lobby group to enforce the observance of UN 
principles and norms.  
iv) INCARNATING THE MULTILATERAL ORDER  
The UN is empowered, not to act, but to guide through the foundational principles and 
norms of its Charter. It is the central domain where states interact. The UN Charter is the 
foundational treaty and guiding meridian that maintains relations between states. It is the 
multilateral system that preserves peaceful order and promotes social and economic 
progress. BRICS has no foundational treaty of its own31; it strategically subsumes itself 
under the UN Charter, actively advancing its expedient implementation. Its commitment 
to the Charter ensures that BRICS is not duplicitous. Each country aligns its (diverging) 
domestic architectures to that of the universal body, thereby designing a non-
confrontational lobby group. Through the norms and objectives of the UN Charter BRICS’ 
member states, of varying civilisational and political manifestations, are tactically, as well 
as strategically, united.  
Coherence under UN authority legitimates BRICS’ members while delegitimating 
US unilateral territorialisation of the global order32. BRICS’ rhetorical, as well as effective, 
embodiment of the norms and principles of the UN order actively presents 
multilateralism; the appropriate interpretation of the UN Charter. The UN, capacitated by 
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 It, therefore, complies with UN Charter Article 103, which states that: “In the event of a conflict between 
the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under 
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail” (United 
Nations, 1945). 
32
 Discussed on page 25. 
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its member states, is purposed to be the hub (Article 1.4) which collectively maintains 
peace and security, preventing threats and suppressing aggressors (Article 1.1); to 
cooperate respectfully (Article 1.2); and jointly address international concerns (Article 1.3) 
(United Nations, 1945). Though the UN does not design the execution of tasks, it does 
stipulate the manner or form international exchanges must take. Article 2 of the Charter 
lays out the Principles by which the UN and its members must pursue the Purposes stated 
in Article 1.  
BRICS’ interactions incarnate the normative UN order. The affiliation between 
member states demonstrates the legal order; such an order does not follow statements of 
fact, but the embodiments of valid norms (Kelsen, 1967). Its structure is founded in the 
sovereign independence and equality of all members (Article 2.1); its engagement takes 
place openly, in good faith (Article 2.2); members deliberately share and cooperate, 
thereby opposing threat and force (Article 2.4) (United Nations, 1945). BRICS’ form 
presents an exemplary exhibition of UN principles, positively establishing the 
international, legal order. It is an embodiment of the legitimate global order. It rhetorically 
displays the territory upon which it executes its interests; the territory which affords 
member states their prerogative, equitably increasing and diminishing the privileges of 
others.  
BRICS’ posture is, therefore, to claim the space normatively provided by the UN for 
states to execute their independence, allowing for multiple truths. Its articulation of the 
UN order confronts the dictated conception of US. It claims the international order for 
what it is, not unilateral but multilateral. BRICS’ emphasis on the UN points to US liberal 
democracy as being a singular version inside a diverse international system; the US is but 
one in the broader constellation of agents. BRICS articulates the principles of the 
legitimate order, such as independence, non-interference and engagement. By returning 
the state to the central agent of power, in relation to the UN, not the US, it challenges the 
US’ unilateral hegemony over the strategic environment. It claims independence for states 
in general; an indirect claim by member states. BRICS’ challenge to hegemony is not 
direct. Instead, its strategic communications return focus to the foundations of the 




BRICS’ formation into a strategic rhetorical body is to pursue the shared interests of its 
member states. Together it sets out to influence and reform the international domain 
towards equitable multilateralism, greater power for member states and diminished 
power for dominant states. In 2003 Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, appealed for 
reform, in the face of pervasive unilateralism. He warned that “we have come to a fork in 
the road...a moment no less decisive than 1945…we must not shy away from questions 
about the adequacy, and effectiveness, of the rules and instruments at our disposal…it is 
not enough to denounce unilateralism…We must show that those concerns can, and will, 
be addressed effectively through collective action” (Annan, 2003).  
The UN’s charge for effective multilateralism is the strategic opportunity upon 
which BRICS has built itself. Though the UN centrally endorses it, reform must be steered 
and carried out by its member states. BRICS’ formation and its rhetorical performances 
present the willingness and intent of its member states to lead and accomplish the 
implementation of such reform. It evokes Annan’s urgency, his ‘fork in the road’, 
proposing to influence the global multilateral course. By illustrating and exhibiting 
legitimate norms and principles, BRICS’ strategic communications present the rhetorical 
occupation and the control of the strategic environment. In order to appreciate its 
determination and direction, BRICS’ strategic communications must be analytically 










ANALYSIS OF BRICS’ PROGRAMMATIC DOCUMENTATION 
“The real issue arising from the shift in the global balance of power concerns the 
relationship between power and international order. What do the BRICS want from the 
international economic order?”  
             Braz Baracuhy (Baracuhy, 2012: 1) 
“That ultimate disease of cooperation: war” 
           Kenneth Burke (Burke, 1969: 22) 
INTRODUCTION 
BRICS employs a hybrid approach to achieving its persuasion strategies. While it maintains 
an active position in international leadership fora, it increasingly pursues influence in the 
international order by embodying legitimate values and norms through its own designs; 
through its programmes it elucidates an alternative narrative. This chapter examines inter-
BRICS agreements; foundational formations. It pursues direct observation from various 
documents, proposing an understanding of how these scenarios establish influence and 
conviction, claiming common ground. The chapter assesses BRICS’ strategic formation and 
analyses its strategic rationale. It takes cumulatively from its various agreements to 
discern the broader whole. The establishment of its programmes shapes and redefines 
international leadership external to but also in relation with established international 
institutions. The programmatic operations of BRICS canvas the positive intra-state 
relations that it advances. Through exercising its scenarios via the practices, as well as 
principles and norms33 of international law, it exhibits leadership in the international 
order, placing itself at its core.   
                                                          
33
 According to Krasner (1983): “Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards 
of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations” (Krasner, 1983: 2). 
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BRICS PROGRAMMES: ESTABLISHING LEGITIMACY 
BRICS programmatic documentation, treaties, agreements and Memoranda of 
Understandings (MOUs), deliberatively establish a modality of international relations that 
is multilateral. BRICS embodies and articulates the international order via its collaborative 
narrative and scenario. This application is what Schweller and Pu (2011) call shaping 
strategies. Central to BRICS is the political performance of moulding its programmes 
around legitimate means. BRICS’ style is to underpin its agreements with established 
principles and norms. It presents itself, its narrative and scenario, as legitimate, thereby 
reflecting on the diverging political realities of others as being accordingly illegitimate. 
Central to its strategy is, therefore, to dissuade against the existing influence of others. It 
tactically expresses that which it founds itself on. The dedicated performance of a just, 
legitimate order, not the outcome of its actions, is what it critically aims to convey.   
An exhibition of this performance is presented in The Strategy for BRICS Economic 
Partnership:  
“The BRICS Strategy is based on the following principles: full respect for the 
sovereignty of the Member States; commitment to international law and 
recognition of the central role of the United Nations on peace, security and 
development; account for national interests, priorities, growth and 
development strategies of the Member States; openness, sharing of 
information and consensus in decision-making; commitment to the rules 
and principles of the multilateral trading system as embodied in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO); recognition of the multipolar nature of the global 
economic and financial system; support for greater exchanges of best 
practices in enhancing business environment; transparency and 
predictability in the investment environment in line with national policies 
and priorities; commitment to supporting sustainable development, strong, 
balanced and inclusive growth, financial stability, and balanced combination 
of measures ensuring social and economic development and protection of 
the environment; commitment to mutually beneficial cooperation with 
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other countries; inadmissibility of unilateral economic sanctions in violation 
of universally recognized norms of international relations” (BRICS, 2015b: 5). 
By stating selected core principles BRICS makes these principles its own. Its 
selectivity establishes a distinct narrative. This example shows how programmatic 
documents organises meaning and order. They construct knowledge about self and the 
world at large; creating realities and understandings through composed processes. They 
are logical claims that delineate and present BRICS’ scenario. It is within these 
foundational documents that BRICS’ broader narrative and thesis are advanced. These 
documents are more about the demonstration of principles and norms than 
institutionalising substantial programmes among states; appealing through display.  
The principles advanced here form the imprint of how international relations 
should be guided. These documents are therefore firmly rooted in the ethos it wishes to 
present. In their interactions with each other, BRICS states develop a best practice 
modality of interaction, setting out meaning and order, as well as clarity of undertaking. 
Programmes are paths towards an end. It follows naturally to examine how BRICS 
expresses itself, how it constructs itself and how it relates to existing global institutions. 
This broader analysis informs to further conceptualise the strategies of persuasion 
embedded in and outside the established order.  
INVIGORATING REFORM  
BRICS explicitly operates inside of established international law and order. Its rhetoric 
programmatically employs legal principles and norms in order to delineate its own 
narrative, advancing its persuasive ends. “Law is value dependent”, says Scobbie (2014), 
“values cannot be captured in a formal logical system. The application of law lies not in 
defining each word” (Scobbie, 2014). BRICS’ rhetoric interprets and expediently 
substantiates international law. 
World order, explains Falk (1999) regards the “distribution of power and authority 
among the political actors at the global stage” (Falk, 1999: 29). This is the space to locate 
and understand BRICS. Member states together perform BRICS in the UN realm, to ensure 
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its stratagem of exhibiting independence, as well as achieving recognition and reform. 
BRICS’ engagement with international law is to prompt and motion against unipolarity and 
unilateralism, towards multipolarity and multilateralism. International law and latent 
multi-institutionalism34 are used as strategic devices to break free from the grip of 
dominant schemes and to gain common ground. It does not antagonise or contravene any 
legal or political reality. Instead by practising cooperative relations it develops its narrative 
advancing equitable agency of individual states. BRICS embodies the multilateral order 
and propels the reform of the UN and international organisations through its persuasive 
and dissuasive techniques. By and large, in order to maintain its indirect form, it does not 
introduce specific measures to be met. Instead, it motions towards the implementation of 
measures that have been agreed upon but remain unchanged. Relevant reforms remain 
unfulfilled 44 years after the UN submitted that “irreversible changes in the relationship of 
forces in the world necessitate the active, full and equal participation of the developing 
countries” (United Nations, 1974). 
BRICS exhibits the terrain it wishes to be recognised to occupy, while strategically 
avoiding any direct affront. It seeks a “state of international order (which) is determined at 
root by the interactions between great powers and their capacity to cooperate effectively 
on key issues of the day” (Jones et al, 2014: 2).  
BRICS is not a revolutionary bloc. It is a platform towards global governance 
reform, maintaining and invigorating the existing stable order wherein states are the 
legitimate units of power. It is from the existing international legal system that BRICS is 
founded and from where it develops its ethos and logos. The collectivist and multilateral 
functioning of the UN positively informs BRICS. Its interactions present amicable and 
balanced inter-state exchange among leading countries. 
BRICS aspires towards power transition, managed through institutional, diplomatic 
negotiations. Such modulations, says Baracuhy, “are rare and yet sure events in 
                                                          
34
 Latent multi-institutionalism refers to a strategy where states participate in multiple international fora in 
order to expand its influence and gain common ground. These “flexible coalitions, all of them characterized 
by low degrees of institutionalization (G3, G5, O5 etc.). This network strategy guarantees a maximum of 
national sovereignty, flexibility and independence” (Flemes, 2012: 5).  
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international relations...institutionalized power transition would be a novelty in 
international relations” (Baracuhy, 2012: 1-3). BRICS’ persuasive strategy is to ensure that 
this passage is peaceful. BRICS accordingly avoids direct power politics, preferring instead 
to move in a slow, calculated manner, internal to the international order. It employs its 
ethos as the means towards its goal. It is careful of outright balancing and revisionism, 
which would endanger reality as is and the recently improved global positioning of BRICS 
member states. Instead, it finds and proposes alternative delegitimating ways. It 
delegitimates exceptional treatment and behaviour by dominant states through a 
discourse of resistance. This discourse is weakened by its own shortcomings, such as its 
lack of critique for Russia’s exceptionalist handling of the Crimean crisis35 (Stuenkel, 2015). 
BRICS embodies the reform it seeks. Its grouped exhibition of mutually beneficial, 
yet strictly independent, collectivism exhibits its denouncement of unipolarity. Using 
Hobsbawm’s (1973) observation, the less powerful members instead labour “the system 
to its advantage - or rather to its minimum disadvantage” (Hobsbawm, 1973: 13). BRICS 
does not have a revisionist agenda. Instead, it proposes as Ikenberry (2008) does, that 
global power transition does not have to destroy the established order; revolution would 
be irrational, as such a sophisticated system will be immensely difficult and expensive to 
reconstruct. Competitors, says Ikenberry referring to China, can gain full access in a 
“system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political 
foundations” (Ikenberry, 2008: 24). BRICS states have done exactly this, benefiting greatly 
from the system that was largely built by the West. The tactics of US president Trump’s 
America First economic nationalism presents a movement from utilising multilateral 
institutions to engaging unilateralism directly. Increased antagonism36 has undermined 
and weakened multilateral organisations, making it more difficult for other states to draw 
benefit in the international system. The imposition of unilateralism is an about turn for US 
tactics and suggests increased competition for its leadership and control over the 
                                                          
35
 In 2014 the Crimean peninsula seceded from Ukraine to rejoin Russia. The secession, widely regarded as 
an annexation, was accompanied by an increased Russian military presence.  
36
 The Trump administration has threatened multilateral organisations such as the International Criminal 
Court, it has withdrawn from the international climate accord (The Paris Agreement) and its unilateral 
imposition of tariffs has been in direct contravention of World Trade Organisation rules. 
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international strategic environment. It is a clear realist response to the accomplishments 
of its challengers. This is illustrated by his comment that China has “taken advantage of us 
like nobody in history” (Trump, 2017). While the US is turning inward, capitalising on its 
universal power through unilateral tactics, BRICS are advancing ever greater cooperation, 
through open, networked exchange.  
BRICS’ strategic functioning inside the international legal and normative domain is 
furthermore due to it not having the requisite institutions, means or will to forge new 
norms. Regardless of its potential, even combined BRICS states remain too poor and too 
weak to balance US interests37. BRICS combined yearly military spending is less than half 
that of the US; the US security establishment and especially its dominant navy is supreme, 
constraining any belligerent attempt (Tian et al, 2017). 
 Instead, BRICS practises delegitimation through its rhetoric. Its discord with the 
functioning of international relations draws attention; “relations of resistance always 
coexist with relations of domination” (Schweller and Pu, 2011: 47). The establishment of 
its programmes installs alternative measures, repudiating hegemony. Programmes do not 
balance. Instead, they institutionalise BRICS interactions, creating the mechanisms to soft 
balance. Presenting a statement of rejection, programmes logically explain what is and 
what should be.  
  BRICS benefits from the looseness of international law, as a “collection of rules and 
norms that states and other actors feel an obligation to obey in their mutual relations and 
commonly do obey” (Henderson, 2010: 5). From a political perspective, international law 
is applicable only where there is the political agreement for its observation and operation. 
This manifests a law among agents, thereby forming common power, as supported by 
Thomas Hobbes’ adage on law and justice: “where there is no common power, there is no 
law. If there is no law, there is no injustice” (Hobbes, 2016). BRICS collectively evoke 
common (alternative) power through its political agreements. Its deliberate legal 
proclamations function to point out perceived injustice.  
                                                          
37
 The per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in BRICS states is significantly lower than that of developed 
countries, making their governments unwilling and unable to assume international responsibilities (Stuenkel, 
2015: 157).  
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Its interactions on the state level practically set the boundaries, facilitating the 
performance of its relations. Its modus operandi is to substantiate the letter of 
international law; its activities are less important than its performance of ideal-type 
relations and values. This manifestation negates the assertion made by Western 
commentators that “rising powers do not want to play by the west’s rules” (Stephens, 
2010) and that emerging powers do not accord to US Deputy Secretary of State Robert 
Zoellick’s precept of “responsible stakeholders”38.  
It is at BRICS’ rhetorical core to propound member states to be legitimate 
sovereigns in the global domain. In its presentation of legal accord BRICS demonstrates 
the application of the law, objecting to the deployment of sovereign power to 
international organisations. It critiques liberal internationalism for depriving sovereign 
states of their agency. According to Stuenkel, BRICS advances that “states need to be 
represented not only in international rules, but also in the way they are applied. It is thus 
scepticism about the operationalization of liberal norms, rather than the goals and values 
that guide them that shapes the BRICS’ relationship to today’s global order” (Stuenkel, 
2015: 166). BRICS endorses the form of similar structures, where states do not delegate 
authority but remain at the organisation’s core. Kirton and Larionova (eds., 2018) 
poignantly explain this relationship between states and intergovernmental organisations 
(IGO) as states being the principals and organisations the agents; “states retain their 
sovereign control over their institution’s design and agenda” (Kirton and Larionova, eds., 
2018: 4).  
BRICS’ programmes advance legal intergovernmentalism, where cooperation, not 
dominance is central. This system holds that the agency of institutions such as the IMF 
should be limited. From a state-centred position these bodies are seen to act with 
impunity, demanding accord for its proverbial carrot; thereby interfering with national 
sovereignty.  
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 During his remarks to the National Committee on US-China relations, the US Deputy Secretary of State, 
Robert Zoellick, prompted that “it is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to China’s membership 




BRICS prescribes a Weberian legal-rational approach39 to legitimacy. Governments 
execute upon those systems that maintain order (peace and security); government 
maintains its power when pursuing public interest, receiving trust in recognition. This 
approach to legitimacy engages both international law and international institutions. 
Relating international law Wolfram discusses the Schmittian position of state centrality to 
that where power is pushed to the periphery. The former, relating to the thoughts of 
German jurist Carl Schmitt, discusses power centrally executed by the sovereign, the latter 
sees government power supplemented or even replaced by institutions and organisations, 
affording it broader capacity (Wolfram, n.d). Though BRICS advances an outright state-
centric approach, its hybrid strategy40 allows for expedient amalgamations. It uses its 
state-centrism to achieve agency in institutions, adopting a consolidation of the two, 
where valid. Yet, this is not done external to the state; it does not capacitate international 
organisations with exclusive power. Instead, it proposes multilateral exchange among 
equal states to be based upon a singular qualifier: sovereignty; allowing for the 
construction of power, domestically. This opposes the core/periphery model of Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s (1974) world-systems analysis, where there are well-defined differences 
among states. Such a world order functions from a capitalist core and its relations with 
fundamentally dissimilar semi-peripheral and peripheral areas (Wallerstein, 1974). 
BUILDING BRICS NARRATIVES AND SCENARIOS  
Programmatic documentation assembles BRICS’ official thesis through building scenarios. 
It establishes a crafted message of what BRICS pursues in the international order. These 
documents present an account which is transformative, due to it being complete; it is a 
case in itself. It does not rely on external substantiation. Roman consul Cicero defines such 
an account as a narration, where the “cause itself and the whole principle of the dispute is 
contained” (Cicero, 1853: 1.19). BRICS’ narration explains its case; this is the ‘truth’ it 
advances. It uses narratives as strategic paths, carrying influence, through specific, framed 
perceptions. Framing refers to the process of “selecting and highlighting some facets of 
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 The legal-rational approach conforms to principles; “authority is empowered by a formalistic belief in the 
content of the law (legal) or natural law (rationality)” (Williams, 2003). 
40
 Discussed on page 59. 
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events or issues and making connections among them so as to promote a particular 
interpretation, and/or solution” (Entman, 2004: 5).  
Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle produce a compelling conceptualisation of 
narratives in strategic contexts. The authors suggest that: “Narratives are frameworks that 
allow humans to connect apparently unconnected phenomena around some causal 
transformation. The endpoint of this transformation bestows meaning upon all parts of 
the whole” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle, 2013: 5). As a compound of diverging 
states, BRICS uses narratives to compose meaning, to pronounce upon itself as well as the 
international order. Its narratives are designed or nurtured with the intention of 
structuring the responses of others to developing events, to persuade others to favourably 
shape “their interests, their identity, and their understanding of how international 
relations works and where it is heading” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle, 2013: 3).  
Programmatic documents are strategic shaping tools. Each is individually 
delineated, each setting out a route, each playing a substantiating role. In this systematic 
manner, through postulating a sequence of events, BRICS’ scenarios establish and encode 
meaning. Together these set agreements serve a broader strategy; they form the building 
blocks for greater design. Programmes do not curate managed responses. Instead, as 
deliberative arguments, they structure and lead a sequence of events to which the agents 
and the audience have to respond to. BRICS’ scenarios invent meaning in global 
governance and thereby affect its inchoate form. Countenancing the predominant 
rendering, BRICS performs independence, executing a strictly indirect blow to hegemony.   
In constructing its argument, outside the ambit of established institutions, BRICS 
produces its own strategic reality. As an organisation of states, it shapes the reformed 
world by exhibiting it. These scenarios urge acceptance for a course of action. It seeks 
recognition in the international domain. It is not through analysis, but by manifestation 
that its truth is assembled. The construction of a scenario takes place through the 
exhibition of fable, history and argument, Cicero’s subtypes of narration.  
The fable presents statements that are clearly false, but are presented in order to 
galvanise the audience. Whereas this often is the case elsewhere, the precise, legalistic 
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formulation of political agreements avoids this subtype. History is based on provable 
precedents, “an account of exploits which have been performed” (Cicero, 1853: 1.19). 
History is built upon traceable record. BRICS’ political commitments are founded upon the 
consensus to formally actualise its relations from previous meetings; Statements, 
Declarations and Action Plans form the back-story and formalise its wishes. Lastly, the 
argument is a presentation of what should happen41. BRICS’ argument through these 
documents is to produce its willed, reconstituted global governance order, external to 
hegemony. In order to successfully accrue influence, the narration produces the substance 
to serve the argument. Evidence is created, or discovered (as per Cicero’s inventio42), to 
serve this argument; establishing an auspicious message. Herein an appreciation for 
kairos43 is essential, as programmes always have a relation to time.  
BRICS rhetorically constructs its interpretation of affairs in the light of there being 
“no single organizing principle on which global governance rests” (Roseanu in Rewizorski, 
2015: 26). Instead, the author argues that "global governance is the sum of myriad – 
literally millions – of control mechanisms driven by different histories, goals, structures 
and processes" (Ibid). It is therefore that BRICS produces a hybrid modality, of state-
centred, latent multi-institutionalism.   
BRICS’ claims discover what is just and unjust. Its narrative competes for the 
common ground that is bound by international law. It strategically reinvigorates 
established norms to propose a preferable version of affairs. These arguments generally 
remain without external or independent action, staying within the framework of 
established legal order. This strategy hinges on utility, providing alternative ways to 
encounter the international reality. It argues that although established international 
organisations are multinational, they have maintained certain orthodoxies and have been 
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 This is usually captured in the Terms of Reference of a programme. For example: “Convinced that the 
establishment of such a Bank would reflect the close relations among the BRICS countries, while providing a 
powerful instrument for increasing their economic cooperation” (BRICS, 2014a). Or: “Deepening BRICS 
Media Cooperation, Promoting Fair and Just International Public Opinion” (BRICS, 2017c).  
42
 Inventio refers to the discovery or search for the means of an argument. It forms part of Aristotle’s five 
canons of rhetoric. 
43
 Kairos is detailed and applied in chapter five. 
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dominated by the West. This reliance on Western institutional knowledge has obstructed 
the utility of, for example, African policy-makers to produce their own systems 
(Sidiropoulus, 2017). By exhibiting a combined, institutional voice BRICS interrupts the 
Western orientation of international policy guidance. The results of its programmes are 
less important than the substantial challenge they pose. Its actuality presents an 
independent exploitation of the principles of international law, executing a fundamentally 
new reality. 
The establishment of a BRICS narrative has matured over the last years. It, 
however, remains a novel exercise, poorly constituted and plagued by inconsistencies and 
tensions. Members of the group often have very different individual political and 
economic narratives. Examples of which are: the 2017 Doklam border dispute between 
China and India44; trade disputes at the World Trade Organization (WTO)45; and different 
positions on central matters of international relations, such as the reform of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC). The latter provides an indication of BRICS’ strategic 
hedging. BRICS’ summit Declarations (2011-2017) all call for reform of the UNSC, adding 
that “China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status of India, Brazil 
and South Africa in international affairs, and understand and support their aspiration to 
play a greater role in the UN” (BRICS, 2011c; BRICS, 2012b; BRICS, 2013c; BRICS, 2014c; 
BRICS 2015a; BRICS, 2016c; BRICS, 2017c). This consolidated impression is contradicted in 
practice; Russia and China are in fact the only UNSC permanent members not to have 
supported the bid of either Brazil or India to be included into an expanded permanent 
Council. These inconsistencies show a discourse of cooperation as means to showcase the 
failures of the existing system, while BRICS states are often complicit of similar actions or 
non-actions; confirming that it too is a tool used by members. 
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 In June 2017 first Chinese and then Indian border patrols and construction troops entered the area of 
Doklam, an area claimed by both China and India’s ally Bhutan. All groups later withdrew (Panda, 2017).   
45
 “About 70% of China’s WTO disputes are with emerging powers. Brazil and other BRICS countries have 
introduced duties on Chinese products, and by the end of 2012, India had no fewer than 149 antidumping 
cases against Chinese products. Brazil has lodged a complaint at the WTO against South Africa” (Latino, in 
Sciso, 2017: 52). 
59 
 
BRICS is purposed to designate faults and incoherency within the international 
order. Its constituting programmatic documents do not greatly institutionalise but instead 
aggregate a scenario, presenting a representation of its unified performance. The 
instrumentalisation of its own scenarios, through the establishment of its exchange 
platforms, the Think Tank Council, Academic Forum, Network University among others, 
present guidance and policy recommendations towards the re-imagination of 
intergovernmental solidarity and interaction. These meetings, for their consistency and 
commitment rather than practical output, shape the indirect challenge of BRICS 
leadership. It is here that the question of international strategy is deliberatively challenged 
by the production of BRICS scenarios and a BRICS narrative.  
HYBRID STRATEGY: BOTH IN SUPPORT OF AND IN RESISTANCE TO 
INSTITUTIONS 
BRICS presents a hybrid strategic modality, ways and means that pursue influence both 
inside and outside of established institutions. As an example, BRICS states’ membership in 
the G20 affords greater transactional power to steer the direction of future international 
exchange. Its G20 involvement is however also limiting; sustained involvement in the 
status quo impedes upon its own reformist claims and goals. The G20 remains essentially 
an outflow of and thereby contained by the G7 and Bretton Woods institutions, as 
confirmed by the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Statement in 1999. 
Here it was agreed to effectively expand the dominion of the G7 by bringing more states 
under its leadership via the establishment of “a new mechanism for informal dialogue in 
the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system, to broaden the dialogue...We 
believe that discussions held in this group will prove useful to complement and reinforce 
the role of the governing bodies of the Bretton Woods institutions” (G7, 1999).  
BRICS members maintain active participation in and afford authority to established 
institutions. This is done in order to secure common ground. BRICS’ ethos and logos 
appeals are structured from inside these institutions, occurring not as a group, but by 
individual countries claiming greater influence. Their claims, as deserving members of an 
expanded global core, is the narrative that the group is founded upon; supported by 
60 
 
figures such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 
projection that by 2030 China’s gross domestic product will exceed that of the US, while 
India’s will be slightly below that of Europe (Stuenkel, 2015: 165). The corroboration of 
these facts builds the historic as well as prescribed aspect of its scenario. This logical claim 
is that rich, Western, former colonial states occupy a disproportionate share of power. 
Reform is required to assure logical and ethical international equivalency; a means toward 
achieving the spirit of the UN Charter46.  
Together BRICS does not set out this claim textually. It is driven by individual 
states, as sovereign power regards not the grouped entity, but the separate countries. 
Through its participation in platforms such as the G20, BRICS states demand an increased 
share of influence inside the group and established international infrastructure. 
Additionally, it recognises the limitation of participation in the G20 insiders club, which 
holds the dominant scenario. Programmes present an additional, external narrative, over 
which the established powers have no control.  
BRICS’ separate, autonomous narrative demonstrates the ‘and’ to it both forming 
part of the global infrastructure and forming a collective outside of this domain. This 
hybrid strategy seeks concord, not aggravation. A both-and orientation views parts as 
functioning separately, yet inclusive of others. Parts relate interdependently. The 
Confucian concept of zhongyong, also known as the doctrine of the mean, affords further 
understanding. Zhongyong advocates for a courageous (yong) equilibrium (zhong), for the 
harmonisation process between different parts. Zhongyong, says Qin (2010), is a form of 
dialectic, which does not isolate one part from another. Instead, it deals with the 
transformation of parts. Relations are central in this process-oriented thought, where 
everything is correlated, “interdependent and complementary. One cannot exist without 
the other, because one creates conditions for the formation, existence, and 
transformation of the other” (Qin, 2010: 138).  
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 Discussed in chapter two. 
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BRICS’ presentation of such a relational strategy is not curious. A Chinese 
dialectics, of co-theses, vis-à-vis Hegelian thesis and antithesis, is reasonable. China is a 
commanding player in BRICS. Qin presents clarification on Chinese dialectics, stating that: 
“the synthesis is always the combination and inclusion of the two rather 
than the elimination or destruction of one by the other. This is the ‘both-and 
logic’...The essence of this inclusiveness is that it is a process which 
transforms the self and the other through recreation toward a new unity. As 
co-theses are by nature non-conflictual, the fundamental relationship 
between them is harmony rather than conflict” (Qin, 2010: 140).  
BRICS’ performances procedurally sustain a favourable hybrid environment, 
presenting the desire for its own territoriality, its own terms. It performs external to 
Bretton Woods, yet it discusses it with authority, as all states are participants. It, 
therefore, creates an alternative leadership structure, both external to and inside of 
international infrastructure. BRICS’ interactions and rhetoric charges this order with its 
own signified and complete narrative.   
Trubek (2012) suggests that BRICS countries’ litigation and negotiation successes at 
the WTO have contributed to the rise of this hybrid system (Trubek, 2012). This is 
evidenced by Chinese aid programmes not aligning with the conditionalities of the liberal 
Washington Consensus47 (Stuenkel, 2015: 112). BRICS states increasingly engage 
international partners upon a diverging track to that of Western liberalism. Their 
independent policy orientation challenges for influence in the global strategic 
environment. They articulate different ‘truths’, originating from multiple poles, vis-à-vis a 
singular hegemonic ‘truth’. This leads to the tension around territory and common 
ground. The treaty establishing the New Development Bank (NDB) illustrates the 
systematic pathway through which BRICS presents its alternative scenario for 
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 The Washington Consensus presents a set of fundamentally market-driven policy prescriptions that were 
developed in the late 1980’s by Washington based think tanks and policy agencies. They were presented as 
beneficial for Latin American countries recovering from economic crises but have widely been condemned 
for their neo-imperial conditionalities (Komlik, 2017).  
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developmental financing. By establishing a new institution it challenges not only the 
efficacy of established institutions but its organisational legitimacy.  
BRICS’ major formations, the NDB and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), 
are both charged in their constituting agreements to be complementary to existing 
international arrangements48. BRICS’ goal is not to establish its own order. Instead, its 
establishment of alternative institutions forms part of its networked approach. Its own 
hybrid modality of limited formation and latent multi-institutionalism is a soft balancing49 
tactic that expands its influence and gains common ground through elastic relations. In 
short, BRICS’ limited institutionalism advances greater multilateralism50 and its strategy of 
multipolarity.  
By engaging both institutions beyond its direct control and of its own making, 
BRICS complements or bridges the one with the other; providing evidence of its hybrid 
strategy. Gaining recognition from authoritative institutions51 affords it substantial 
legitimacy. It lends influence to its narrative. This narrative advances that authority should 
not be held by external institutions, but directly by the sovereign states. It illustrates 
BRICS’ perception that states should be the central locales of executive power. States 
must act independently and interdependently.  
BRICS: DESIGN AND STRUCTURE   
In an exhibition of its ethos, the name BRICS is deliberately claimed to present a direct 
compound of the member states. It does not carry external signification such as NAM or 
G20. By averting an alternate name it maintains itself within its basis as a collective of 
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 The NDB pursues “complementing the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for 
global growth and development” (BRICS, 2014a). The CRA proposes to: “contribute to strengthening the 
global financial safety net and complement existing international monetary and financial arrangements” 
(BRICS, 2015d). 
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 Soft balancing is discussed in chapter four. 
50
 “The Bank shall mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and 
other emerging economies and developing countries, complementing the existing efforts of multilateral and 
regional financial institutions for global growth and development” (BRICS, 2014a) 
51
 In 2018 the NDB received favourable to top ratings from two of the three major (Western) rating agencies, 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch (Xinhua, 2018b).  
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sovereigns. Considering that a ‘bloc’ signifies a group of countries working towards certain 
political interests, it could have been a suitable mode of discernment. BRICS, however, 
evades this term. By referring to itself as a ‘bloc’ it would create an internal/external 
divide, suggesting that member states all have the same interests and that non-members 
are excluded. Instead, BRICS constructs itself within the global collective, through 
Ministerial and leaders’ meetings, through working groups and fora. The emanating 
documentation produces it, per se. 
It is from The Strategy of BRICS Economic Partnership that the clearest definition of 
self emerges. Here the collective is referred to as “a dialogue and cooperation platform 
among member states…This platform aims to promote peace, security, prosperity and 
development in multipolar, interconnected and globalized world. The BRICS countries 
represent Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America, which gives their cooperation a 
transcontinental dimension making it especially valuable and significant” (BRICS, 2015b).  
As a platform, BRICS suggests it to be a location, a place where norms and values 
are enacted. The Merriam-Webster dictionary classifies a platform as “a declaration of the 
principles on which a group of persons stand” (Merriam-Webster, 2018). This rationale is 
fitting as BRICS is foremost a place where individual nations pronounce on the principles 
they share, finding ways to put the means and ends they commonly hold into effect. Celso 
Amorim, a BRICS architect and former Brazilian Foreign Affairs and Defence Minister, 
explains that BRICS is “not a bloc, it's an association of common interests and common 
views which can exchange experiences in economic and social areas” (Amorim, 2017).  
Before analysing and discussing the central, constituting principles of BRICS, it is 
instructive to regard which tools or mechanisms it uses programmatically. The choice and 
structure of founding documentation establish the understanding of its step-by-step 
course of action, allowing for greater comprehension of logic and relevant processes 
involved. These texts are institutional, they charge structures with ideas.  
Most programmatic documents take the shape of legally non-binding political 
commitments. BRICS only has one treaty that is filed with the UN Treaty Collection, 
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complying with UN Charter Article 10252. This unique document requires individual 
comprehension. In May 2016 the multilateral Agreement on the New Development Bank 
was accordingly registered in the Treaty Collection. This makes it the only multilateral 
legal obligation that binds the BRICS countries. Its actualisation is recognition of self, 
offering potency and signifying 2016 as an offset for the group. The establishment of the 
NDB transcends will to engage, it has a logos of its own as well as a timeline. It seeks to 
constitute the networked order: to “reflect the close relations among the BRICS countries, 
while providing a powerful instrument for increasing their economic cooperation” (BRICS, 
2014a). 
Instead of building upon interest and desire, as most other political commitments 
do, the manifestation of the Bank is the actual foundation upon which further cooperation 
is built. In committing to “mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable 
development” it seeks to adjunct, not supplant, other financial institutions; to obtain 
influence and territory from strategic sectors (BRICS, 2014a). The Bank is an expression of 
BRICS’ alternative international narrative, it clarifies its scenario: “The creation of the Bank 
is an expression of the growing role of BRICS and other emerging market and developing 
countries (EMDCs) in the world economy, and their greater willingness to act 
independently in matters of international economic governance and development” (New 
Development Bank, 2017). Strategically it is forward-looking. It aims to deliver on the 
under-financed sustainable development and infrastructure needs. It seeks to position 
itself in this morally oriented and increasingly strategic niche. A clear attempt for 
influence, gained from trust and equal regard, the Bank does not assign traditional 
conditionalities. It also pursues positive impression by committing to “sound banking 
principles”, according the norms of international financial best practice (BRICS, 2014a).  
The Bank presents itself as a solution, not a challenge to other institutions; “it shall 
also cooperate with international organizations and other financial entities” (BRICS, 
2014a). The NDB, therefore, pursues financial influence through its accomplishments, 
                                                          
52
 UN Charter Article 102: “Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of 
the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with 
the Secretariat and published by it” (United Nations, 1945). 
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disrupting the status quo. Bringing a broader contingency of peripheral countries to 
participate in the centre of global finance will change the landscape from within. If 
successful it will paradoxically do the opposite to what Goldman Sachs intended when it 
coined BRIC53. It will decentralise and balance international financial power, offering the 
group increased influence and legitimacy in the operation of international finance.  
A further feature which differentiates the Bank from other BRICS political 
commitments is that it directly remarks on the participation of non-BRICS states. While 
presently operating only among BRICS states, the founding Agreement proposes that it 
will later open to all UN member states; further entrenching UN authority (BRICS, 2014a). 
Significantly, as the singular institution that binds the group together, its planned inclusion 
of external countries indicates its broader intentions for international development; the 
purpose of the group clearly supersedes its current form. By opening to the broader 
international community BRICS presents its first real territorialising mechanism, pressuring 
the existing global infrastructure. Its potential expanded membership commands legal and 
ordered operation. As the showcase institution it renders manifest potential for influence.  
From its first summit Declaration, BRICS has “committed to advance the reform of 
international financial institutions, so as to reflect changes in the world economy” (BRICS, 
2009). The establishment of the Bank realises the second of its pronged strategy, to 
maintain internal pressure for reform as well as building alternative mechanisms. 
Critically, while it lambasts established organisations for privileging its founding members, 
BRICS instils similar favours in the NDB. While it seeks legitimacy by according the 
presidency to be determined upon a rotational basis, the Agreement obliges that the 
president is elected from one of the founding members, privileging founding members 
ahead of possible future members (BRICS, 2014a). The Agreement embeds power within 
the original membership, committing the same act that it accuses institutions such as the 
World Bank and IMF of doing. Further, by establishing “founding members having 55% of 
total voting power”, it ensures that the original group maintains a permanent majority, 
regardless of future membership (BRICS, 2014a). This provision further complicates BRICS’ 
quest for legitimacy, presenting future aspirations for dominance. BRICS’ hybrid strategy 
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requires constant navigation between its own and established scenarios. This is a 
management task, which requires constant reinsurance of it not being in disagreement 
with the norm. This complicated path explains its lack of institutional development.  
BRICS’ vision of networked independence legitimates cooperation. Its political 
commitments stress cooperation as non-exclusive; they are stated to be open to other 
countries. BRICS’ strategy is for members to sustain, not renege on, their relations with 
non-member states54. Transcending political allies, BRICS’ strategy is about fostering 
mutually beneficial cooperative partnerships. Institutionalisation, with the NDB as the 
central example, allows for principles to be displayed and executed, therefore averting 
political fealty. The establishing Agreement of the NDB expresses that its founding not 
only reflects but also provides the instrument through which cooperation is realised. The 
political commitments embody the relations as to not require further compacts, while 
instruments such as the NDB allows for external cooperation. It becomes the nexus 
through which the principle of cooperation can be incorporated globally. It also seeks to 
“cooperate with international organizations and other financial entities, and provide 
technical assistance for projects to be supported by the Bank” (BRICS, 2014a).  
The realisation of the NDB integrates BRICS into the domain of international 
organisations. It actively forms part of the international collective; it does not stand apart. 
Its interdependent formation and function are to obtain leverage to shape the global 
order accordingly. It does so by asserting its alternative narrative as a sine qua non for 
justifiable economic and social order; fulfilling the tasks that others have not. 
Apart from the NDB Agreement, BRICS members use Declarations, agreements and 
MOUs to manifest its political programmes. It constructs its international scenario 
external to institutional formations, but internal to the expression of established 
principles. BRICS programmes deliberatively give momentum to its intent. Instead of 
carrying legal obligation and shaped as political commitments, its programmes produce 
answers to questions that ask: if not the status quo, then what? Hollis and Newcomer’s 
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 “Each Party recognizes that the cooperation described in this Agreement is not exclusive and that each 
Party may enter into similar cooperation agreements with any other party or parties” (BRICS, 2014f). 
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(2009) model shows that political commitments in lieu of treaties allow for greater 1) 
flexibility, 2) credibility and 3) confidentiality (Hollis and Newcomer, 2009). 1) BRICS is by 
nature a loose and impermanent grouping; its agreements are strategically aimed at 
creating awareness, responding to evolving phenomena. Flexibility allows the absorption 
of shock; agreements are easily amendable, renegotiated and cancelled. 2) Credibility is a 
central facet of the entire BRICS project. Projecting credibility, through enacting values 
and norms is central to BRICS’ public diplomacy campaign. Through political agreements 
BRICS oppose the negative consequences of reneging on expectations and legally binding 
terms. It, therefore, precludes negative judgment. 3) BRICS is a nascent project that largely 
remains the work of member state officials. The classified channels between states, as 
well as the select publication of its interactions, allow for configured confidentiality; BRICS 
controls the image that it projects outward. This allows for the intergovernmental 
interaction that provides it progressive learning and development.  
BRICS operates centrally through these political commitments. Using Hollis and 
Newcomer’s description of political commitments, as establishing national commitments 
between two or more states, the majority of BRICS agreements constitute pledges or 
rhetorical treaties (Hollis and Newcomer, 2009). The pledges made between BRICS 
countries develop their bond through reciprocal commitments, establishing continued 
relations. These formulations are deliberate, as political commitments are excluded from 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and therefore are apparently excluded from 
legal consequences; “only politics governs the political commitment” (Hollis and 
Newcomer, 2009: 520). This practice, while avoiding international obligation advances 
their potential outcomes; “informality is best understood as a device for minimizing the 
impediments to cooperation” (Lipson, 1991: 500). Pledges make fewer demands and are 
open to amendments.  
However, as much as BRICS maintains that its obligations are not legally binding, 
the matter of pacta sunt servanda55 is as relevant for political agreements as it is for 
treaties. According to Lipson, legal scholars rarely differentiate between such agreements 
and official treaties (Lipson, 1991). This could be why BRICS has held much of its 
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 “Treaties shall be complied with” (Solomon, 2008). 
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interactions internal; maintaining the nations as the discussants and building trust in-
house. Lipson argues that “the dominant view is that international agreements, whatever 
their title, are legally binding upon the signatories, unless clearly stated otherwise” 
(Lipson, 1991: 502).  
Though many do not, various political commitments do state that they are not 
legally binding. The MOU on Cooperation among BRICS Export Credit Insurance Agencies 
clearly states that it is “only a statement of co-operative intent and sets forth no legal 
obligations for any participant” (BRICS, 2014b), the MOU on the Creation of the Joint BRICS 
Website commits that it “is not an international treaty and does not create rights and 
obligations regulated by international law” (BRICS, 2015c). Clearest is the Treaty for the 
Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which nominally is a treaty, 
but states: “the CRA does not possess independent international legal personality” (BRICS, 
2015d). The proviso of not being a legal entity is an undertaking to avoid direct 
subjugation to international law, asserting domestic judicature. The MOU on cooperation 
with the NDB and local development banks successfully compounds this sentiment: “this is 
a statement of good faith…it is not an international agreement nor does it create legally 
binding rights or obligations” (BRICS, 2014a). These expressions negate obligation. Many 
political commitments provide no such thing. They furnish an ambiguous commitment to 
international law, or simply display inconsistencies among an organisation with no central 
secretariat. The choice not to declare its commitments as treaties is a clear provision to 
maintain its structures strictly within its own ambit.  
The MOU is the preferred form of BRICS political commitments. MOUs 
systematically express particular schedules and objectives. According to the UN Handbook 
of Treaties, an MOU “sets out operational arrangement under a framework of 
international agreement” (United Nations, 2012). These are action-oriented undertakings, 
which as international agreements have inherent official value. The authority of these 
documents is less determined by their form and more by their content. They are furthered 
by the acknowledged positions of signatories. BRICS makes its position clear by not using 
language that indicates international law. Whereas a treaty may designate “entry into 
force” (BRICS, 2014a), an MOU may instead be worded as “become effective” (BRICS, 
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2015e). The very classification as “Agreement” expresses binding nature, whereas the 
“Understanding” in MOU, indicates something less definitive. Furthermore, words such as 
“undertaken”, “terms” and “conditions” (BRICS, 2014a) incur a greater obligation, 
whereas “will” and “provisions” (BRICS, 2014b) avoids language that is binding. As such 
they do not provide exchanges of promise, but instead public statements of cooperation. 
BRICS MOUs are greatly aimed towards setting up systems of support through 
reciprocating gain, sharing56 and cooperation; these are central across all BRICS political 
commitments. In this they “aim at promoting and strengthening the cooperation” (BRICS, 
2016d), to “strengthen and enhance…relations among member countries” and “explore 
cooperation” (BRICS, 2015e). BRICS agreements demonstrate its raison d’être as principle-
oriented, vis-à-vis structure or institution based.  
While MOUs serve the function of building and exchanging knowledge, they also 
serve to mediate spaces comprising diverse agents. BRICS countries have great differences 
in their legal, political, social and other systems. Unlike its counterpart or counterpoint the 
G7, which shares certain tangible features57, BRICS represents a functionally and 
ideologically diverse group. Achieving momentum, through building commonality and 
trust forms part of its procedural aims. Political agreements are mechanisms to attain 
corresponding cultures amongst the officials taking part in the formative phases, but also 
for populations who are newly brought into contact. The agreements are productions of 
public diplomacy; constructing interfaces among BRICS publics, setting up infrastructure 
and enabling learning. It thereby manifests clear communication channels of shared 
purpose. These operations align beliefs with practice. They produce and exhibit values, 
often emanating from and directed beyond that of local systems. They are however 
relationally organic as they are created through the joining of national bodies. Rallying 
around core values the political commitments facilitate and develop political persuasion, 
through familiarisation and acceptance. The difference in culture is pardoned through 
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 “In order to support and encourage trade and investments between and among the BRICS countries, 
Participants agree to assist each other in obtaining information for risk assessment and claims management 
with regards to projects in their respective countries. The Participants may, periodically, share experience on 
export credit issues and investment insurance in areas of common interest” (BRICS, 2014b). 
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 The G7 are all advanced liberal capitalist countries. It comprises the “world’s most industrially advanced 
economies” (G7, 2017). 
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openness and willingness to exchange. Member states’ efforts to align show a will beyond 
association. BRICS aspires for the trust that is substantiated by bridging difference through 
cooperation. 
EXPLORING ACTION PLANS 
Summit Declarations form the central communication tools of BRICS. They are, for the 
purposes of this study, not considered programmatic but rather discussed as functional, in 
chapter four. The Action Plans, introduced at the Sanya Summit in 2011, are appended to 
the Declarations. Between 2011 and 2014 the Action Plans were named together with the 
Declaration58, but since 2015 the Declaration and Action Plan have been disconnected in 
what can be interpreted as a means to structurally distinguish the documents. The result 
is that these Action Plans, instead of being presented as mere appendages, take on a life 
of their own. Due to this deliberate detachment and their programmatic nature Action 
Plans are analysed here.  
An Action Plan maps the sequence of tasks as well as the resources required for a 
strategy to be successful (Business Dictionary, 2017). The 2011 Action Plan is purposed as 
“laying the foundation for the BRICS cooperation” (BRICS, 2011c). It is instructive that this 
document refers to “foundation”, suggesting the commencement of a coherent strategy; 
committing resources to goals. This document neatly divides “enhance existing 
cooperation programmes” from “new areas of cooperation” and “new areas to explore” 
(BRICS, 2011c). The continued publication of these categories was either not a matter of 
importance or regarded as excessively ambitious. This procedure was not repeated. 
Another feature that was only the case in 2011 and changed subsequently was the 
language used. The points of that Plan speak instructively to the very persons executing it. 
For example: “hold the third meeting”, “continue to hold” and “encourage cooperation” 
(BRICS, 2011c). From 2012 the language evolved. Events were now merely listed, thereby 
less determined. This also spoke to a non-specific and therefore comprehensive audience. 
Less particularity ensured fewer obligations, obviating responsibility and possible 
remonstration.  
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The format for the years 2012-2014 maintained similarity. Throughout these years 
the order of points presented a hierarchy of importance. In each document the meeting of 
Foreign Affairs Ministers on the margins of the UNGA would be mentioned first, 
designating this gathering as the most important outside the leaders’ summits. It also 
distinguished the central authority to the UNGA, suggesting that BRICS’ form is not only 
incumbent upon its own meetings, but that its partnership at international fora plays a 
constituting part. Meeting on the margins of external events has been a central means 
that BRICS has used to build its relations, as well as its influence. It has variously met at 
the World Bank, G20 and IMF, but also places such as the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering, an initiative of the G7 that all BRICS countries are members of. Its 
regular assembly at these external spaces affords for a strengthening tactical interface, as 
well as elevating its relevance in the eyes of other states.  
Its Action Plans foregrounds it at ministerial meetings and is followed by meetings 
between working groups and consultations among permanent missions and embassies. 
They furthermore specifically mention meetings on the margins of sustainable 
development, climate and environment-related international fora. The recognition of 
these meetings designates them as useful and relevant. These are potentially chosen as 
places where BRICS could make its mark, as later established by their featuring centrally in 
the strategy of the NDB59. The 2014 document consolidated a similar, expanded structure 
to that of previous years by introducing a new phenomenon: commencing the hosting of 
events which in the past BRICS members would attend externally60. The materialisation of 
these kinds of events demonstrates the creation of its own narrative. 
There is a substantial shift from 2014 to 2015. Both 2015 and 2016 include 
significantly more points than those preceding them, from 23 in 2014 to 72 in 2015 and 
then 136 in 2016. This growth, together with the introduction of the subheading “other 
initiatives of the Russian Chairship” (2015) and “key initiatives during India’s BRICS 
Chairmanship” (2016) suggests signs of individual countries contending over control of 
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 The Bank is set up “to address infrastructure gaps and sustainable development needs” (New 
Development Bank, 2014a: 1). 
60
 For example: the inaugural BRICS Seminar of Officials and Experts on Population Matters. 
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what had been largely group-based affairs. The separately named 2015 Plan moves away 
from listing preference to UNGA ministerial meetings. Together with reneging to stress 
“consultative” meetings at “the margins of relevant…international fora” (mentioned 2012-
2014), it instead refers to internal matters, first. This is supported by the significant 
increase in internal fora and meetings.  
The decided shift beyond official governmental diplomacy presents a 
consequential development. This makes place for an increased number of events that 
relate to public diplomacy and cultural exchange; where the interactive production and 
sharing of values is central. Before 2015 diversity of BRICS cultures were only affirmed 
(2010) and cooperation was to be explored (2011 and 2014) or encouraged (2012 and 
2014); exchange among cultures, at least in the Action Plans, remained in word only.  
The sprawling Action Plans since 2015 bring various public diplomacy and cultural 
exchange programmes into being. These motion BRICS beyond the official sphere and 
increasingly invoke public operation. In 2015 the first meeting between the Ministers of 
Culture led to the instructive BRICS Agreement on Cultural Cooperation. A joint website 
was launched, a youth summit held and an MOU signed creating the BRICS Network 
University. There was also a contest and forum for young scientists and entrepreneurs, 
while exchange among BRICS media professionals was mooted. Perhaps the most telling 
was the introduction of the Civil Society Forum, joining the Academic, Think Tank, as well 
as Business and Financial Fora as associate platforms meeting before the summit. By 
inviting one hundred civil society participants, from healthcare, education and sustainable 
development BRICS strategically brought public consultation into the official proceedings, 
before antagonism manifested on the outside. This introduction suggests official 
apprehension of the possible challenges the group could face as its influence advances. It 
hereby also profits from, recognises and tactically checks the ideas of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). 
According to the World Alliance for Citizen Participation’s Enabling Environment 
Index which “examines the conditions within civil society work” both Brazil and South 
Africa perform above average, while Russia, China and India all tendering particularly poor 
results when it comes to the environment for civil participation (CIVICUS, 2013). Though 
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the BRICS platform presents an external reality, the different compositions and conditions 
of member states could make for a divergent reality. Apart from restraining resistance, 
these platforms are constructed to facilitate direct social interaction among member 
countries, a place for principles and values espoused by the leaders to take root. 
Described by President Putin: “the role of people’s diplomacy in building trust 
and understanding between countries…is especially important” (Putin, 2015). The 2015 
Civil BRICS Forum met to discuss “building racial, ethnic and religious tolerance and non-
discrimination, regulation of migration and integration of migrants” (BRICS, 2015j). Such 
meetings and platforms are potent public diplomacy mechanisms. They incorporate 
internally, at an official level, what traditionally would be the substance of alternative 
bodies, such as NGOs. These meetings lay the foundation of a show of unison around 
shared values; projecting a positive, progressive and inclusive image. 
The Plans are public diplomacy tools. They are crafted to impress. The very first 
listed event of the 2016 Plan is suggestively a Women Parliamentarians’ Forum. The 
prioritising of this new event points to it being designed to respond to the contemporary 
international movement for improved representation of women. Further such initiatives 
advance the development of inter-group interaction and exchange, including the BRICS 
Friendship Cities Conclave. The inclusion of the subheading People-to-People & Business 
Exchange shows that the exclusive official diplomacy from before has been surpassed, to 
focus on public diplomacy. Many events launched in 2015 have been repeated, while new 
initiatives such as the consolidation of the commercial partnership under a BRICS Trade 
Fair, the organisation of a BRICS Under-17 Football Tournament, hosting of a BRICS 
Convention of Tourism as well as BRICS Film Festival all offer access and promotion of local 
peoples and cultures. These events function as bridges, accessed not only by officials, but 
affording the broader public of the host country the opportunity to showcase itself to the 
people of other member states. These are mechanisms to better understand fellow 
member states, to inculcate BRICS solidarity and even identity. 
 In total, the evolution of the Action Plans demonstrates the group’s systematic 
and consolidated growth. When an event is held it is very likely to be held again the next 
year. The BRICS Fortaleza Summit Compliance Report suggests that “BRICS countries 
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complied well with the development commitments at the core of their agenda”, achieving 
around 70% compliance in 2014 and close to that average at the three previous summits 
(Larionova and Kirton, 2015). The public expression of values has progressed steadily, yet 
it remains the documents that offer its clearest expression.  
PROGRAMMATIC DOCUMENTS: DEMONSTRATING A GLOBAL ETHOS 
Programmatic documents reciprocally advance the principles that it employs through its 
utilisation. These documents are usually relatively terse, frequently under five pages long. 
The exceptions are the NDB and CRA agreements, which have monetary obligations. These 
are laid out in greater contractual detail, their purpose greatly different from that of 
political commitments that do not have set timelines; these either continue indefinitely or 
stipulate provisions for renegotiation. These properties, together with the freedom to 
withdraw upon notice periods of six months or less, provide for the managing of relations 
and greater agency, obviating complicating ramifications. It also proposes that the group is 
bigger than any individual country. If one member were to leave, the group would subsist. 
Chiefly, this is to ensure amicable cooperation. The documents are clearly structured not 
to impose. Regardless of the name, whether MOU, agreement or Declaration the 
programmatic documents are soft pacts that offer the same format and seek the same 
outcome. It is within the recitals of each document that the terms of agreement are laid 
out and that values are centrally expressed. These are therefore put forward as the 
channels through which commitment is to be carried out. Though mostly non-legal these 
are nevertheless duly formal, suggesting earnestness. The documents bring different 
countries into consolidation, creating the platform that allows the networking among 
them.  
BRICS’ rhetoric substantiates the world as multipolar. In 2015 The Strategy for 
BRICS Economic Partnership was adopted as a key code towards the desired outcomes of 
advancing “peace, security, prosperity and development in multipolar, interconnected and 
globalised world” (BRICS, 2015b). These collective aims are conditional on the acceptance 
and partnership of reciprocal sovereignty; to “accomplish the cooperation…and to 
exchange information on a regular basis, the Parties shall proceed in accordance with their 
respective internal rules” (BRICS, 2015e).  
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The agency of BRICS is inherently limited; interaction among the states is premised 
to “account for national interests, priorities, growth and development strategies of 
Member States” (BRICS, 2015b). The individuation of each member is underwritten by 
their “commitment to international law and recognition of the central role of the United 
Nations” (BRICS, 2015b). The role of the group is to unite individual states in trust, 
committing to cooperation. The ethos embodied in the political commitments forms the 
intergovernmental vehicle towards achieving the goals of the group. The Strategy 
accordingly describes its basic principles as “openness, sharing of information and 
consensus in decision-making” (BRICS, 2015b).  
The principles that form the core of BRICS and its programmatic documentation 
are 1) equality, 2) sharing and 3) cooperation. BRICS countries’ foundation in sovereignty 
establishes their equality, lending towards an integrated relationship of trust and 
increased partnership. Equality is expressed through willing mutualism or the practice of 
reciprocating understanding, learning and endeavouring towards consensus. One 
document puts forward that the “striving for strengthening and further 
developing...cooperation among the BRICS countries (is) based on the principles of 
equality and mutual benefit” (BRICS, 2015f). Hereby equality is provided as a condition for 
group accomplishment. The MOU itself is a means to advance (as its title suggests) mutual 
understanding. It is an appeal for coordinated expression of intent, constructing greater 
interaction between the agents, not by declaration, but by consigning intent: “parties 
intend to establish a working group” (BRICS, 2015f).  
Programmatic documents project BRICS as a developing partnership, committed to 
open and mutual interaction. This occurs through the commitment to and execution of 
the networking events where ideals are performed. Such expression of stayed 
commitment intends for increased opening up and awareness of each other. Here the 
BRICS Agreement on the Cooperation in the Field of Culture is an excellent example. This 
Agreement commits to what it reflexively calls BRICS values: “the spirit of openness, 
inclusiveness, equality, respect for cultural diversity, and mutual respect and learning” 
(BRICS, 2015g). The values prepare the table for cultural dialogue and friendship. 
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Facilitating a commensurate and sympathetic climate prepares a favourable space of 
interaction for these disparate countries.   
Emphasis on equality is directed toward establishing cooperation, toward 
embodying the commensurate multilateral system. It, however, does not create many 
tangible measures to ensure responsibility and maintenance. The 2015 MOU on the 
Creation of the Joint BRICS Website was set up to open BRICS countries to each other and 
the world; “to disseminate information on BRICS values, goals and practical activities 
among the public of our countries as well as the international community” (BRICS, 2015c). 
Through the MOU the respective Foreign Affairs Ministries, as parties, committed a joint 
effort of public diplomacy. Members were enjoined to “maintain properly their national 
modules”, their news feeds, as well as “posting of all the information in the official 
language of the State of that Party in each module of the BRICS website” (BRICS, 2015c). 
As chair, Russia launched the website infobrics.org. The website which was envisioned to 
be adopted by all members remains poorly represented, except for Russia which is the 
only state to constitute it. Though all countries are given equal access and agency through 
the MOU it is unclear whether the parties agreed on this specific site. While equal 
members’ independence guarantees positive interaction, it also complicates decision 
making, as there is no central authority.  
Furthermore, each country already has its own efforts of public diplomacy, 
including websites of the respective Foreign Affairs Ministries, none of which links or 
mentions this BRICS site. In the years following the MOU, India (2016), China (2017) and 
South Africa (2018) have all developed their own, additional websites for their 
chairmanship. Meant as an effort to synchronise, through manifest equality, the project of 
a joint website has produced a disaggregated, muddled result. A further Russian effort to 
coordinate BRICS’ affairs was presented in the form of a virtual secretariat. At its 
announcement in 2013 Russian Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak said: “We will 
depend on modern technology and establish an electronic secretariat so that we avoid 
getting into too much administrative work. An electronic secretariat would store all 
necessary documents and information” (The BRICS Post, 2013). Two years later, utilising 
its chairmanship, Russia again pushed for the establishment of a virtual secretariat. 
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Though it is possible that it has been launched and is maintained confidentially there has 
been no further official mention thereof.  
The nonexistence of a (public) secretariat motions member states’ wariness of 
external institutions to also be relevant internal to BRICS. Instead of aggregating their 
agency into an additional body, the different states each chooses to manage its own 
affairs, so as to avoid overreach and dominance in the group. This illustrates consistency; 
BRICS’ powers are differentiated, not pooled. Chairmanship of the group rotates on a 
yearly basis, maintaining power internally and central to each member state, not deployed 
into a supplementary body. As an expression of its equality, each state rather creates a 
new scenario each year to avoid alliance creep. While it constructs a Bank with specified, 
tangible obligations, it dodges the management of a persuasive, intangible platform that 
would require extensive negotiation.  
Openness and equality are appeals to engender commonality. This allows the 
overcoming of obstacles between BRICS, such as the novelty of the project and the 
divergence between states. It expresses a willingness to relate; allows for and encourages 
credibility to take root in a friendly atmosphere. Essentially it establishes space for sharing 
and cooperation to take place. When the MOU on Cooperation in Science, Technology and 
Innovation recites “recognising...principles of voluntary participation, equality, mutual 
benefit, reciprocity”, it is essentially creating space for relational exploration between the 
parties (BRICS, 2015h). 
Programmatic documents often execute upon the declarations made at summits. 
For example, the 2011 Sanya Declaration authorises the need “to explore cooperation in 
the sphere of science, technology and innovation” (BRICS, 2011c). BRICS documents 
function as the pathways for their collaboration. Here equality and mutual benefit are 
made practical by “harnessing synergies”, toward the stated objective of establishing “a 
strategic framework for cooperation” while “utilising shared experiences and 
complementarities” (BRICS, 2015h).  
The group manifests equality through its various political commitments, such as 
the MOU on Culture, which states that: “Any amendment to this Agreement shall be made 
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by agreement of all of the Parties” (BRICS, 2015g). Equality in toto is, however, a 
complicated matter. This is especially seen in the light of monetary obligations. The CRA 
has three levels of state liability: China commits 41%; India, Brazil and Russia each 18% 
and South Africa 5%. Their access limits are also differentiated; indicating that though they 
express equality, member states are conferred different capacities, forestalling equality of 
contribution and therefore complete equality (BRICS, 2015d). Participation by all member 
states is however strategically paramount to what percentage each commits. The 
comprehensive partnership presents a shared commitment to ideals. 
Principles such as equality and openness set the platform for exchange among the 
parties. Sharing is at the very core of BRICS, it links the different members into one entity; 
open interaction is the engine of the networked order. There is only one programmatic 
document that does not stress exchange or sharing centrally, the legally binding NDB 
Agreement. The interfaces that bring BRICS together serve the purpose of sharing 
information and providing reciprocal knowledge. Essentially this is not the sharing of 
goods or other tangible items, but rather of knowledge and the learned experience; it 
opens a space of flows. These are the assets of the information economy and through 
centralising these features BRICS concentrates a network economy, allowing for 
unrestricted gain through access. In this information economy, the resources are 
intangible and non-exhaustive, interest is accommodated by working together and 
benefits are not determined in a winner-takes-all scenario, but can be multiplied and 
shared.  
Propagating a relationship of mutual benefit is central to this attraction. Operating 
through networks, BRICS mostly does not have to replicate institutions that already exist 
in the different countries. The BRICS Network University is just such an example. It brings 
together different schools and departments from across the states to share their academic 
ways and means, therefore not requiring new structures to be built. This mode of 
operation ensures the efficient sharing of skills while avoiding redundancy. It also 
contributes to different states frequenting themselves with the others, allowing the 
development of shared understanding and a shared narrative. Herein BRICS functions as 
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intergovernmental communication mechanism bringing together best practice in an 
incorporated system of exchange; benefitting from sharing instead of competing.  
Most BRICS documents refer to information sharing. Yet with no enforcement 
mechanism the act of sharing remains interest-driven. Sharing is encouraged as to allow 
for positive reciprocity, win-win relations, which require the persuasion of trust. BRICS 
political commitments are tools to rhetorically construct format and authority for sharing 
to take place. When the Agricultural Action Plan 2012-2016 stipulates that “BRICS 
countries shall share/arrange/mobilize financial resources”, its first point stresses the 
“creation of basic agricultural exchange system of BRICS countries” (BRICS, 2012a). 
Promoting shared responsibility is a common feature and a clear goal emerging across 
formative BRICS initiatives. In the Agricultural Plan equal obligation is bestowed upon all 
members, each state receiving chairmanship over a set topic for their national working 
groups to investigate and prepare subsequent feedback. This practice of sharing 
responsibility, ensuring that mechanisms bestow responsibility to each state, is a central 
feature of BRICS.   
In preparing its combined document Towards a Long-Term Strategy for BRICS, the 
BRICS Think Tank Council demonstrated exemplary sharing. It organised its project across 
five pillars, which they then delegated to each country, with working groups comprising at 
least one member from each other country. This was done so that the “diagnosis and 
recommendations corresponds to the broad view shared by various members of society in 
the five countries” (BRICS Think Tank Council, 2015). While the principle is underscored, 
the details are left vague as to not impose, specify or manage impressions. The “exchange 
of policy perspectives and priorities lays an essential basis” that underpins the BRICS Trade 
and Investment Cooperation Framework (BRICS, 2013d). It is in “sharing policy practices”, 
that BRICS constructs its expanded knowledge economies. Its willingness to exchange 
knowledge is not a selfless act but instead promises a four-fold return, benefitting from 
the different cultures across the nations. Openness to understanding each other lays the 
groundwork for expanded ability and expertise; by these means the group advances 




While programmatic documentation centrally constructs official commitments, 
thereby compiling layers of organisational structure, the shift towards greater civic 
participation has opened these programmes and learnings to the public, building further 
capacity to inform upon policy. Nevertheless, commonality through exchange is difficult 
when members are so divergent. While the network ensures diverging individual 
contributions, it still requires a common language. Assuring global access, sharing 
common ground, BRICS documents are compiled in the English language. The 2015 
Agreement on Cultural Cooperation explains that “(T)he English language shall be used as 
a working language”; the CRA says that “the official language of the CRA shall be English”, 
while the MOU on Cooperation among BRICS Export Credit Insurance Agencies clearly 
states that “all written communications required or permitted under the MOU shall be in 
English” (BRICS, 2015g; BRICS, 2015d; BRICS, 2014b). Though English is only an official 
language in India and South Africa, its use standardises exchange among members and 
opens access to international publics. It also decentralises agency, suggesting BRICS to be 
a global formation and not dominated by one of its powerful members forcing its language 
on the others.  
As a collective of individual entities, BRICS is sustained and advanced through 
cooperation, realising its multilateral network. There is no BRICS without cooperation; it is 
therefore that it is stressed in every single political commitment and every document it 
releases. The greater the exercise of other principles, the greater cooperation is needed 
and subsequently formed between members. While the goal of the political commitment 
is often plainly stated as cooperation, its way is likely to involve equality and sharing. The 
BRICS Trade and Investment Cooperation Framework assays the promotion of “trade, 
investment and economic cooperation among the BRICS” through “enhancing information 
exchange on trade/investment policies and business opportunities through mechanisms 
including websites for trade/investment information sharing” (BRICS, 2013d). The MOU 
between Competition Authorities offers details of the causal relation between cooperation 
and outcomes; “cooperation between parties will contribute to improve and strengthen 
effectiveness” (BRICS, 2016d). Cooperation is, therefore, the supporting essence and gives 
force to BRICS. The purpose of this MOU, among others, is to set up an institutional 
partnership between parties through a general framework for multilateral cooperation. 
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MOUs and political agreements provide the substance for the exercise of this momentum. 
By linking two or more entities together the establishing documents gives shape and 
substance.  
While BRICS’ organic documentation narrowly concords to international law, an 
informative phenomenon appears across programmatic documentation. In some MOUs 
BRICS state that “all cooperation pursuant to this Memorandum of Understanding will be 
subject to domestic law in force in the territories of the Parties” (BRICS, 2016d). This 
comment affirms national supremacy, suggesting all actions to remain to the sovereign 
discretion of the individual states. This is a feature of its non-binding preferences. This 
particular MOU explicitly states that it “shall not be considered as an international treaty 
and does not establish rights or obligations for the Parties” (BRICS, 2016d). This allocation 
of authority, as expressed earlier, introduces ambiguity and begs the question as to the 
position of international law. This MOU further includes as an annexure, reference to the 
actual corresponding domestic legislation of each BRICS member state. The peculiarity of 
this order suggests the cooperation of states transcends legal cohesion provided under 
international law, developing special bonds, when not alliances. These provisions, allowing 
sovereign freedom, engender an insider/outsider divide; institutionalising, contrary to 
their commitments to international law, a unity among particular states. Though it is 
careful in its construction not to form an alliance, there are nonetheless features of 
syndication appearing.  
Further agreements render similar assessment. While the NDB Agreement is 
submitted to the UN Treaty Collection it also states that it is subject “to the laws, 
programs and policies of respective governments and, specifically, to laws regulating 
banking secrecy and regulations to which each Party may be subject in their respective 
countries” (BRICS, 2014a). Some documents, such as the MOU between the NDB and local 
development banks commit large swathes (here about a tenth) of its content to detail 
how it is not legally binding. Instead, it seeks to instil trust in the individual supremacy of 
each state; establishing the foundations of the network (BRICS, 2015e). This realisation of 
cooperation significantly imparts authority through the network, avoiding external 
authority or institutionalisation. This raises a further question: if it can function together 
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fluently, then what does this prove? This regards central, yet unanswered matters of 
international regulation, law and the role of established international agencies. 
Increasingly, BRICS will function as a global governance experiment.   
A central way to avoid confrontation proves to be the entangling of interests - 
further opening up allows for greater cooperation. While constructing new initiatives the 
documentation importantly also activates collective presence in the UN and other 
international organisations. BRICS’ initiatives act as a way to bring divergent countries 
together, facilitating unified positions in the UN. The Agricultural Cooperation Action Plan 
suggests the creation of a BRICS grouping in the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation; 
to collaboratively “act also within the United Nations Food Program” (BRICS, 2012a). 
These initiatives advance generally what the BRICS Trade and Investment Cooperation 
Framework refers to specifically as “strengthening coordination in the World Trade 
Organisation’s Doha Round, as well as in other multilateral fora” (BRICS, 2013d). Strategic 
coordination inside international organisations allows the collective to push toward 
resolutions while maintaining internal good standing with the international community. As 
a precaution, such as not defaulting and causing internal issues, platforms such as CRA 
maintain central links and provisions set by the IMF. Doing this prevents internal 
contentions, maintaining financial resolutions on the outside of the platform.  
What its unity allows for is a greater collective say. While the type of coordination 
within BRICS takes place first according to domestic laws, international standards are used 
to maintain unity and correspondence. In order to ensure correlation of means, its 
interactions are premised, as detailed in the Economic Strategy “within the UN system as 
well as with other international economic organizations in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of the UN Charter” (BRICS, 2015b). Correspondence to the UN is 
also used to annul any potential threat, as well as to legitimate its interactions. This is seen 
in the Network University MOU pledging to implement the UN Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation’s Constitution, Article 1: “to contribute to peace and security by 
promoting collaboration among nations” (BRICS, 2015i). In adopting these goals as its own 
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initiatives, BRICS establishes cooperation not only in the UN but also with the UN61. It 
legitimates the UN and in return legitimates itself. 
Cooperation is both a strategic way and an end. The commitments are employed 
to build forward; they are evolutionary. Most documents do not simply establish, but seek 
to “strengthen cooperation” (BRICS, 2012a). Centrally these established frameworks are 
“open ended and progressive”, with sustained cooperation leading to partnership. 
Common among recitals of various documents is the charge to pursue and effectuate the 
summit Declarations. These undertakings detail the narrow chain of command which 
allow for following through on promises.  
Through its burgeoning interaction and deliberation, the group is increasingly 
creating a cooperation-driven international system. Though BRICS originally took shape 
through the official, technical realm, it is increasingly expanding to include the public. As a 
final illuminating case study the Action Plan of Promoting BRICS Media Cooperation is a 
pledge to “building a fairer international communication order” (BRICS, 2017d). If the NDB 
is implementing a form of the NAM-inspired NIEO then this Action Plan strikingly reminds 
of NWICO’s plans to reshape global media representation. It offers a timely attempt to 
“break the information monopoly and rebalance international public opinion...building a 
fairer international communication order” (BRICS, 2017d). It represents the decided push 
for greater BRICS influence. Through this Action Plan BRICS seeks to expand its public 
diplomacy campaign beyond governmental projects and into the realm of private and 
state-affiliated institutions; advancing national interests. Cooperation remains central, 
while the agent changes from official to private. Legitimacy is however feigned as 
advancing the interests of the parties involved. Its execution is to balance what it regards 
unjust media practices and domination of public opinion. 
Through broad participation it seeks to develop counter-narratives; slowly 
constructing new scenarios. Significantly this suggests greater group involvement in the 
functioning of global politics. The first point on its agenda is “jointly sending out press 
releases on international major issues, improve coordination on topics-setting...firmly 
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 See reference to the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation on page 103. 
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safeguard international equity and justice as well as lawful rights and interests of 
developing countries” (BRICS, 2017d). Coordinating the same message across these 
different countries builds parity and unity. Not with each other directly but through 
exposure to the same message, indirectly standardising the messages that audiences 
receive; shaping opinions and consent. To execute jointly upon these matters is in effect 
to coordinate as a bloc; building and shaping public opinion of the greater world. Though 
countries might be disparate and might differ in reaction, the exposure they receive will 
be such as to soft balance the status quo through a rhetoric of legitimation and 
delegitimation. 
The Plan confirms that media outlets, a broad contingent of private and state-run 
organisations from across member states “agreed to strengthen media’s social 
responsibility”, to “demonstrate the achievements and prospects of BRICS economic 
development, and social progress” (BRICS, 2017d). The direction given to media outlets is 
to report kindly on BRICS, for them to persuade publics of BRICS’ work and to pursue 
greater convergence of opinion. Furthermore, it is to associate BRICS with the norms and 
values it espouses (BRICS, 2017d). Through joint interviews and press releases, it not only 
achieves unity of opinion of itself and the world at large, but also unity regarding the 
architecture that constructs and emits its messages. The persuasion, of the outlets 
themselves, is BRICS’ prime target. Through this broadly endorsed Action Plan they seem 
one step closer to this goal.  
CONCLUSION  
This chapter has detailed how BRICS does not seek to break down the international form, 
but achieve power inside of it, producing its own narrative and scenario. Its operations 
function to pick apart (delegitimate) and align to (legitimate) features of the existing 
order. Political commitments are BRICS’ building blocks, the foundations that shape its will 
and form. They are configurations where principles, values and norms are presented and 
where its ethos is postured. Programmes motion toward and do not greatly implement 
alternative infrastructures. They afford an understanding of style and are often more 
about appearance than implementation. This is evidenced by the failed website. Instead, 
individual members each use BRICS as a mechanism to pursue their own interests, 
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preserving independence and avoiding notions of an alliance. Baracuhy writes: “We are 
not living in a period of revisionisms, but of adjustments and reforms to the existing rules 
and structures that underlie the global order. Today’s rising powers are ‘status-quo 
powers’” (Baracuhy, 2012). BRICS’ strategic communications motion towards the 
international acknowledgement of this perception, pursuing reform and the agency it feels 



















ANALYSIS OF BRICS’ ORGANIC DOCUMENTATION   
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter has detailed how BRICS does not wish to revolutionise global 
governance; instead, it pursues power from within a stable global governance system. 
BRICS’ rhetorical strategy to manifest and represent the international order is based upon 
advancing its own legitimacy, while delegitimating dominant powers; occupying greater 
agency. The central question in this chapter asks how BRICS pursues its quest for influence 
and reform in global governance through the Declarations that emerge from its summit 
diplomacy. The BRICS summit Declarations, the organic outcome document of its yearly 
leaders’ summit signifies the functioning of BRICS. They explicate the properties and 
thought of evolving operational structure. These documents substantiate the clearest 
articulation of BRICS’ endeavour towards securing influence in global governance. They 
are displays of significance. In BRICS’ pursuit for recognition, credibility and legitimacy, the 
summits and their Declarations detail its alternative, yet internal, regime in networked 
order. To consider BRICS as an entity of global governance this chapter will first articulate 
it as an intergovernmental regime. The various concomitant concepts and features that 
constitute the regime are discussed before looking directly at BRICS’ summit diplomacy 
and global governance. Exclusive use of summit Declarations narrows in on BRICS’ core 
strategies and tactics.  
THE BRICS REGIME 
BRICS is formed by sovereign states collaborating in a realist approach; as a rationalist 
pursuit for power. Haslam’s view of realism is useful, affirming that under nominal 
multilateralism states rationally maximise their self-interest (Haslam in Goodin, 2010). Yet, 
while realism traditionally suggests coercion as the path to interests, BRICS rather holds 
cooperation and therefore decentralisation central. Cooperation as central means allows 
BRICS countries, in the realist guise, to maintain a differentiated pursuit of national 
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interests. Narrow national interests are complemented by comprehensive strategic 
interests: the achievement of a broadened spectrum of means and ways that will facilitate 
and permit the greater amassing of individual benefit.  
BRICS’ unified forum does not accord with individual interests. It never reflects 
specific individual national projections, nor does it combine to propose a collective BRICS 
Consensus. Instead, its projected goal is always distinguished as being of universal 
concern62. This pursuit of collective influence to actualise, not dismantle, the multilateral 
international domain, is where its interests play out. As discussed in the previous chapter 
the norms and values it utilises as concepts are embedded in the prevailing UN order that 
it emerges from. Its hybrid strategy, therefore, sees it conceiving itself as realist and 
idealist, both situated inside (allowing the occupation of leadership and dissemination of 
critique) as well as outside (avoiding responsibility) of the established system. This 
produces new modalities for achieving common ground. In doing this it radically avoids 
dominating practices of international institutions.  
Incorporated under their primacy as sovereign states, BRICS members converge 
around the ideas, norms, rules, and expectations captured in each summit Declaration. 
These features establish it, according to Krasner’s (1983) definition, as a regime in 
international relations (Krasner, 1983). Regimes are mostly incorporeal, they exercise a 
normative framework. The broader order consists of a “system of territorially based and 
sovereign states that interact in the absence of any central government…regimes are 
regularly nested in international order in the sense that they build on the foundation 
provided” (Young, 1989: 14). Regimes see actors engage through engaging principles; they 
do not have administrative capacities. The creation of a regime is consolidated when 
individual states, not bound in alliance or bloc, collaborate in pursuit of consolidated 
interests; regimes are therefore instances of international cooperation. The regime can be 
considered the institution, the strategic ways and means, where the broader order is the 
end. BRICS’ formation as a regime is appropriate. It strategically embodies the established 
normative framework, pressuring other regimes, such as Bretton Woods institutions.  
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process for building a universal and integrated development agenda with poverty eradication as the central 
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Tactically BRICS uses its high-profile leaders’ summits, together with the resulting 
summit Declaration, as its central governing substance. The BRICS regime consolidates the 
individual power and knowledge of member states to form a rational pursuit of interests. 
It finds consensus among states based on sovereign interest before pragmatic 
implementation.  
This new cooperative regime functions akin to OPEC’s diffused agency in broader 
international relations (Tudoroiu, 2012). While OPEC started from limited capacity, of 
focused input between disaggregated nations, it gained power through its collectivised 
approach. Though it holds sway over only a single economic commodity (oil), OPEC affects 
broader geopolitical influence. BRICS commences from a similar, yet expanded approach, 
coordinating among countries whose leverage over an increasing portion of the global 
economy and power affords it agency. The BRICS regime de-personalises this undertaking, 
cloaking individual pursuits under a broader international demand for legitimacy.  
Both OPEC and BRICS, attuned to the realist view, calls for a modified, state-
centred international economic order. Akin to contemporary BRICS, the Financial Times 
wrote, in 1961 of OPEC, that “it is, indeed, the psychological effect of OPEC’s very 
existence which may have the most important consequences” (Tudoroiu, 2012).63 Singular 
countries may not have corresponding interests or characteristics. The matters that 
separate these states, as studied at length (Cameron, 2011; Laïdi, 2012; Armijo, 2007; 
Pant, 2013), is of little significance and relevance here. BRICS focuses on what it is and 
wants, avoiding otherwise. Though member states are not constitutionally analogous, its 
regime emerges from and is ordered by the same, rule-based order. BRICS should be seen 
in this light. Its regime is institutionally concentrated; its members are beneficiaries of the 
existing system. BRICS is a new exemplary regime (exclusive) in the established (inclusive) 
networked international order. 
The BRICS regime categorically precludes singular leadership by any one member 
state. Nor is BRICS a determined feature. Nowhere is BRICS presented as fixed reality. The 
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procedural manifestation of the regime, exhibiting beneficial relationships among 
members, is its power; the greater invigoration of network order is its end. It is here that 
the nation states engage, in the tangible, real and inclusive system, above the BRICS 
regime. In the networked order, power does not exist in a vacuum; it moves through 
communication, it is obtained through displacement. Communication intimately affects 
the functioning of power. It works to gain trust; its strategic use centrally constructs and 
maintains relationships (Castells, 2013). The rise of the network order, the communication 
order, entails the change in the relationship of power. Boundaries and frameworks are 
transcended. It is, therefore, that nation-states change their structure, their functions and 
understandings of power, ensuring they maintain command (Castells, 2013). This evolving 
nature and form of power suggest that once significant geopolitical change occurs, 
regardless of responsibility, continued BRICS operation appears unlikely. As a vehicle for 
reform BRICS will cease its reason to be if it fully achieves its aims. This will entail the 
broader order emulating the regime.  
The development of instruments, processes and goals strategically evolves the 
regime. One such tactic is presented in the expansion towards broader participation, 
avoiding exclusivity. The Russian Valdai Discussion Club and Chinese Foreign Minister were 
the first to comment on the potential emergence of expanded BRICS Plus formation 
(Wang, 2017; Lissovolik, 2017). BRICS Declarations readily refer to and advocate for the 
development of external countries, BRICS Plus presents a consolidated approach. The 
2017 summit Declaration affirmed the thinking around an emergent BRICS Plus 
formation64. Though it offered no substantiation to this approach it does prove that a 
broader more comprehensive regime is central to BRICS’ goals65. It is an enactment of the 
network it wants to invigorate. What the G20 is to the G7, BRICS Plus may be to BRICS. It 
may offer a persuasive expression of a new global integration model. BRICS’ expansion 
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 “We shall also strive towards broad partnerships with EMDCs, and in this context, we will pursue equal-
footed and flexible practices and initiatives for dialogue and cooperation with non-BRICS countries, including 
through BRICS Plus cooperation” (BRICS, 2017c). 
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 In his speech to the BRICS Business Forum in 2017 President Xi said: “We should promote the ‘BRICS Plus’ 
cooperation approach and build an open and diversified network of development partnerships to get more 
emerging market and developing countries involved in our concerted endeavors for cooperation and mutual 
benefits” (Xi, 2017).   
90 
 
would incorporate greater connectivity at the state level; its increased influence would 
offer greater pressure. However, BRICS itself may not be chosen as the executive platform 
for such broader participation. There are other institutions, such as the SCO, which may be 
used for these practical pursuits.  
Whether a BRICS Plus takes shape beyond the present model waits to be seen. The 
recent inward turn by the US66, to unilateral nationalism instead of internationalism, may 
provide BRICS members and other aspiring states the chance to compete for influence, 
attracting affected states into its fold. Concurrently, it may increasingly prove that the US 
aggressively integrates a bloc around its own interests, employing its power and centrality 
to create an insider/outsider design, pressuring smaller states to pick one or the other. 
This may open to greater international competition, pressuring emerging states to not 
stand up against the might of the US, preventing the alternative regimes from centrally 
informing the global order.  
This order constitutes itself; through the legal, the real is modified by the ideal. 
Significantly this is the case among BRICS. It is not the additional legal structural 
agreements that constitute the real. Instead, upon each state’s legal authority, ideals build 
influence and legitimacy. The BRICS regime is, therefore, an informal, intergovernmental 
pressure group. BRICS Declarations do not present regime permanency. The timeline of its 
existence is directly apportioned to its achievement of aims; actualising greater 
regionalisation (multipolarity) and delegitimating global hegemony (unipolarity). Each 
Declaration reflects its first statement of resolve67, but each Declaration also dynamically 
evolves, to offer context to the ongoing present state of affairs.  
BRICS: ETHOS AND LEADERSHIP 
BRICS’ ethos is not the aggregation of individual countries, but that of the singular 
corporate regime. Through the exhibition of values and principles, BRICS shapes its ethos 
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 “We underline our support for a more democratic and just multi-polar world order based on the rule of 
international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making 
of all states” (BRICS, 2009). 
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in accordance to the authoritative UN multilateral international order. At its core is the 
active networking among independent states. From a study of its summit Declarations 
Freire (2018) discusses the common governance elements central to BRICS’ embrace. 
These include: 1) the “promotion of a more inclusive, transparent and just international 
order, where wider representability in global governance institutions might be fostered 
through institutional reform processes”; and 2) respect for “noninterference in the 
internal affairs and respect for the territorial integrity of states” (Freire, 2018). These 
measures in effect propose the firmer application of UN guided norms and principles. This 
is seen by BRICS not having a foundational document of its own, instead methodically 
acceding to the authority of the UN Charter. The UN is conveyed as the ultimate arbiter of 
global legitimacy, it enjoys “universal membership and is at the centre of global 
governance and multilateralism” (BRICS, 2013c). 
Though BRICS’ formation takes shape outside of UN infrastructure, it very carefully 
does not dislocate from its authority. Its’ very architecture, the legal organisation which 
allows its interdependence is conserved by the UN Charter and not through a mechanism 
of its own. BRICS is not a duplication of the UN; instead, it offers motion to its ethos and 
logos. It presents a scenario of functioning, reformed international order. BRICS’ hybrid 
strategy seeks to favourably combine the liberal international system, under which 
member states have developed, to the conservative, sovereign system that it espouses as 
a group. This model of hybrid governance brings together state, interstate and everything 
in between, to favourably build an international consensus of mutual dependence and 
lessened domination (Stephen, 2014).  
Leadership is central to BRICS. Its summit declarations exhibit and mimic the ethos 
and leadership of the UN realm, so to persuade its audience. It demonstrates a careful 
exhibition of an independent will to be interdependent; it moves through concord with 
opponents, not through aggravation. The key here is to articulate leadership and ethos 
that emerges from inside the legitimate order. BRICS’ expression of loyalty through its 
commitments to the international system portrays the networked international identity. 
This is a favourable choice as research suggests that “good leadership depends on 
constituent cooperation and support” and “that to gain credibility among followers, 
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leaders must try to position themselves among the group rather than above it” (Reicher et 
al, 2007). 
 Ethos deals with appearance, not direct force; credibility stems from appearance 
more than actual arguments. States such as China, with its own interpretations of matters, 
such as human rights68, can, therefore, appear to advance the international consensus 
through the group. It does not persuade with a favourable result, but instead dynamically 
through the performance of values.  
BRICS’ focus on ethos is clear from the way that it advances ideals without 
necessarily backing them up in deed. It does not pretend to be neutral. By aligning to the 
international order it desists being seen as an elitist project, as described by Taylor (2012) 
and suggested by Bond and Garcia (2015). The agency it adopts through its Declarations 
display a clear understanding: it implements its networked regime as an interpretation of 
the loose concepts of international order. Herein BRICS presents itself as a leadership 
regime, to bring about another modality of doing that which is already agreed upon.  
Haslam et al’s (2011) definition of leadership closely corresponds to Nye’s soft 
power69: “leadership, for us, is not simply about getting people to do things. It is about 
getting them to want to do things. Leadership, then, is about shaping beliefs, desires, and 
priorities. It is about achieving influence, not securing compliance” (Haslam et al, 2011: 
xx). Shaping desires are central to BRICS, its rhetoric proclaims meaning, inspiring others 
to want what it wants, to support its promotion of international reform. Its leadership is 
therefore about attraction through setting a credible example. Leadership is self-
regenerating (Haslam et al, 2011). BRICS independently shows how principles require 
national will and agency.  
Leadership, as an art of influence, does not simply subscribe to certain norms. 
Through action and embodiment, leadership redefines norms. BRICS Declarations “define 
their group’s social identity to fit with the policies they plan to promote, enabling them to 
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 Since 1991 China has released a number of White Papers on human rights. This is a territorialising 
initiative wherein it puts forward its own narrative on human rights.  
69
 Detailed on page five.  
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position those policies as expressions of what” it already believes (Reicher et al, 2007). Its 
Declarations “allow the BRICS countries to emphasize their common desire to increase 
their collective voice in world affairs while sidestepping differences on specific issues” 
(Vabulas, 2014: 3). Its regime endorses leadership to be structurally exhibited.  
The establishment of the NDB presents BRICS’ central instrumentalisation of 
leadership. The NDB General Strategy 2017-2021 introduces a: 
“21st century multilateral development bank that builds on the experiences 
of existing institutions”, but that also “act independently in matters of 
international economic governance and development”; the “creation of the 
Bank is an expression of the growing role of BRICS…in the world economy” 
(New Development Bank, 2017: 3).  
The Bank seeks to inspire persuasion by breaking free and transforming financial 
dependence.  
“NDB is the first development institution of global scope set up exclusively 
by emerging market countries with no participation of advanced economy 
countries in the initial stage. Its establishment reflects the rise of BRICS and 
other EMDCs in the past decades and a shared view that they can contribute 
to economic growth and sustainable development in a new way. The 
support shown by the founding member countries is a testament to their 
vision of creating a truly transformative development finance institution” 
(New Development Bank, 2017: 10). 
The Bank is future-oriented, advancing a new, changed world that requires new financial 
modalities. 
“The context for global development has changed dramatically in recent 
decades…New forms of development cooperation are needed to achieve 
these outcomes…(of being) a truly 21st-century multilateral development 
bank (MDB), one that makes use of the MDB’s proven core financial model, 
while designing and implementing systems, practices and an organizational 
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culture that can live up to the challenges and opportunities posed by the 
current global context (New Development Bank, 2017: 6). 
Furthermore, the Strategy is a clear attempt to advance sovereign interdependence. 
“Most importantly, NDB is committed to a new mindset of partnership with 
all members and borrowers, in the belief—based on founders’ own 
experiences—that projects will be most successful when borrowing 
countries are in charge of their own development path” (New Development 
Bank, 2017: 6). 
Institutionalisation in BRICS’ hybrid strategy substantiates what Shelepov (2015) 
calls: BRICS’ second type of engagement. BRICS member states maintain their first 
approach, seeking inclusion in the world systems, such as the IMF and World Bank. This 
catalytic approach was exclusively pursued in BRICS’ formative years, aimed towards 
change from the inside. This remains its predominant position of "stimulating or 
supporting changes in and reforms of international organizations" (Shelepov, 2015: 8). In 
recent years BRICS has consolidated its leadership and ethos in a second, parallel 
approach. The development of institutions rebalances representation, which is "likely to 
speed up voice reform even in the established multilaterals" (Reisen, 2015: 88). This 
second, more direct soft balancing mode, has not become prevalent and instead is used to 
append the first. Too much broader institutionalisation would put at risk its neutral, 
insider advantage, from where it creates its fundamental indictments. The greater 
institutionalisation inside BRICS was not to launch forceful formations but to instil a 
cooperative archetype of multilateralism. These displays of partnership have formed 
BRICS as a network, deliberately communicating its desire for global reform.   
BRICS: STIMULATING REFORM THROUGH LEGITIMATION AND 
DELEGITIMATION  
BRICS relations present the state-centric governance model it seeks. It sets out a soft 
balancing approach towards redefining international consensus. This drive for reform is 
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deliberated through its summit diplomacy70. Herein its decisions project a direct reflection 
of contemporary global governance failures. BRICS performs its narration so to dissuade 
and delegitimate, framing others as faulty. BRICS is affirmed out of these failures; it 
operates out of negative rationality: failure of the international financial institutions, 
failure of achieving UN reform, etcetera. It presents itself as a new formation, untainted 
by former behaviour. It legitimates itself, seeking influence while delegitimating the forces 
responsible for the status quo.  
To achieve reform through increased legitimacy, without political or legal force, is 
a strategically superior approach. The sovereign legitimacy of each state combines to form 
the legal foundation that BRICS uses to censure the illegal overreach of dominant 
countries and institutions, bequeathed with appended legality to ensure maintenance of 
authority. Against these institutions and their handlers BRICS pursue, in Burkean terms, 
identification. According to Kenneth Burke (1951) identification is a deliberate persuasive 
device, correlating the speaker’s interest to that of the audience. It may also be an end: 
“people earnestly yearn to identify themselves with some group or another” (Burke, 1951: 
203). Identification’s significance emerges from shared, yet different, experiences. Were 
there no distinction, there would be no need to unite. BRICS as a shared vehicle for 
divergent members incorporates its regime under identification as positive and 
cooperative. Its progressive, developmental programme also allows for identification by 
other states. Identification allows the advantages of positive affinity and attraction, 
without needing the means to assume responsibility.  
 BRICS members’ collective, reciprocal recognition of each other, allows for a 
credible and legitimate entity to egress. BRICS recognises itself, through positive 
interaction, as a composite formation, formed by its years of cooperation; advancing its 
influence, building forward. This pursuit is clearly expressed in the 2017 summit 
Declaration:   
“We reiterate that it is the overarching objective and our desire for peace, 
security, development and cooperation that brought us together 10 years 
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ago…Our cooperation since 2006 has fostered the BRICS spirit featuring 
mutual respect and understanding, equality, solidarity, openness, 
inclusiveness and mutually beneficial cooperation, which is our valuable 
asset and an inexhaustible source of strength for BRICS cooperation. We 
have shown respect for the development paths of our respective choices, 
and rendered understanding and support to each other's interests. We have 
upheld equality and solidarity. We have also embraced openness and 
inclusiveness, dedicated to forging an open world economy. We have 
furthered our cooperation with emerging markets and developing countries 
(EMDCs). We have worked together for mutually beneficial outcomes and 
common development, constantly deepening BRICS practical cooperation 
which benefits the world at large” (BRICS, 2017c).  
BRICS’ espousal of norms and principles carefully soft balances hegemonic control. 
Stuenkel suggests that American “dominance over system-shaping ideas remains very 
strong” and that “any anti-hegemonic alliance” that wishes to make an impact needs to 
have a solid “intellectual foundation” (Stuenkel, 2015: 157). BRICS legitimation takes place 
through its affirmation of UN dominion. Every BRICS summit Declaration offers “strong 
commitment” to the UN playing a "central role" in multilateral diplomacy, international 
peace, and security. The UN Charter is used to censure abusive powers, while the 
organisation’s consented to, but unexecuted reform71, signals proof of improper function. 
BRICS capitalises on this deficiency by insisting on returning the world to a fluid, balance of 
forces; away from hegemonic dominance, to a “multipolar, equitable and democratic 
world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, 
coordinated action and collective decision-making of all States” (BRIC, 2010). 
BRICS’ hybrid strategy moves it from what is towards what should be. As G20 
insiders, BRICS states operate in a formative and affirmative manner. Several of its calls 
are lifted verbatim from G20 summit Declarations. Its overt support for the G2072 is clearly 
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 Every BRICS Declaration but 2009 and 2013 call the G20 the "premier forum" for international financial 
and economic cooperation. 
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contrasted to it functioning as a counterpart to the G7; both groups’ members are also 
members of the G20. The continued existence of the G7 has opened the space for an 
alternate body to synthesise its relations with the G20. Were the G7 to cease following the 
launch of the expanded G20 in 2008, BRICS’ claim to relevancy and legitimacy would have 
been much weaker. BRICS strategically responded to continued G7 existence following the 
G20’s first expanded leaders’ summit in 2009 by launching its own leaders’ summit. It has 
moulded into a G7-like regime.  
BRICS’ structure occupies similar form and ways to that of the G7: an informal 
forum, with no headquarters or secretariat and a rotating Presidency, empowered to lead 
yearly proceedings and drafting the yearly summit Declarations. It has designated national 
representatives or Sherpas and Sous-Sherpas that configure its mechanisms. It is 
structured hierarchically, from the national leader down, steered by ministerial meetings 
and executed upon by the working groups formulated at official gatherings. These hold 
great gravitas, setting the course for multilateral interaction. These plenary are more 
exemplary than substantial, performing an equal, cooperative framework of exchange. 
Where the G7 advances external international institutions to constructively support 
national systems73, BRICS advances the centrality of the state. The G20 forms the greater, 
overlapping forum between G7 and BRICS, an aggregated meeting place for all members 
of the triad (Rewizorski, 2015).  
Though BRICS has the “potential to challenge the G7 in the coming decades” 
(Mostafa and Mahmood, 2015: 166), it is its narrative that forms a claim for common 
ground, as an alternative to the G7, not a direct challenge. Instead, it strategically 
operates alongside the G7, manifesting itself as legitimate. Where the G7 represents the 
apex regime of select developed countries, BRICS presents itself as a burgeoning example 
for emerging states advancing independent, cooperative development.  
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The realisation of BRICS’ processes of organisation forms part of the international 
networked order. The BRICS regime extends upon sovereignty, as right and recognition of 
independent agency, through its willing, sovereign collaboration. This allows 
“governments to accomplish through cooperation…what they could once only hope to 
accomplish acting alone within a defined territory” (Slaughter, 2004: 285), or through 
coercive alliances. Herein global governance as separation is replaced by cooperation. 
Networked sovereignty, therefore, transcends the right to be left alone, to emphasise a 
capacity to interact. The focal sphere of sovereignty evolves from legitimacy of authority 
domestically, to a global focus where countries are the legitimate actors of authority 
externally, amongst each other. It is through, not by, international organisations and 
agreements that engagement among countries transcend the outer projections of each 
other and come to shape their relations. A greater level of interaction does not have the 
effect of weakening sovereignty. Instead, the deeper the state’s relations with others the 
more consolidated its position, the greater the state’s power of independence (Slaughter, 
2004: 286). Independence therefore contradictorily is not advanced by being left alone, 
but rather from concession, enmeshed together in networks. Through their reciprocation 
in global networks independent “government institutions would affirm their judicial, 
legislative, or regulatory sovereignty” (Slaughter, 2004: 326). 
In an earlier formulation Slaughter (1997) calls the new emerging order 
transgovernmental: “The state is not disappearing; it is disaggregating into its separate, 
functionally distinct parts. These parts - courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even 
legislatures - are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of 
relations” (Slaughter, 1997). Beyond these interactions BRICS pursues a state-centric 
approach. Intergovernmental, instead of transgovernmental, will therefore be employed 
here. 
BRICS forms an informal intergovernmental regime, a networking platform for 
sovereigns. States develop such organisations in order to preserve their sovereignty. 
BRICS’ informal nature allows the pursuit of shared goals without being charged with 
responsibility, avoiding internationally binding agreements (Vabulas, 2014). BRICS as such 
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advances the legitimacy and credibility of informal organisations, while opposing formal 
ones which transfer power from the state into an external construct. BRICS’ success could 
well depend on whether it is able to achieve greater recognition and legitimacy for 
informal organisations. The decline of formal organisations would ensue in powerful 
Western infrastructure increasingly being manipulated and ruptured. The sustained and 
recently increased pressure from the US on NATO states to pay its agreed financial 
contributions (Nix and Capaccio, 2018) presents a clear example of such manipulations 
and cleavages. Increased pressure, of states pursuing first their interests through state-
centric mechanisms, could see a major shift in international politics, a tipping point where 
informal IGOs are preferred to formal ones (Vabulas, 2014). 
BRICS’ networked approach persuades by presenting open relations, based on a 
country by country approach. There is no central power; there is no core to determine the 
lot of the periphery. BRICS oppose alliances. Instead, it says "we support the ‘Alliance of 
Civilizations’, a United Nations initiative aimed at building bridges, mutual knowledge and 
understanding around the world” (BRICS, 2010). This explains Li and Agustín (2014) leads 
to interdependent hegemony: “the rise of the BRICS has indeed, to a large extent, 
challenged many aspects of the existing international order’s functionality, scope, 
legitimacy and authority…However, it has not yet fundamentally changed the structural 
power of the existing international system” (Li and Agustín, in Kirton, 2014: 69). 
States not only interact in networks of identity, but also in networks for identity. 
Agreements and Statements facilitate norms and identity within the collective. 
Communities arise around shared ideas. The basis of the BRICS partnership is inclusivity. 
To advance comprehensive reform, while avoiding zero-sum games, it requires a 
consolidated effort. Such international cooperation opposes a purely competitive us/them 
or core/periphery dichotomy. It perceives and embraces the network as the contemporary 
base of a global society, replacing hierarchies internationally.  
The result is not world government, but global governance (Slaughter, 1997). The 
network society breeds network governance – governments still pursue their national 
interests, but they do this interactively, sharing information and working together on 
issues such as terrorism, the environment, and trade. Networked governance emboldens 
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the state by disaggregated functionality, with parts associating with their equals from 
other states. Intergovernmentalism is embraced through BRICS working groups and 
ministerial meetings, approved and launched through Declarations. BRICS is a testament 
that civilisational or cultural similarity is not a prerequisite for partnership. Instead, in 
networks trust and common enterprise is built upon willingness and reciprocity (Slaughter, 
1997). Evolving summit Declarations play an integral role in building as well as checking 
progress and internal confidence. As they are also consensually legitimated, they are ideal 
for advancing commonality74.  
BRICS DECLARATIONS: TOOLS OF SUMMIT DIPLOMACY 
BRICS employs dedicated summit diplomacy, utilising the highest national display of 
sovereignty to declare, through its combined gravitas, the consensus it has formed. The 
summit is an elevated moment of exhibition and performance; the leaders stamp their 
approval upon the evolving list of common pursuit, prepared by the hosting state, six to 
eight weeks in advance (Barnard, 2017). The summit Declaration is the central means of 
rhetorical invention for BRICS, presenting its argument to the world and its publics. Its 
position on the desired state of affairs artfully emerges from the documents, disguising its 
tactical points under a diplomatic cloak supporting positive vis-à-vis negative change. 
Declarations are carefully orchestrated and have largely maintained the same structure 
and perspective while expanding in scope and content.  
BRICS Declarations instructively establish a dichotomous distinction between what 
should and what should not be the case. The Declaration works in tandem with all other 
protocol, to build trust and evince displays of reciprocal benefit. Summits are leadership 
exhibitions of great educational value. While being carefully scripted, rehearsed and 
compiled, direct and multilateral exchanges construct meaning through intentional 
displays to each other, their publics and the world at large. The mediated accessibility that 
summits impart emboldens the increasing agency of publics. These auspicious occasions 
are of great newsworthiness; states recognise the public diplomacy value underlying the 
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summit (Melissen, 2003: 13). Every effort is taken to put a positive spin and tint on the 
story and image, respectively. The chairing country leads with great pomp. While equally 
important, the visiting leaders accord with great decorum, presenting a total image of 
grandeur, trust and reciprocity. The limited time available brings central matters to a 
head; talking points and ready-made sound bites are cardinal for success.  
Declarations are also displays committing authority; they signify the functioning of 
BRICS. Though states may diverge, may change domestically under new leadership, 
membership in BRICS will do little to affect internal dynamics in individual countries. BRICS 
membership is strategic and substantial to the national interest, not the optics or bases of 
particular leaders. BRICS, through its Declarations, do not form a closed identity. It instead 
aims to foster global ideas. Citizens of BRICS countries are therefore not guided to 
essentially think of selves as BRICS citizens, in the manner Belgians are invoked to regard 
themselves European under the European Union; at least not yet.  
Instead, its didactic position assumes a global identity, addressing a total audience, 
with comprehensive global interests. BRICS emerged as a grouping through summit 
diplomacy and has retained this instrumentality throughout its existence. From here it 
claims its significance and power. The commencement of the BRICS summit follows 
summitry becoming a core component of international relations in the mediatised era. 
BRICS exploits the attention it receives around the summit to display its core principles 
and values. The optics is carefully managed. Each year’s summit produces a ‘family photo’ 
of the leaders; usually they are presented holding hands, smiling for the world to see their 
friendship and unity. The function of the summit is to draw attention, to present BRICS as 
a formidable feature in international affairs. The attendance of all national leaders, as has 
been the case throughout all summits, is a serious validation stamped upon the 
proceedings and the final Declaration. Their presence suggests the meeting to be of great 
importance; the Declarations declare a direct mandate. 
The summit Declaration is furthermore a tool to display longevity. BRICS’ first 
summit in 2009 indicated its intentions to develop. It was never going to be once off. Its 
declaration acknowledges and thanks the next year’s host. This practice has continued 
every year, with each Declaration indicating continuation. BRICS is also future-oriented, 
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setting itself up to promote dialogue and cooperation “in an incremental, proactive, 
pragmatic, open and transparent way” (BRICS, 2009).  
BRICS’ simulation of the G7, by meeting in a similar format, forms part of its 
broader soft balancing strategy. Soft balancing is core to BRICS strategy of latent multi-
institutionalism, of using its access to buffer against power. It does not seek to coalesce, 
nor does it wish to aggregate or align its individual positions. Instead, through soft 
balancing BRICS states subvert the status quo by cooperating, surreptitiously presenting 
itself as powerful through its summit diplomacy75. These are expressions of its networked 
form. While most of the summit takes place behind closed doors, the assembled 
articulation of self is promoted through the Declaration. 
The summit Declarations provide BRICS with the functional tool to advance its 
shared policy ends “through the establishment of mechanisms of coordination and 
cooperation…with a view to optimising collective outcomes” (Tudoroiu, 2012: 28). The 
summit is a leading expression towards reform; engaging independently it establishes 
what Russian President Dmitry Medvedev called “conditions for a more just world order” 
(Stuenkel, 2015: 17). 
As the G7 Declaration does, BRICS’ version commences: “we, the leaders”. This 
positive affirmation presents BRICS as a purposed and authorised regime. Following its 
consistent expression of unity, each Declaration systematically affirms the choice of 
acronymic identity by listing the official names of member states, so to claim and affirm its 
legitimacy and leadership.  
The group’s resolve is affixed by the subsequent proclamation of summit theme. 
Commencing in 2012 the summit theme allows divergent nations to channel their 
perceptions and volitions, to present the wholeness. It averts miscommunication, which in 
such a format and with limited meeting time, could easily occur. At the BRICS summit the 
“rotating host will definitely influence the substance as they will formulate the theme and 
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 Flemes (2013) proposes that countries entangle diplomatically, seeking influence by “the use of rules and 
procedures of international institutions…In addition, rising powers use global governance institutions and 
summits to build new coalitions and networks for the pursuit of common interests” (Flemes, 2013: 1020). 
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summit outcomes; also the structure to a certain extent, but the issues are relatively 
standardised by now” (Barnard, 2017). Though the host crafts the wording of the theme, 
the substance from which it stems has been crystallised under the values and maxims 
distilling BRICS signification. The theme is a rhetorical tool that instils purpose. It is greatly 
informative of how BRICS constructs and seeks identification. In more than half the cases 
BRICS presents itself as a “partnership”: “for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity” 
(2012), “for Development, Integration and Industrialisation” (2013), “a Powerful Factor of 
Global Development” (2015), “for a Brighter Future” (2017). The centrality of 
“partnership” averts the incongruity of member states; it suggests equality and affirms 
BRICS as cooperative, not bound in an alliance.  
The other two summit themes imply a comprehensive relationship by using the 
word “inclusive”: "Inclusive Growth: Sustainable Solutions" (2014), and "Building 
Responsive, Inclusive and Collective Solutions" (2016). In all of the themes, there are clear 
intentions to actively be part of improved global governance. Their pledge to “solutions” 
presents a claim to deal with global conditions. Yet, strategically their modes remain 
nondescript, if not simply suggestive. Their programme is clearly to adjudicate, not 
execute. Summits drive a multilateral being-as-process; their themes assist this 
orientation, to become through presentation. Instead of a fixed organisational structure, 
through treaty or otherwise, the themes and summits present and perform a normative 
demonstration of global governance. The themes present a broad range of strategic 
concepts76 through supporting adjectives77, intimating preferable outcomes78, but offering 
little detail. Over the years its rhetoric of values has expressed a consistent push towards 
greater legalistic and moralistic international relations.  
The theme compactly articulates the overarching focus of the summit, holding the 
leadership on point. It also reads as a headline would. It is short, conveys action and 
promises benefit through appealing concepts. The rest of the Declaration, “a masterpiece 
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 The theme in 2012: “BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity”. 
77
 The theme in 2014: “Inclusive Growth; Sustainable Solutions”. 
78
 The theme in 2016: “Building Responsive, Inclusive and Collective Solutions”. 
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in the art of compromise” (Melissen, 2003: 3), formally pronounces on the principles and 
projects that bind the member states together and which drive the regime forward. 
Summits and their Declarations are not only displays of coherence, but through active 
diplomacy also produce the regime, without implicating a specific country. Foremost 
members are not beneficent, the articulated arguments provide indirectly for further 
implementation of individual national strategies. The oblique formulations of regime can 
also allow the pursuit of a totally different strategy to that of individual countries, without 
necessarily deviating goals. 
BRICS’ actions and interactions affirm it as a realist, strategic regime. Member 
states benefit from a synergistic relationship, crafted for purpose. Tudoroiu makes a 
significant point here. The author states that BRICS present its:  
“democratic and just stand only within the regime, i.e. with regard to each 
other and their joint actions undertaken in the BRICS framework. Most 
likely, the Kremlin will continue to bully Tbilisi. But at the same time it will 
act within G20 to increase the weight of emerging and developing countries, 
Georgia included. This might seem cynical, but it is a realistic, effective 
strategy that is qualitatively different from that followed by the non-aligned 
movement after Bandung” (Tudoroiu, 2012: 38).  
Declarations execute the basis of the system that BRICS members wish to realise; 
advocating their form as best practice. Pragmatism, opportunism and commonality are 
central to pressure groups attainting influence and consolidating legitimacy. Further 
tactics have been employed to advance BRICS’ strategy of consolidating its legitimacy. 
Personal pronouns constitute a powerful factor in rhetorical persuasion and identification. 
Throughout its Declarations BRICS invariably refer to the group as ‘we’. It prefaces its 
supporting claims with “we reaffirm”, “we commend”, “we call”, “we support”, etcetera. 
Hereby it conveys support, without admitting ownership towards change. Its expression 
emerges from a united position, avoiding directly attributable responsibility to single 
parties. ‘We’ also declares active engagement and utility. BRICS Declarations build a 
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positive impression of reform; each of the 48 times reform is mentioned79 it is in relation 
to the improved execution of global governance, the achievement of international 
representativeness.  
BRICS regularly expresses its “concern” with international developments, invariably 
advancing an international solution centred in principles80. Sinha and Dorschner (2010) 
dismiss BRICS’ lack of institutionalism, arguing that compiling a Declaration is “a paper 
exercise similar to the Non-Aligned Movement that will prove heavy on rhetorical flourish 
but unlikely to significantly change the unipolar status quo” (Sinha and Dorschner, 2010: 
88). This argument, while compelling, misses BRICS’ considerable and attuned summit 
diplomacy. BRICS summit Declarations allow informative discernment of contemporary 
global issues. They play the significant performance of embodying the reform that BRICS 
wishes to achieve through a soft balancing approach.    
BRICS DECLARATIONS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
i) CONTEXTUALISING BRICS’ DECLARATIONS 
Summit Declarations expound BRICS’ version of global governance as an arrangement of 
geopolitical interdependence, based on strategic transactions among states, vis-à-vis 
institutions. In 2011 BRICS underwrote this intergovernmental pursuit by identifying its 
vision for global governance:  
“We share the view that the world is undergoing far-reaching, complex and 
profound changes, marked by the strengthening of multipolarity, economic 
globalization and increasing interdependence. While facing the evolving 
global environment and a multitude of global threats and challenges, the 
international community should join hands to strengthen cooperation for 
common development” (BRICS, 2011c).  
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 BRICS summit Declarations 2009-2017. 
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 “We are deeply concerned by the situation in Iraq. We strongly support the Iraqi government in its effort 
to overcome the crisis, uphold national sovereignty and territorial integrity” (BRICS, 2014c). 
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Under the provision of “universally recognized norms and international law and in 
a spirit of mutual respect and collective decision making”, it said that global governance 
“should be strengthened, democracy in international relations should be promoted, and 
the voice of emerging and developing countries in international affairs should be 
enhanced” (BRICS, 2011c). The drive for global governance to be a collective and 
comprehensive enterprise not only advances the agency of countries that have historically 
been excluded, thereby ensuring democratic engagement, but also essentially returns 
agency back to the sphere of the state. BRICS’ aim is for an enterprise in an 
intergovernmental network, “marked by the strengthening of multipolarity, economic 
globalization and increasing interdependence” (BRICS, 2011c). 
Declarations build a common directive to align governance to the values and 
principles it expounds81. Cooperation lies at the heart of BRICS’ Declarations; cooperation 
is by far the most used word throughout82. Furthermore, openness is characteristic of this 
pursuit. BRICS stresses that its interactions and all international relations should be open, 
to ensure collaboration, but also to avoid domination. Openness is also invoked by BRICS 
Declarations as essential to the behaviour of international institutions. Openness allows 
states to cooperate in their collective interest. Slaughter (2004) provides a compelling 
understanding of how BRICS might regard cooperative or relational sovereignty. While the 
author writes before BRICS’ formation, she discusses the conditions from where BRICS 
emerges:   
“If sovereignty were still understood as exclusive and impermeable rather 
than relational, strengthening the state would mean building higher walls to 
protect its domestic autonomy. But in a world in which sovereignty means 
the capacity to participate in cooperative regimes in the collective interest 
of all states, expanding the formal capacity of different state institutions to 
interact with their counterparts around the world means expanding state 
power” (Slaughter, 2004: 327). 
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 Detailed in chapter three. 
82
 The number of times cooperation is mentioned: 2009: 8; 2010: 19; 2011: 29; 2012: 19; 2013: 19; 2014: 56; 
2015: 101; 2016: 56; 2017: 119. 
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Given that all BRICS states are members of authoritative bodies, especially the G20, 
it can employ its Declarations to influence the modalities of these platforms in its favour. 
It commits its shared voice to the “central role played by the G20 Summits in dealing with 
the financial crisis” (BRIC, 2009). Herein the 2009 BRICS summit can already be seen more 
as an intergovernmental forum, with this Declaration an affirmative call to action. This 
document takes a multilateral, inclusive and future orientation. It places BRICS in a 
leadership position by advancing the same calls as the G20, affirming that a “global crisis 
requires a global solution” (G20, 2009). BRICS as global governance forum is advanced by 
the G20’s determination to “reform and modernize the international financial 
institutions…we will reform their mandates, scope and governance to reflect the changes 
in the world economy…and that emerging and developing economies, including the 
poorest must have greater voice and representation” (G20, 2009). G20 resolve for change 
in global governance opens the door for BRICS. Central to BRICS’ operational purpose is to 
prompt the activation of reform that has already been committed to83. It amplifies the 
G20’s pledged reform84 through reiteration; holding it to account, advancing the activation 
of its commitment. 
 BRICS’ inception at the formation of the G20 suggests that its states had little faith 
in the ability of the G20 to effect reform, alone. BRICS bandwagons upon the G20, 
functioning as an advocacy group. Hereby it avoids confrontation and liability. Instead of 
introducing new content, BRICS identifies with it, using its Declarations to call for its 
execution, while maintaining a loose, disaggregated relationship. Instead of inserting itself 
as an instrumental agent, it craftily comments on its performance. One tactic is to motion 
towards appropriate, norm-based behaviour through the construction of its own, separate 
narrative. This is done to remind others of their commitments, advocating for suitable 
realisation. For example, it lifts directly from the G20: saying that international financial 
institution leadership “should be appointed through an open, transparent, and merit-
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 “We call upon all states and relevant international bodies to act vigorously to implement the decisions 
adopted at the G20 Summit in London on 2 April, 2009” (BRIC, 2009). 
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 “advancing the reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions so that they can more adequately reflect 




based selection process” (G20, 2009; BRICS, 2009). Copying this central point, iterated 
yearly in subsequent Declarations, does not challenge but prompts the G20 into action. In 
so doing it does not only seek identification but employs identification rhetorically.  
 BRICS’ first priority mentioned in its 2010 Declaration is that global governance 
needs to change with the world. To achieve this end the G20 must accomplish its 
resolutions. It pushes G20 “member states to undertake further efforts to implement 
jointly the decisions adopted at the three G-20 Summits…to be proactive and formulate a 
coherent strategy for the post-crisis period” (BRICS, 2010). In so doing it constitutes the 
G20 as the premier economic forum, soft balancing the powers and interests of the G7.  
 BRICS affords rhetorical motion to the G20’s active implementation of its 
programmes, propounding that the G20 “remains a critical factor for strengthening the 
prospects for a vigorous and sustainable recovery worldwide”; charging it to play “a bigger 
role in global governance” (BRICS, 2014c; BRICS, 2011c). It advances multilateralism by 
suggesting each country accepts individual responsibility for itself in the broader 
collective. Its stress on sovereign equality furthers equivalence of emerged and emerging 
countries, securing bi-valence and relative power; “(W)e stand ready to work with others, 
developed and developing countries together, on the basis of universally recognised 
norms of international law and multilateral decision making” (BRICS, 2012b). Working 
within this legal structure BRICS insists upon corrective measures to global governance85. 
The improvement of developing countries is consistently presented through the modus of 
UN programmes and institutions, so to not absorb responsibility, but to promote 
legitimacy. In every Declaration it gives substance to its call for openness by urging the 
international community to successfully and comprehensively conclude the Doha 
Development Round of the WTO. This tactic not only advocates the improved agency of 
developing (vis-à-vis developed) countries in international trading but maintains the order 
under which BRICS countries have flourished. 
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 “Reforming these institutions' governance structures requires first and foremost a substantial shift in 
voting power in favor of emerging market economies and developing countries to bring their participation in 
decision making in line with their relative weight in the world economy” (BRICS, 2010). 
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 More specifically, in every Declaration, it calls upon every country to take 
independent action in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and 
subsequently the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)86. The agency for fulfilment 
greatly lies with the developed countries, with developing countries as recipients. BRICS 
further lays responsibility at the door of developed countries by pressing for their funding 
commitment of 0.7% of gross national income as recognised in 1970 by UNGA Resolution 
262687. BRICS has also taken to partnering with authorities such as the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) to form the UNIDO-BRICS Technology 
Platform in 2016. This cooperation forms a pioneering and authorising venture for BRICS 
to tangibly collaborate in existing infrastructures; to develop partnerships and gain 
recognition. 
The growth of the Declaration develops the regime, impressing with increased 
validity and success. It matures the ethos through building a historical foundation; 
Declarations give direction to past and future engagements. Herein BRICS has laboured 
not to succumb to its own critique of non-compliance. According to University of 
Toronto’s BRICS Information Centre, BRICS has improved upon its already high compliance 
rate of political commitments, achieving 78% for 2015, up from 64% in 2012 and 70% in 
2014. (Larionova et al, 2015). Success is a potent tactic towards legitimacy. The 2013 
Declaration stated: “We consider that the next Director-General of the WTO should be a 
representative of a developing country” (BRICS, 2013c). This goal was achieved a few 
months later when the Brazilian Roberto Azevêdo was appointed its new director. 
The reform of the international governance institutions and the increased capacity 
of emerging and developing states are central in every BRICS Declaration. BRICS stresses 
that international governance structures do not accommodate contemporary power 
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 The Millennium Development Goals were adopted at the Millennium Summit of the UN in 2000. It 
established eight development goals, to be achieved by 2015. The subsequent Sustainable Development 
Goals were adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in 2015. It combines a comprehensive call 
to eliminate global poverty, ensure climate protection as well as human security into 17 delineated goals.  
87
 “Each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official development assistance to the 
developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7% of its gross 
national product” (United Nations, 1970). 
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distribution, hereby expanding upon the NIEO. BRICS closely imitates the NIEO’s claim for 
"equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among 
all states"; that "irreversible changes in the relationship of forces in the world necessitate 
the active, full and equal participation of the developing countries” (United Nations, 
1974).   
In furthering these claims it develops a modern articulation for the advance of 
developing countries in global governance. As such it transcends and replaces the de facto 
defunct NAM and the G77. By not mentioning the former, the latter only once, 
congratulating it on its 50th anniversary in 2014, BRICS transcends these historical regimes. 
Dissimilar in its mandate BRICS adopts a comprehensive position on global governance. It 
expounds equality as an outcome of its approach to relational states, standing up against 
powerful states to persuade of political equivalence. It thereby seeks the favour from 
weaker states, while substantiating its challenge to the powerful.  
ii)  STATE-CENTRISM 
The locus of BRICS’ persuasion and identification is invariably the network of separate 
states. Throughout its Declarations its commitment remains to a “solid legal basis” and to 
the “democratic and transparent decision-making and implementation” by individual 
states (BRIC, 2009). This distinction advances the state as the unit of power in a complex, 
multilateral order, where there are many poles. This is in contradiction to the 
core/periphery universalism, where there is a singular pole. State-centrism is a core 
component of neo-realist international relations, which views states as the regulative 
containers of their society; power is territorially circumscribed (Lacher, 2003: 521). State-
centrism opposes what it sees as the infiltrating forces of singular universalism, where the 
opening up of nationally bound territories sees forces interacting with local societies, 
interfering in the authority and affairs of local power structures. Proponents of state-
centrism are concerned with universalising systems which are unaccountable and beyond 
the territorial reach of local authorities. BRICS propounds state-led globalisation. It claims 
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that universalising processes have created instabilities in the national power nexus; they 
have returned power to the national realm, often to a political strongman88. 
A significant modality BRICS employs to advance state-centrism are partnerships 
between state organisations; it stresses “the important role that State Owned Companies 
(SOCs) play in the economy” (BRICS, 2013c). These organisations make up the majority of 
its engagements and aim to circumscribe the freedom and power that international 
capital holds. This expanded cooperation manifestly returns agency, from externally 
organised, to circumscribed by the state. “The central position that state controlled banks 
and sovereign wealth funds take in the BRICS model of development”, says Duggan (2015), 
“also challenges the current system of global governance by reducing the influence of 
private capital in the global marketplace” (Duggan, 2015: 21). This commonality of state-
centric capitalism, across the BRICS states, is an evident reason for its partnership; a 
supporting rationale for its specific membership.  
BRICS engages the national agencies of member states to construct state-led 
alternative or complementary institutions, breaking the pre-eminence of external bodies. 
In 2016 BRICS started to explore “the possibility of setting up an independent BRICS Rating 
Agency based on market-oriented principles to further strengthen global governance 
architecture” (BRICS, 2016c). The NDB is the clearest example “to cooperate closely with 
existing and new financing mechanisms” (BRICS, 2015a) and which aims to contribute 
"greatly to the global economy and the strengthening of the international financial 
architecture" (BRICS, 2016c). Organisations such as NDB do not present international 
platforms to accede to the functions of the state, nor do they directly oppose 
international institutions. The NDB is explicitly purposed to “mobilize 
resources…complementing the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial 
institutions for global growth and development” (BRICS, 2014a).  
The NDB is purposed to impress with best practice, suggesting that the capacity of 
“BRICS economies to better deal with the risks”, provide “sound macroeconomic policies, 
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 China (Xi Jinping), India (Narendra Modi), South Africa (Jacob Zuma) and Russia (Vladimir Putin) have all 
seen considerable power consolidation in an individual leader in the recent past.  
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efficiently regulated markets and robust levels of reserves” (BRICS, 2015a). It is expressly 
set up to be “based on sound banking principles” (BRICS, 2014a). It provides BRICS with 
the opportunity of not having to rely on external institutions and players; in the future it 
plans to trade in local currencies, empowering member states, thereby opposing the 
might of the US Dollar. These indications point toward future global resolve that promotes 
extra-Western solutions. While BRICS avoids direct authority over developing states, it 
aspires to give global direction. Instead of outsourcing governance to Bretton Woods and 
other institutions that are nominally neutral, but have been historically dominated by 
Western countries89, BRICS advances cooperative governance intergovernmentally. BRICS’ 
support for state-led growth and state-driven development-banks present a direct and 
consequential response to the dominance of the Washington Consensus (Stuenkel, 2013).  
This democratic approach expands the focal sphere of sovereignty from the 
legitimacy of authority internally in a country to a global focus where countries are nodes 
of legitimacy, amongst each other. It maintains authority over multi-track diplomacy and 
relations, incorporated into networked intergovernmentalism. It presents a shift from 
governance, centred on administration and control (management) to greater transactional 
interdependence. Such governance, steered by international principles, is the work of 
leadership and negotiation. It represents a contemporary neo-mercantilism that is 
executed by sovereign states, not external, mandated institutions. The reciprocating, yet 
unilateral economic nationalist policies of the Trump administration in the US suggest that 
it is not only BRICS moving in this direction. 
BRICS states prefer networking in this state-centric design over which it holds 
central power. BRICS’ strategy can be seen in Cooper and Momani (2014): “As new centers 
of power mobilize and old institutions fall behind the curve of change, the trend in world 
politics has been for countries to substitute, bypass, or marginalize established institutions 
of global governance in favor of engagement with new forms of cooperative institutional 
arrangements - in short, toward informality in global governance” (Cooper and Momani, 
2014: 213). 
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 Leaders from the World Bank and IMF consistently hail from the US and Europe, respectively. 
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The BRICS rhetorical strategy returns the state to the centre of global governance. 
Since the 2014 Declaration the words “mutually beneficial” have often been appended 
when the word “cooperation” is mentioned. It does so to avert the fears of traditional, 
combative mercantilism. It advances transactional nation-to-nation relationships that 
contradict the neo-liberal tiered relationships which opens the domestic space to external 
agency. Instead of forcing terms upon weaker states, the transactional model is presented 
as less coercive. BRICS’ intergovernmentalism executes state control, instead of arbitrary 
domination that emerges from a core/periphery model. 
 Instead of being forced to accept terms, states persuade each other and conclude 
deals. This transactional model poses a great advantage for durable states to pursue their 
own strategic interests. Success in this model greatly depends on the domestic stability of 
states. One party will endeavour to secure its autonomy while pursuing to undermine that 
of the others’. True independence, as discussed in chapter two, is of primary importance. 
In the domain of transactional relations IW and the influence of foreign domestic publics, 
as opposed to traditional state-to-state battlefields, will increasingly be the order of the 
day. 
Intergovernmentalism, however, also poses volatility where states are not the 
designers and arbiters of their power and are vulnerable to influence in their internal 
affairs; not only by organisations but by other states directly. What this model of 
engagement effectively does is separate political formations that are independent and 
strategically capable to those that are not. It removes inevitability and permanency and 
returns the world to a state of geopolitical flux, opening to interference. Bond (2014) 
warns that despite BRICS’ potential for anti-imperialism, to ameliorate inequitable and 
abusive international relations, it has been showing inter-imperialist and “sub-imperialist” 
tendencies (Bond, 2014). 
Universality, as exhibited through BRICS reform, affirms separation in a distinctly 
non-tiered, networked, nodal order. Hereby states are constrained to conform in common 
but differentiated responsibility. Simply, this entails a removal of automatic privileges of 
association and alliance. Instead of immutable relations, states return to their traditional 
islands of power in a balance of forces. This realist projection sees states pitted in 
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transactionalism. They are equally distinct, to succeed or fail by their own enterprise. The 
retreat of a centralising or universalising force ensures sovereign differentiation, which 
removes any automatic independence. Instead, independence has to actively and 
individually be fought for and claimed.   
This furthermore transcends a system of tiered governance; disambiguating 
developing/developed or South/North countries to units of a global whole, privy to the 
same guidelines. This is not utopian; political independence does not incur economic 
equivalence. Rather, central to BRICS’ global governance is the application of universal 
obligations, diminishing privilege divides between countries. This allows the shoring up of 
power for states presently excluded by overly concentrated power dynamics. BRICS seeks 
the territory for those, such as its member states, which are willing and able to claim their 
independence, to exert influence in their region and globally. While BRICS motions for the 
right of sovereigns to claim autonomy and territory, it is no handout or nurturing project. 
It seeks to provide the conditions for the global cake to be cut up again, by no means 
providing special treatment to anyone; this approach is antithetical to developmental aid.   
BRICS’ state-centrism underpins its pursuit of reform. Following its formative years 
(2009-2011), where BRICS established its global geopolitical gravitas, 2012 saw the 
escalation of its declarative indictment of global governance. Its increased discernment of 
the international system sees roughly the same number of points, 35, relating to global 
governance, as previous Declarations consisted of in total. Each point perceives an aspect 
of the international system, either to be cherished or reformed. This focus is maintained 
or increased subsequently. In 2012 BRICS transcended its earlier comment on 
international affairs only in context to its own association90 to express concern of select 
international situations and to exact judgment procedurally91. BRICS’ strategy is advanced 
when it tactically declares that “global interests” are best “served by dealing with the crisis 
through peaceful means that encourage broad national dialogues that reflect the 
legitimate aspirations of all sections of Syrian society and respect Syrian independence, 
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 For example: “we wish to continue our cooperation in the UN Security Council on Libya” (BRICS, 2011c). 
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 For example: “We express our deep concern at the current situation in Syria and call for an immediate end 
to all violence and violations of human rights in that country” (BRICS, 2012b). 
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territorial integrity and sovereignty” (BRICS, 2012b). This advance is clearly precipitated by 
the previous year’s UNSC Resolution 1973, the first-ever approval to use force against a 
sovereign state, Libya.  
This approval was the direct application of the previously abstract concept of 
Responsibility to Protect92 (R2P) (Stuenkel, 2015: 40). The ambiguity in the interpretation 
of legitimacy in international law, expressed here, further exposes its incoherency. The 
US-led adjudication that Libya’s regime had lost political legitimacy led directly to the UN, 
through its Security Council, determining the Libyan state to have lost legal legitimacy. 
This precedent exposes the complicated implication of the international norm-based 
authority transcending its core sovereign-diplomatic sanctity by condoning coercion. The 
perceived insecurity created through these tangible changes presents the international 
regime as insecure, open to influence. It is from the loss of this normative sanctity that 
BRICS have coalesced, warning of instability and developments in international relations; 
change begetting more change. Seeking to exploit the opportunities opened by Western 
imposition BRICS deliberately opposes aggression. Stuenkel suggests that “rather than 
developing a new international norm, the propagation of R2P represents the absence of 
international political consensus and the failure of Western leadership” (Stuenkel, 2015: 
46). In this space, BRICS advances its legitimacy and intergovernmental regime. It 
endeavours to take advantage where international law has been neglected. These actions 
take place in light of power having shifted to international institutions, which have forced 
states to align to them (for example the WTO) (Thomas, 2013: 3). This convolution is 
illustrated by BRICS member states, in fact, supporting R2P on various occasions, whether 
out of principle or simply ensuring that it is not seen as renegades (Stuenkel, 2015: 130).  
In order to stress the centrality of states, BRICS Declarations emphasise that UN-
sanctioned protocol play integral consolidation roles; they provide platforms for 
interaction and cooperation and offer clear guidelines to the states as relational agents. A 
significant example that features in seven out of eight Declarations is an 
acknowledgement of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. BRICS 
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 “The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is the enabling principle that first obligates individual states and 
then the international community to protect populations” (UNRIC, 2018).   
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systematically “call upon all nations to work together to expedite the adoption of the 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism” (BRICS, 2016c). International 
ratification of such a convention will judicially draw clear lines to guide behaviour, limiting 
the dominant forces to authorise what would then be extra-judicial or unilateral actions. It 
sees such actions as empowering democratic internationalism; instituting a balance of 
relational forces and disavowing exceptionalism.  
  iii) DECLARATIONS: MOTIONING BRICS’ CLAIMS  
To BRICS global governance is an evolving, geopolitical process. In order to gain a 
commanding position, BRICS uses its Declarations to motion its claims. The Communiqué 
of its very first leaders’ meeting, on the margins of the G8 summit in 2008, presents its 
logos: appealing for recognition, based on its increased economic power. Citing its 
combined GDP to be a quarter of the world’s it affirms that this number will continue to 
grow. To assert authentication it uses OECD statistics (BRIC, 2008). In 2009 it further 
sought to capitalise on the recognition it received, tactically applying Goldman Sachs’ 
original designation of BRICS as a grouping of emerging economic markets. This initial 
claim for authority and inclusion into the group of powerful global states was not 
successful, as exemplified by the continued existence of the G7. 
BRICS then moved to substantially change its line of attack. Not to exact, but to 
pressure for its desired global outcomes; thereby grouping itself as leading members of 
the expanded global fraternity of nations. The 2011 Declaration moves beyond advancing 
the G20. It commences with an increasingly central strategy, to present itself as a leading 
driver of reformed global governance. Throughout subsequent years BRICS would declare 
upon states of affair, what should and should not be the case internationally. The 2009 
Declaration establishes this precedent in light of international financial architecture. These 
comments of reform invariably relate to accepted principles for the normative and legal 
execution of global governance. 
To further build towards its global governance goals, through cooperation, it has 
consolidated an outreach programme similar to the very Heiligendamm Process which 
incorporated BRICS countries at G8 summits. Each summit since 2013 has invited both 
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neighbouring regional states and regional bodies to a meeting on the sidelines of the 
BRICS summit. In 2015 it emphasised its willingness to expand its network93 and in 2017 it 
first touted the idea of BRICS Plus. 
The outreach programme is accommodated to impress the message that BRICS is 
an inclusive regime looking for a consolidated partnership. Such admittance presents 
BRICS as open to non-BRICS countries, dispelling exclusivity as alliance and fostering 
broader cooperation. The outreach programme, though clearly problematic as tokenistic, 
ostensibly suggests that it does not speak for anyone, but instead with them, inclusively. 
Considering that the outreach programme is repeated yearly, it could be that it becomes 
formalised as BRICS Plus. Lissovolik (2018) suggests that BRICS Plus may well be 
consolidated into another platform94 consisting of regional arrangements (Lissovolik, 
2018). This concept is based on the five previous summits each inviting its regional 
configuration. Such an aggregation, with BRICS at its core, could very well transform it into 
an elevated and potent mechanism in global affairs.  
In the light of expanding cooperation, BRICS systematically declares its desire for 
“increasing engagement with other countries, particularly developing and emerging 
market economies” (BRICS, 2014c). It affirms active support95 for developing countries, 
committing “funding and technologies” and “accelerating sustainable growth” (BRICS, 
2011c). Its movements commit to “increase in the voice and representation of developing 
countries…in a just international monetary system” (BRICS, 2012b); “achieving sustainable 
development objectives and supporting developing countries in the implementation 
efforts” (BRICS, 2014c). Illustrated here as well as elsewhere BRICS clearly details ‘what’ it 
intends, but not ‘how’ it intends on accomplishing it. Its engagement explicitly contrasts 
and avoids defined leadership over developing countries. Yet its posturing as an 
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 “The BRICS are open to cooperation and constructive engagement with other countries, as well as open 
with international and regional organizations in dealing with current international issues” (BRICS, 2015k). 
94
 Lissovolik suggests the establishment of a platform, consisting of The African Union (South Africa), 
Mercosur (Brazil), the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia), SCO (China) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for 
Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (India). 
95
 BRICS Declarations engage by propounding: “we reaffirm”; “we recognize”; “we commit”; “we reiterate”; 
“we believe”; etcetera. 
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alternative to the G7 and its campaign for alternatives to established bodies leaves serious 
questions of international leadership unanswered. Instead, by elevating more states to 
international participation it emboldens these states to positions where they can claim 
their own independent agency and in the process depresses the command of the 
hegemon. This leaves BRICS with a favourable impression from weaker states and 
recognition from those more powerful.  
BRICS’ focus on previous and actual crises, such as security, finance and the 
environment, presents the world as being in disaccord96. The group deliberatively 
persuades a broad audience to “judge future events by divination from past events” 
(Aristotle, 2004: 44). These judicious appeals for reform consign the fault to developed 
states. In a formulaic fashion, the Declaration first assesses a given condition in light of the 
developed world (as liable), with the developing world bearing the adverse effects. A 
comprehensive, normative solution is then provided and concluded by BRICS committing 
itself to such amelioration. For example:  
“excessive liquidity from the aggressive policy actions taken by central banks 
to stabilize their domestic economies have been spilling over into emerging 
market economies, fostering excessive volatility in capital flows and 
commodity prices. The immediate priority at hand is to restore market 
confidence and get global growth back on track. We will work with the 
international community to ensure international policy coordination to 
maintain macroeconomic stability conducive to the healthy recovery of the 
global economy” (BRICS, 2012b). 
And:  
“Developing countries face challenges of infrastructure development due to 
insufficient long-term financing and foreign direct investment, especially 
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 In 2013 it condemned the “abuses and acts of violence against the civilian population” of the Central 
African Republic (BRICS, 2013c). In 2015 it expressed its support for humanitarian efforts in South Sudan, 
Libya, Syria and the DRC, commending the work of UN agencies that “stabilize the region and protect civilian 
populations” (BRICS, 2015a). 
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investment in capital stock. This constrains global aggregate demand. BRICS 
cooperation towards more productive use of global financial resources can 
make a positive contribution to addressing this problem. In March 2012 we 
directed our Finance Ministers to examine the feasibility and viability of 
setting up a New Development Bank for mobilizing resources for 
infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other 
emerging economies and developing countries” (BRICS, 2013c). 
Over the years BRICS has increased its adjudication of and direction for reform. It 
has systematically expanded its Declaration, so to impress with bulk. Not only have the 
Declarations become longer in word, they have increased from pledging 15 commitments 
in 2009 to 92 in 2014 (Kirton, 2015); a steady increase from 16 points in 2009 to 110 in 
2016. These commitments have evolved over the years. The focus has systematically 
shifted to global relations. In 2009 five commitments related to energy concerns, while in 
2014 24 points addressed international cooperation (Kirton, 2015). From 2015 the agenda 
expanded dramatically to include more internal initiatives. These have mandated and 
capacitated various Ministries and SOCs to collaborate in working groups relating to 
health, media and other public affairs. 2015 also saw the commencement of a more direct 
push97, while the 2017 Declaration started making unambiguous demands98. These are 
clear signs of BRICS’ maturing and evolving posture.  
While it refrains from direct criticism of nation-states99, it singles out institutions100. 
The bulk of the countries it addresses directly are those it pledges solidarity with, 
                                                          
97
 “We express our commitment to resolutely reject the continued attempts to misrepresent the results of 
World War II” (BRICS, 2015a). 
98
 “We reaffirm our commitment to conclude the IMF's 15th General Review of Quotas, including a new 
quota formula, by the 2019 Spring Meetings and no later than the 2019 Annual Meetings” (BRICS, 2017c). 
99
 The only state it criticizes by name is the United States: “We remain deeply disappointed with the 
prolonged failure by the United States to ratify the IMF 2010 reform package” (BRICS, 2015a). 
100
 “We remain disappointed and seriously concerned with the current non-implementation of the 2010 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms, which negatively impacts on the IMF’s legitimacy, credibility 
and effectiveness” (BRICS, 2014c). 
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advancing reform101. The focus on public conditions has become a central feature of 
Declarations, advancing social consciousness and empowerment. BRICS has increasingly 
commented on the improvement of social matters such as health102, youth and gender103, 
as well as environmental matters. Earlier Declarations appealed directly to UN agencies 
and similar bodies, whereas in recent years BRICS have taken it upon itself to act upon 
these matters104. Since 2014 it has increasingly called for and initiated greater people-to-
people relations, boosting a civil force behind its initiatives. BRICS intends its “enhanced 
people-to-people connectivity will further stimulate interaction among BRICS countries, 
people and society” (BRICS, 2015a).  
BRICS’ consensus building, public-focused approach is shown in its Declarations 
committing to and pushing for the UN SDGs and the earlier MDGs. These are persuasive 
vehicles for goals that require consensus and differentiated global responsibility; shifting 
towards partnership and diversified obligation instead of the centralised 
donor/beneficiary relationship. BRICS may craftily commit as a group, but since it does not 
execute as a group, it has no responsibility to bear.   
Furthermore, environmental problems and its support for ‘green’ initiatives are 
mentioned in every Declaration. BRICS speaks to this pertinent and topical matter in direct 
correlation to its reform claim; away from established systems and towards alternatives. 
In 2009 it stressed an open “constructive dialogue…based on common principle of 
differentiated responsibility” (BRIC, 2009), while in 2016 it declared “the need to scale up 
low carbon fuels and other clean energy solutions”, which require access, international 
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 For example: “The UN has a core role to play in the coordination of the international community efforts 
to settle the situation in Afghanistan” (BRICS, 2015a). 
102
 For example: “We underscore our firm commitment to strengthen dialogue and cooperation in the fields 
of social protection, decent work, gender equality, youth, and public health, including the fight against HIV 
/AIDS" (BRICS, 2011c). 
103
 “We confirm our strong commitment to address social issues in general and in particular gender 
inequality, women's rights and issues facing young people and we reaffirm our determination to ensure 
sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights for all” (BRICS, 2014c). 
104
 “Recognising global health challenges we emphasise the importance of cooperation among BRICS 
countries in promoting research and development of medicines and diagnostic tools to end epidemics and 
to facilitate access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines” (BRICS, 2016c). 
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cooperation and finance (BRICS, 2016c). Concentration on the green economy and 
sustainable development, an NDB declared focal point105, is not only a tactic toward 
improved ecology but also a measure to grow influence. In nearly every Declaration it has 
supported and elevated the evolving UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. In 
2016 it lauded the signing of the resultant Paris Agreement. This acclaim could well be 
perceived as a clear advance of multilateralism, embodying the principles of common 
differentiated responsibility and capability. It motions towards the implementation of the 
Agreement to secure influence106, while urging developed countries not to renege on its 
obligations and “to provide financial, technological and capacity-building support to 
developing countries to enhance their capability in mitigation and adaptation” (BRICS, 
2017c).  
Energy is a broad and strategic dimension where BRICS share “complementary 
strengths”, agreeing “to exchange knowledge, know-how, technology and best practices” 
(BRICS, 2012b). To coordinate closer on energy relations BRICS has signed an MOU on 
Energy Saving and Energy Efficiency107, which since 2015 has offered an attractive space 
for BRICS energy Ministries to conduct economic intensive business108. On the surface 
energy is used as a public diplomacy tool; Declarations are filled with comments on the 
importance of energy109, committing to the universal access of clean energy110, including 
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 The NDB has purposed to mobilise “resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects” 
(BRICS, 2014a). 
106
 “We recognise that nuclear energy will play a significant role for some of the BRICS countries in meeting 
their 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement commitments and for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions 
in the long term” (BRICS, 2016c). 
107
 “striving for strengthening and further developing of energy saving and energy efficiency cooperation 
among the BRICS countries based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit” (BRICS, 2015f). 
108
 The 2015 Action Plan mentions a “Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Energy preceded by the meeting of 
Working Group on Energy and Energy Efficiency” (BRICS, 2015a). 
109
 For example: “Underlining the strategic importance of energy to economic development, we commit to 
strengthen BRICS cooperation on energy” (BRICS, 2017c). 
110
 “We will expand sourcing of clean and renewable energy, and use of energy efficient and alternative 
technologies” (BRICS, 2012b). 
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nuclear111, as central to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and “critical to the 
shared prosperity and future of the planet” (BRICS, 2016c). At the same time, BRICS 
confirms that “energy based on fossil fuels will continue to dominate the energy mix for 
the foreseeable future” (BRICS, 2012b). Energy lies at the core of the global strategic 
economic and security nexus. Close relationships allow for considerable business and 
security benefits. To assure a state’s sovereign independence it must maintain secure 
access to its energy. BRICS’ exchange opens doors for greater energy interdependence 
and power outside of Western influence112. Inter-BRICS agreements have already 
produced a number of significant deals113. BRICS’ increased energy relations pursue 
independence and abate Western control over the sector. 
Finally, organic documents evolve throughout subsequent years. The procedural 
nature of the Declaration can be used to impress specific dynamics, such as extolling 
perseverance, preventing traps of stagnation and repetition. In 2013 BRICS completed its 
first cycle of summits. The moment was remarked on as both the successful completion, 
as well as an opportunity to renew and rejuvenate commitments. This impression of 
durability, maturation and purpose was expanded. In the next year, it used the 
commencement of the second cycle to impress maturity, to recommit to its shared views. 
The 2017 Declaration followed suit. It was used to further “build on the outcomes and 
consensus of our previous Summits with unwavering conviction” (BRICS, 2017c). BRICS 
purposefully uses the momentum of its first cycle of summits and its first decade to affirm 
its “pledge to deepen our partnership with a renewed vision, based on openness, 
inclusiveness and mutually beneficial cooperation” and to evolve “new areas towards a 
comprehensive cooperation and a closer economic partnership” (BRICS, 2014c).  
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 “we stress…nuclear safety standards with a view to increasing public confidence in nuclear energy as a 
clean, affordable, safe and secure source of energy” (BRICS, 2012b). 
112
 The US and European Union have placed damning sanctions on the Russian gas and oil industry following 
the Russian incorporation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. 
113
 In 2015 South Africa’s Department of Energy and Russia’s Nuclear Energy Corporation (Rosatom) signed  
two publically maligned MOUs on nuclear power co-operation; in 2014 China and Russia signed a $400 
billion gas deal and in 2017 China bought a $9 billion share of Russia’s state-run Rosneft oil (Reuters, 2015; 




Summit Declarations prove to be effective tools to pursue influence and shape global 
governance. They signify BRICS’ embodiment of international order. Its regime toward 
international reform accords and exhibits a strategy to actualise principles and norms of 
the networked system; it motions leadership. BRICS members cooperate in order to 
influence toward greater networked intergovernmentalism. This strategy presents 
stability. The BRICS regime is, however, a shared tactic which holds no necessary 
permanence, nor obligation. Declarations are mechanisms that BRICS use to bring 
strategic items into the public consciousness. Its summit diplomacy appeals are 
deliberately persuasive, not coercive. While its strategy shows great caution, its will to 
lead is becoming increasingly ambitious, suggesting imminent difficulty in remaining 
neutral. BRICS’ common but differentiated responsibilities approach proposes strategically 
diminishing the structural dominance that powerful states have over the weak. 
Cooperative development and self-realisation, not under imposed conditions or charged 
good governance obligations, allows for independent agency. It instils greater sovereign 
function and advances its pursuit for legitimacy and influence. Ultimately BRICS’ 
promotion of autonomy that opens states to new interferences could facilitate new forms 











ANALYSIS OF BRICS’ OPPORTUNISTIC DOCUMENTATION 
“Human activity of politics is an art…By understanding how matters of style are crucial to 
the practice of politics, we discover not sham, but design, not decoration, but a world of 
meaning”.  
                    Robert Hariman (Hariman, 1995: 195) 
INTRODUCTION  
This chapter completes the analyses of BRICS documentation. Following the examination 
of BRICS’ legitimation in the established international order (programmatic) and its 
legitimation in and of itself (organic), this chapter synthetically closes the triad of analyses 
by looking at its presentations at international fora, communication at events outside its 
direct control (opportunistic). Previous chapters looked at BRICS as the central 
protagonist. Here BRICS uses its active participation at broader fora to opportunistically 
style the issues outside of its ambit in order to first recognise and then be recognised 
internationally. In these documents BRICS seize upon issues to design meaning from the 
rhetorical situation according to its selected style. This process is directed at 
territorialising the international domain according to its interests.  
RECOGNITION 
BRICS presents press Statements following its high-level international meetings and 
summits. These opportunistic documents advance its programmes and affirm its summit 
Declarations. Organic and programmatic documentation persuade through the direct 
performance of the global strategic environment. This third category employs indirect 
means: Communiqués and Statements. Collective responses at international fora where all 
BRICS states are members present appeals to a sense of belonging, to recognition and 
territorialisation of the multilateral domain.  
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Recognition regards more than acknowledgement or feedback from others. It 
entails a deeply interpersonal endeavour. Salazar (2015) views recognition, in the military 
sense of reconnaissance, to relate to the strategic seizure of a space, making it a territory 
(Salazar, 2015: 413). Recognition is linked to territoriality and legitimacy. When these 
spaces are recognised as legitimate an authority can set a standard, by motioning it as 
such. In order to assure such a relationship, the communication and recognition of power 
is imperative.  
Once subjectivity is established between parties recognition affords dynamism, 
locating the argument in a place, delineating subjectivities. Mutual recognition, affords 
epistemic authority to others, allowing for the admission into normative space (Mattias, 
2013). According to Brandom (2007) “recognition is a normative attitude. To recognise 
someone is to take her to be the subject of normative statuses, that is, of commitments 
and entitlements, as capable of undertaking responsibilities and exercising authority” 
(Brandom, 2007: 136). To recognise the other is to accept them as a subject in one’s 
normative world; being recognised means being granted agency in a political domain. The 
persisting contention between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the 
US is illustrative. The DPRK strategically postures the threat of nuclear assault upon the US 
in the quest for recognition and the subsequent negotiations which would follow. The US’s 
refusal to recognise the DPRK presents a rejection of its subjectivity in a potential 
negotiation, disallowing the DPRK normative access and strategic participation in the 
international political domain114.  
Control over the global domain is not an aim pursued in the content or form of 
BRICS’ opportunistic communications. Instead, BRICS seeks recognition as a normative 
subject, as an actor taking up equitable strategic territory, displacing the territory of 
dominant powers. BRICS shapes and redefines norms with itself at the representative 
core; effective leaders shape their message to align to views that their audience already 
holds (Reicher et al, 2007). Opportunistic documentation seeks recognition by responding 
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 The strategy of the US in the first half of 2018 suggests a change. The US appears to leverage negotiations 
with the DPRK, as an apparent move against China. Discussions with the DPRK should be seen as tactical 
recognition, giving it a chance to territorialise this partner of China.  
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to existing phenomena. They relate to events beyond their control, shaping the perception 
and reactions of participating states.  
The conflict and instability in Syria presents a clear case where BRICS recognises an 
international situation in order to draw international attention to it, as well as be 
recognised for doing so. Syria presents an opportune situation to shape the international 
perception of matters beyond its direct control; configuring the narrative regarding Syria 
and the international order at large. Every UNGA statement since the start of the conflict, 
bar 2014 when it focused on the founding and functioning of the UN, the condition in 
Syria is authoritatively addressed. These tactics are demonstrated in the sections below: 
“The ministers stated their resolve to maintain the unity of approaches to 
the Syrian issue at the UN Security Council. They noted that an escalation of 
sanctions against Damascus would provoke opposition to ratchet up 
confrontation with the authorities. And this would only aggravate the 
situation even more and put regional peace and security in jeopardy” 
(BRICS, 2011b).  
“They called upon all parties to commit immediately to a complete cease-
fire, to halt violence and to end all violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law” and “The Ministers expressed satisfaction with recent 
important developments that bring renewed hope for a peaceful resolution 
to the Syrian conflict” (BRICS, 2013a). 
“They noted that terrorist activities of the extremist organizations which 
control large parts of territory of the Republic of Iraq and the Syrian Arab 
Republic pose a direct threat not only to all the countries of the Middle East, 
but to the whole international community” (BRICS, 2015k).  
KAIROS 
BRICS is fundamentally a kairotic body, composed to acquire territory in a fluid 
international order. Kairos, Greek for an opportune and decisive moment (Merriam-
Webster, 2017), holds a qualitative character for timeliness and is central to Aristotle’s 
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rhetorical design. BRICS’ documentation and in particular its Statements opportunistically 
pursue both qualitative temporal and spatial considerations. The ability to judge a 
situation, acting accordingly, corresponds to recognition and ownership over the related 
matter or territory. In order to territorialise, BRICS relies greatly on an appreciation for 
kairos; to capture recognition at the decisive moment.   
Kairos is fundamental to BRICS’ original ethos, assigned by the ‘thought leadership’ 
and publicity of Goldman Sachs (Bourne, 2015). The BRIC countries opportunely adopted 
the recognition of its combined, ascending ethos, to gain subjective agency in the global 
discourse. The ethereal financial concept, as suggested by the original designation115, 
collapsed when the countries combined to recognise and therefore territorialise its name. 
Its kairotic subjectivity commenced when the leaders performed the self-ascribed BRIC 
moniker, in a media Statement following its first formative meeting in 2008. This is a 
statement of origin, a founding moment; subsequently, there has been a tangible record 
affording meaning and direction. It transformed recognition into territoriality. Claiming a 
name is to claim hegemony over the territory or locus (Segun Ige, 2002: 94). This 
formative expression eclipsed a statement of intent and realised potential in a kairotic 
moment of design. BRICS’ origination encompassed a claim and seizure of geopolitical 
territory; signalling coherent purpose and direction.  
This first text commences to foundationally affirm “their first meeting in this 
format”, while it closes by agreeing “to continue coordinating their moves on key 
economic issues” (BRIC, 2008a). Hereby BRICS creates and sustains its identity. This 
opportunistic proclamation of subjectivity is by extension a proclamation of power116, an 
affirmation of agency, transcending the boost and free ride that was afforded by Goldman 
Sachs.   
The first leaders meeting presented a rhetorical opening to the BRICS narrative and 
scenario. It was largely an announcement of BRICS’ agency, therefore intentionally brief. 
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 Goldman Sachs’ 2003 paper is titled: “Dreaming with BRICs?” 
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Instead, the Joint Communiqués that followed the Finance Ministry meetings, on the 
sidelines of the G20’s yearly summit, encompassed the initial opportunistic tools in the 
early years of BRICS. These documents constructed a conceptual foundation. They 
provided a platform for BRICS to form itself through assertion, parading its value and 
virtues. These statements carefully pushed the group’s agency in the global financial 
debate, a space to pronounce upon continuing financial crises117. The Communiqués 
utilised BRICS’ recognition as financial powers, presenting expedient expressions, such as 
judgments “on the reform of international financial institutions and global governance” 
(BRIC, 2008b). By interjecting itself into the broader, global discussion, BRICS signals 
support and rejection; amplifying its ethos and pathos. These assertions of financial power 
ceased in 2011, replaced in 2012 by a Statement detailing the meeting of the leaders at 
the G20; supplanting particular (recognised financial) power with comprehensive (claimed 
political) power of command. This move was not incidental. Instead, the form that 
replaced the Finance Ministry Joint Communiqués bears significant insight to its expanded 
opportunistic modalities. While the early documents displayed the moment of founding, 
they remained ends in themselves, limited by their locales. 
In 2009 the G20 opportunely expanded to a comprehensive economic mandate 
when it declared itself the “premier forum for our international economic cooperation” 
(G20, 2009). Subsequent meetings would thereby open the kairotic space for active, 
creative participation in economic global governance. It furthermore emphasised the 
expanded influence of high-level meetings among leaders (summits), suggesting these are 
increasingly the locales that rhetorically shape international processes and global 
governance. BRICS’ development can be seen as a coherent response to these regulative 
proclamations. The increased prominence of international summitry presents an 
alternative to formally constituted institutions (for example the IMF or WTO) and moves 
toward constituting intergovernmental order. This indicates power’s return to the state as 
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 Example: “we reflected on the main causes of the current financial crisis, its latest developments, future 
scenarios, as well as BRIC experiences and policy responses…we exchanged views on the reform of 
international financial institutions and global governance. We also discussed proposals put forward by the 
countries on reforming the global financial architecture” (BRIC, 2008b). 
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the centre of authority. Summits displace the fixed, hard law approach of international 
institutions, proposing power as a fluid process, requiring constant re-constitution. 
SUMMITS AS RHETORICAL SITUATIONS  
Summits and summit diplomacy are integral to BRICS’ strategy. In addition to organic 
documentation, opportunistic statements emerge from high-level international meetings, 
the locales of power. Apart from its yearly leaders’ summits, BRICS leaders meet on the 
sidelines of the G20 conference, while Foreign Ministers from member states meet on the 
sidelines of the UNGA. These are the most prominent international fora where all BRICS 
are members, ideal (neutral and non-hierarchical), legitimate venues for BRICS to claim 
common ground and maximise influence and interest while minimising overreach. The 
remaining analysis in this chapter focuses on the Statements emerging from the UNGA 
and G20, as apex global political leadership forum and global economic leadership forum, 
respectively. BRICS uses these platforms to coordinate and consolidate its own positions 
while aiming to influence and leverage the positions of fellow participants. Presently both 
occasions provide informative statements, composing the core of its opportunistic 
documentation. Here BRICS opportunely delineates its substantiating 
intergovernmentalism118.  
By authorising these organisations, it reflexively legitimates itself. Initially, its 
opportunistic documents touted its “value and significance”, as a group representing 43% 
of the global population (BRICS, 2012b). This claim, core in its early years, changed away 
from impressing upon its significance. Instead, it now assays a neutral position; instead of 
promoting itself, it advances multilateral norms, rhetorically propounding equitable 
international relations and the empowerment of the developing world. 
BRICS maintains a mode of continuous establishment through G20 and UNGA 
Statements. It regards the global condition, presenting its strategic role in an entangled 
and sophisticated way. BRICS establishes its involvement in recognising the UNGA and 
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 Discussed in chapter four. 
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G20, acknowledging its legitimacy; avoiding direct responsibility. Instead, BRICS’ 
membership ensures that its Statements present constructed and delineated advocacy.    
Summits increasingly shape the political processes of the networked order. They 
facilitate intergovernmentalism by configuring the “architecture, institutions and, most 
critically, the political and policy behavior of the actors engaged in the influence of 
outcomes of common concern in the international system” (Alexandroff and Brean, 2015: 
2). Summits therefore engage and declare upon situations that produce conviction. As 
such summits commandeer the response to international situations. They respond to and 
manage situations. According to the G20 it is purposed “to develop global policies to 
address today’s most pressing challenges” (G20, 2018). This is done by pronouncing upon 
international affairs, ensuring maintained recognition and influence. The ultimate 
convention that international leadership summits pursue is to corroborate and elevate 
their continued collaboration. The recommitment to these fora produces re-
territorialisation and the preservation of the status quo. Summits play the part of 
assembling world leaders to show cognition and conviction of global demands; these 
rituals occupy, as well as perform, leadership. 
Under this comprehension, summits are rhetorical situations; providing leaders 
with the context, means and ways to act, as well as the substance and constraints to 
respond to. Central to the rhetorical situation is an urgent need or demand, or exigence. 
Bitzer (1986) advances that every rhetorical situation has “at least one controlling 
exigence which functions as the organizing principle: it specifies the audience to be 
addressed and the change to be effected” (Bitzer, 1968: 7). It is towards this exigence that 
rhetors direct their oration, seeking control over the situation. The exigence is the guiding 
principle. It is a potential end to be brought about, requiring the appropriate resources 
and audience, as it also requires the absence of constraints that will configure the speaker 
and the audience. An exigence provides for a response, which itself draws a reciprocal 
response (Bitzer, 1968). In the exploitation of the exigence, Bitzer advances the need to 
move the mediators of change (the audience), while observing the given constraints to the 
actions that modify it (Bitzer, 1986: 8). A kairotic response to the rhetorical situation, 
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through its own statement on affairs at international fora, sees BRICS manifesting its own 
version of events in order to enter into and command international subjectivity.  
BRICS regularly refer to influential institutions and bodies in its communication119. 
The inverse is however not the case. BRICS receives very little recognition from 
established international organisations, formal or informal. Though it is a limited 
illustration, as BRICS states are often members of these groupings, its gross lack of 
recognition does allude to the DPRK case, mentioned earlier in this chapter. It is not within 
the ambit of this study to further pursue this matter. It does, however, provide grounds 
for further study. It will be illustrative to observe the quantitative as well as qualitative 
recognition that BRICS is accorded.  
Bitzer proposes that carefully sculpted discourse can “effectively constrain human 
decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence” (Bitzer, 
1968: 6). Exigence is central in BRICS’ communication strategies. In producing its 
Statements BRICS contributes to the rhetorical situation’s expediency and immediacy. Its 
participation at international fora increases the gravity of international summits. The 
summit is both a rhetorical situation, as well as structurally being a pronouncement upon 
international developments; the representative expansion from G7 to G20 proving 
illustrative. In order not to appear external to the collective BRICS opportunistically affirms 
the leadership of the host and commits to the exigence of the summit, declared in the 
theme. This ensures that its Statement does not facilitate its own rhetorical situation. 
While Statements affirm this association120, their end is to secure greater recognition for 
itself and conversely de-territorialise the established power order. G20 Declarations 
sustain dominion, while BRICS’ Statements interpose, painting an untenable global 
situation. It does so in a number of ways. It remarks on global insecurity121; deficient 
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 “They urged the need to ensure that trade and economic blocs are consistent with WTO norms and 
principles and contribute to strengthening the multilateral trading system” (BRICS, 2015l).  
120
 BRICS leaders “reaffirmed their willingness to work with other G20 members for a successful Summit” 
(BRICS, 2014b). 
121
 “leaders strongly condemned the abhorrent terror attacks in Paris” (BRICS, 2015l). 
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economic infrastructure122; inadequate recovery from the economic crisis123; and non-
representative institutions124. In sum, summits declare command over international 
exigencies, while BRICS’ Statements, especially at the G20, assert that the opposite is the 
case.  
While veiled under the broader international domain, these persuasive 
performances indicate BRICS’ aim of capitalising on the circumstances at hand. Both 
setting and timing are strategically exploited. BRICS uses the established recognition of its 
member states as permanent members of both fora to produce an internal, limited 
collective. BRICS’ actions and Statements procedurally recognise each other and thereby 
elevate the influence of their combined ethos; shaping the process and deterritorialising 
the control over the broader collective. By seizing exclusive territory inside these fora it 
compels those excluded into recognising it, providing BRICS with a platform and an 
audience.  
Furthermore, BRICS releases its Statements a day before the G20 Statement is 
released and while the UNGA General Debate is ongoing. These efforts not only engage 
the discussion in progress125, but through providing historical linkages to previous 
Statements and events it steers international pedagogy. By delivering its own account it 
seizes the moment, inducing its distinct signification. In doing so, while knowing the 
content of the broader proceedings, it is able to strategically shape the debate, presenting 
a distinct and compelling argument which manipulates the rhetorical situation. 
BRICS pursues influence through advancing an ameliorated international condition. 
Both UNGA and G20 Statements focus on the world at large. UNGA Statements are 
generally broader, dealing with approaches and style, whereas G20 Statements are more 
                                                          
122
 “We welcome the contribution of the New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement to 
international financial stability and sustainable development” (BRICS, 2017b). 
123
 “the global economy was still at risk and its recovery was not yet sustainable” (BRICS, 2015l). 
124
 “we stress the importance of increasing the voice and representation of EMDCs in global economic and 
financial institutions” (BRICS, 2017b). 
125
 “the BRICS maintain a constant dialogue on the main issues on the international agenda” (BRICS, 2015k). 
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issue-specific, pressuring for the execution of definite resolutions. BRICS Statements direct 
attention to issues it wants to focus on. When it says that “(T)he current situation requires 
decisive actions”; that “(W)e are taking necessary steps to secure growth, maintain 
financial stability and contain inflation”; and finally that “(T)he contribution of BRICS 
countries and other emerging market economies to global growth is rising and will 
increase further” BRICS interjects the present to actively introduce a future state of affairs 
(BRICS, 2011a). Its Statements rhetorically offer leadership over the international 
situations126. When it states that “we are concerned with the slow pace of quota and 
governance reforms at the IMF”, it speaks not against the IMF, but to it (BRICS, 2011a). 
BRICS’ motions engage the agents it addresses. It does so in order to gain recognition and 
territoriality. Its outward engagement is to ensure the stability of the networked 
international order.   
MIMESIS   
BRICS hardly acts. Instead, it displays, through mirroring. The very first assertion in its 
inaugural Statement following the Foreign Ministers meeting on the sidelines of the UNGA 
in 2008 is revealing. It reports that “(P)riority issues on the 63rd UNGA agenda were 
discussed” (BRIC, 2008c). This statement is illustrative of BRICS’ broader mimetic 
rhetorical strategy. In producing its own narrative, BRICS reproduces the authority of the 
UNGA, through its own words; showing, through the enacted representation of character, 
rather than telling. This practice of mimesis, performative imitation, is a tactic to create 
common ground, to be recognised. Hartman (1999) contends that “(R)hetoric in the 
service of mimesis, rhetoric as imaging power, is far from being ‘imitative’ in the sense of 
reflecting pre-existent reality. Mimesis becomes poiesis, imitation becomes making, by 
giving form and pressure to a presumed reality” (Hartman, 1999: 23).  
Mimesis is fundamental to understanding BRICS’ strategic communication. BRICS 
imitates and re-enacts global order in order to ensure its multilateral functioning. In doing 
                                                          
126
 In its 2011 UNGA Statement BRICS “noted that an escalation of sanctions against Damascus would 
provoke opposition to ratchet up confrontation with the authorities”. Instead, it supported the urgent 
“carrying out the reforms announced by Syria’s government so that people could really feel the benefits of 
the change” (BRICS, 2011a). 
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so it constructs agency, to shape the agenda and conjure global order. It reproduces 
reality in order to speak out; strategically remaining dispassionate. BRICS states are valid 
international members; they do not need to prove anything. Instead, BRICS’ mimesis 
reaffirms both the global arrangement and BRICS itself.     
Imitation is foundational to BRICS; indicated by its incorporation of the pre-existing 
Goldman Sachs moniker. Through mimesis BRICS expediently presents its interests to its 
audience. It serves what is in front of it, exploiting the situation at hand. BRICS’ mimetic 
performance aligns to Isocrates’ insistence on the presentation of civic excellence (Terrill 
in Benson and Snee, 2008). Mimesis is not mere mechanistic duplication; instead by being 
spoken the content becomes part of the personification of the speaker, who in turn is 
substantiated manifestly with signification. Mimesis creatively fashions meaning according 
to the logos it utilises. While representation accords to intention, it is adaptable as “means 
of self-fashioning” (Hariman, 2008: 136). Mimesis is a significant medium of style, a way of 
consciously using existing works to serve present goals. 
The embodiment of texts, of modalities and values, however established, under a 
new constitutive speaker opens a new conversation. By simply adding its voice to existing 
calls, such as for “resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (BRICS, 2013a), BRICS 
introduces new agency, a potentially different view and a potentially new outcome to the 
matter. By incarnating the issue it claims that the matter is not stagnant, nor is its 
outcome predestined. Its motion on the issue removes its inertia.  
Instead of relaying the mediated views of individual countries, with internal 
inconsistencies, it advocates directly, contributing synergistically. The style, in which the 
content is reincarnated, in turn, produces its ethos. Temporally the process of mimesis, 
though taking from the past, does not pay tribute to what has happened, but instead 
reanimates in the present, looking forward. BRICS aims towards preferred future 
conditions by suggesting that “universally accepted norms, standards and practices is of 
paramount importance” (BRICS, 2013a).  
Through the process of mimesis BRICS tangibly becomes. It seeks to derive and 
subscribe its ethos through the “sympathetic magic” of mimesis, drawing on the 
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“character and power of the original, to the point where the representation may assume 
that character and that power” (Taussig, 1993: xiii). BRICS uses mimesis, advancing original 
authorities, while accurately embodying its ethos and power, through form127 and 
content128. While the structure and subject matter is taken from the UNGA and G20, the 
active agent is BRICS. Across its opportunistic Statements the typical paragraph, if not 
sentence, commences referentially with “the leaders” or “the ministers”, followed by an 
operational verb, such as “affirm”, “support” or “reiterated”. The intention is not to 
palpably act upon these matters, but to ascribe agency, instilling the impression that 
BRICS holds authoritative prominence.  
EPIDEICTIC 
The use of rhetoric, as opposed to the epistemic end of the dialectic, is based upon the 
contingent beliefs that shape conviction. To BRICS the process of mimesis is a creative 
display of these beliefs. Aristotle discusses such a disclosure of virtue under the epideictic 
or ceremonial oratory. As a mirror to established authority, BRICS’ opportunistic 
Statements can appear judicial, but the epideictic regards not so much the speaker. 
Instead, the audience, not as a judge or debater, but as a spectator, witnesses the 
disclosure of praise and blame (Prelli, 2006: 295). The audience is therefore “judging, not 
about the matter of discourse, but about the orator’s skill” to move them (Perelman, 
2012: 6). BRICS’ observations of proceedings are shaped to convince an audience. Instead 
of the speaker being the active party, the epideictic seeks to move the audience to take 
action. The audience is inspired by their reading. The text invokes feelings. The epideictic 
presents a vision or form and inspires the audience to actualise it129. As such it seeks to 
animate the audience, to ensure they internalise the message, to arouse active 
participation (McKeon, 1994: 211).  
                                                          
127
 BRICS’ G20 Statement reflects the form of the G20 media Statement. 
128
 BRICS’ UNGA Statement affirms the same content that is discussed at the UNGA. 
129
 For example: BRICS “shares a common vision which drives it to also increasingly identify common areas 
for cooperation to assist with finding global solutions to global challenges” (BRICS, 2013a). 
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The archetypal epideictic piece, Pericles’ funeral peroration to the fallen Athenian 
soldiers during the Peloponnesian War, does not beseech the people to go to war. 
Instead, his endeavour is to frame the historical moment (Thucydides, 1982). BRICS’ 
Statements do not pay tribute to the dead in the fashion of Pericles. It does, however, 
pursue similar ends. Its goal is to glorify and territorialise the extant multilateral order; to 
inspire a kinetic movement towards these ends. So too BRICS frames the contemporary 
international order130. It presents its ideals when it exclaims: “we stress the importance of 
upholding a more inclusive, balanced, and open world economy” (BRICS, 2017a). These 
displays prefaced by “we firmly support” or “we affirm”, makes confirming use of the 
personal qualifier “we”. It thereby builds a relation between its formative self and the 
ideals it espouses.  
Furthermore, it applies an energetic form that brings the intended object or state-
of-being into the present; not by deed, but through an appeal to virtue. The current 
events where BRICS publishes its Statements provides it with what Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (2014) define as presence: “displaying of certain elements on which the 
speaker wishes to center attention in order that they may occupy the foreground of the 
hearer’s consciousness” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2014: 93). BRICS’ Statements do 
not foreground the event, but instead the topics, the ideals, principles and agreements, 
establishing these in the minds of the audience. It hereby makes correlations between 
ideas, events and agents, according to its interest. BRICS advances its arguments through a 
strategic display131. An argument is more convincing when the audience can relate; when 
it can feel that there is something present. BRICS makes reality by performing it.   
Sheard (1996) expands a broader, historical understanding of the epideictic, saying 
that it designates “discourse appropriate within pedagogical or ritual contexts” (Sheard, 
1996: 767). Taking from this comment the epideictic can be denoted as 1) ritualistic; 2) 
pedagogical and 3) assigning praise and blame.  
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 For example: the “need for a comprehensive reform of the UN…making it more representative, effective 
and efficient, so that it can adequately respond to global challenges” (BRICS, 2014e). 
131
 Discussed in chapter four. 
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BRICS’ delivery of its yearly Statements depends on the recurrence of international 
fora. These documents are opportunistic in their very existence. Its form and content 
depend on the G20 and UNGA fundamentally maintaining its procedural consistency. This 
allows the promulgation of its ritualistic message. Were the G20 to deviate from its 
conventional course or were it to comply to or exceed BRICS’ petitions it would throw off 
BRICS’ formalistic invocation towards reform, usurping BRICS’ foundational appeal. BRICS’ 
current form is therefore paradoxically dependent on its calls not being recognised. 
In ritualistic form, BRICS repeats the same message for effect. Through mimesis it 
vitalises the form in the present moment. It furthermore often recalls132 or reiterates133 
already established documents and commitments. Repetition suggests that these 
commitments have not been put into place as agreed, thereby showing dedication to 
implementation as well as blaming the mechanisms of power for reneging on its 
commitments. Repeatedly stressing that the global economy has not recovered 
sufficiently since the 2008 financial crisis134, BRICS uses repetition to emphasise the 
continued failure of resolution. These Statements do not say or prove anything new. 
Instead by repeating it, it advances conviction and removes doubt. It does not produce 
practical exigence. The use of ritual is an extraordinary use of language; it is due to it 
breaking the behavioural rules that it gains value (Carter, 1999: 212). It does not seek 
engagement to convince; instead, ritual breathes life and assigns meaning. 
The epideictic approach affords pedagogical guidance. The 2011 UNGA Statement 
advises that “escalations of sanctions against Damascus would provoke opposition to 
ratchet up confrontation with the authorities. And this would only aggravate the situation 
even more and put regional peace and security in jeopardy” (BRICS, 2011b). In the context 
of ongoing events of global consequence, BRICS takes advantage of international 
gatherings to guide through consigning meaning to complex affairs. Projecting a firm 
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 “the Ministers recalled the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (BRICS, 2016b). 
133
 “They reiterated the urgency of unblocking the IMF reform as a measure to reform global economic 
governance consistent with the interests and needs of the developing countries” (BRICS, 2015k). 
134
 “As to the world economy, six years after the beginning of the international financial crisis, the Leaders 
noted that a strong and long-lasting recovery is yet to materialize” (BRICS, 2014d). 
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understanding of what has happened and what is likely to happen it establishes a 
paradigm for praxis. Furthermore, by saying “the Ministers reiterated that there is no 
military solution to the conflict and that it is time for diplomacy” (BRICS, 2013a), BRICS 
both makes sense of the situation as well as encourages others to accept guidance in 
particular behaviour. Instruction through disclosure reciprocally conceals alternatives, as 
well as that which is not being said, even when unintentionally done. Concealing 
possibilities further inform the nature and intent of the speaker. Naturally, it is difficult to 
examine what is being left out, especially when content is ritualistically repeated. What is 
instructive from exclusion is that BRICS Statements procedurally use developing (non-
BRICS) countries as its subjects. Herein the member states avoid their own centrality in 
seeking what is essentially betterment for them135. Concealing or rerouting their 
instrumentality also allows for concealed criticism. This is the case when BRICS directly 
accuses developed countries of their “unintended negative spillovers of unconventional 
monetary policies” (BRICS, 2013b).  
The central function of epideictic is to showcase the honourable and the shameful, 
what deserves praise and what deserves blame. The use of praise and blame serves the 
same function, whether positive or negative, to move the audience to feel and take the 
speaker’s wish further. The primary example of BRICS’ praise and blame relates the 
fulfilment or failure of commitments and conventions. Its Statements at the G20 
repeatedly praise “emerging market economies” for “contributing to global economic 
activity by sustaining high growth rates, despite adverse circumstances and spillovers of 
major advanced economies” (BRICS, 2014e). The recurring condemnation of the IMF’s 
deferred implementation of agreed reforms succinctly focuses on international 
institutions’ failures136. When BRICS remarks that “major economies, including the G20, 
could do more to boost global demand and market confidence” (BRICS, 2013b) it 
opportunistically consigns responsibility and critiques non-compliance.  
                                                          
135
 “They reiterated the urgency of unblocking the IMF reform as a measure to reform global economic 
governance consistent with the interests and needs of the developing countries” (BRICS, 2015k). 
136
 “The leaders also reaffirmed their disappointment and serious concern at the non-implementation of the 
2010 IMF reforms, and its impact on the Fund’s legitimacy and credibility” (BRICS, 2014e). 
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The use of praise and blame personifies subject and object; it situates BRICS as a 
conscientious agent. When it says that “they highly appreciated the role played by Egypt 
in the cessation of hostilities” in the Gaza Strip, it is in “support for the immediate 
resumption of negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians based on 
international law and relevant United Nations resolutions” (BRICS, 2014e). Herein BRICS is 
supporting its principled position, seeking to move the international audience to advocate 
for the upholding of international law. The firm standard (deserving praise) is UN 
legitimated state sovereignty; whatever threatens its realisation is criticised137. 
BRICS procedurally blames recent instabilities in the international order, especially 
where aggravations affect the sovereignty of states. Its UNGA Statements are keenly 
focused on the sovereign crises in Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya and Israel/Palestine. In 
these states and elsewhere outside interventions are condemned, yet belligerents are 
never named, so to avoid involvement. Condemning all actions against sovereign states 
brings the actions of intervening states into the discourse on undermining sovereignty, 
including terrorism; a potent tactical equivalency that the epideictic affords. BRICS does 
not define or delineate terror138. Instead, terror’s maleficence is simply condemned. This 
allows the failure and the need for functional UN systems to be highlighted 
simultaneously. Its overall advocacy for a principle-based approach when addressing 
extra-judicial affairs presents leadership, an apparent response to the recent, increasingly 
managerial direction that foreign policy has taken in dealing with problems on the local, 
regional and global stage (Alexandroff and Brean, 2015).  
Pericles’ peroration is kairotic, inspiring the city to prevail, extolling the greatness 
of Athens and its people. His is a true vox populii. So too BRICS’ praise is for a networked 
international order, seeking to inspire its merits to be held high. It is not the personal 
expression of the member countries, but an attempt at a collective, global voice. The 
manifest scope of both the UNGA and G20 ensures that BRICS’ business is equally broad. A 
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 “The Ministers voiced serious concern over the conflict areas in Africa that negatively affect the security 
and stability of some States” (BRICS, 2014e). 
138
 Illustrated here: “The Ministers stressed the role of the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group in 
further deepening the dialogue on counter-terrorism cooperation” (BRICS, 2017a). 
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global audience and landscape also ensures that no one is excluded, or implied as 
oppositional. Instead, the comprehensive nature of the message facilitates communitas; 
an appealing construction, wherein all are included. By transcending the national and 
regional scope BRICS’ broad claims are not territorial to a bounded state, but to the global 
order at large. The comprehensive, view obviates the potentially antagonising picking of 
sides. Instead, it pedagogically presents a global, inclusive vox populii.  
Returning to the comparison with Pericles, his oration centred on Athens itself. 
Sparta, the direct enemy, is never named outright. Similarly, though BRICS condemns 
actions and conditions, blame is used to stimulate conviction for and allegiance to the 
multilateral international order139. BRICS uses terror and domination to signify loss, in turn 
glorifying the valorous system it espouses. BRICS’ value is elevated by the enemy’s 
depravity. It uses these failures to re-vitalise the international system according to its 
wishes. BRICS suggests that to “combat terrorism…the international community should 
take the necessary steps to enhance cooperation...(and) particularly highlighted the UN 
cooperation framework and the need for all member states to implement international 
convention of the United Nations” (BRICS, 2008c). Its opportunistic claim is therefore that 
terrorism can only be legitimately addressed through a collective effort led by the UN, 
involving the affected states. Such an exercise would elevate the agency of member 
states. 
The 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the founding of the 
United Nations offers BRICS a prime epideictic opportunity to pay tribute while projecting 
forward. Its call for “the UN to initiate and organize commemorative events to mark and 
pay tribute to these two historical moments” and their reaffirmed “commitment to 
safeguarding a just and fair international order based on the UN Charter” is in revitalising 
praise for the openly multilateral spirit and body that emerged from the Second World 
War (BRICS 2014a). This opportune moment to rejuvenate the founding principles bolsters 
BRICS’ claim for comprehensive reform.  
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 “The Leaders reiterated their wholehearted commitment to the fight against terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations, with the United Nations playing a central role…They emphasized the need for a united 
global effort to combat terrorism in accordance with norms and principles of international law, including the 
UN Charter” (BRICS, 2016a). 
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The 70th anniversary is the central theme in the 2015 UNGA media Statement. It 
charges the revitalisation of multilateral relations and diplomacy in order to pay “tribute 
to all those who fought against fascism and militarism and for freedom of nations” (BRICS, 
2015k). By procedurally returning to the 70th anniversary the text maintains the original, 
legitimate embodiment of the UN through re-activation. By aligning itself to original UN 
authority140, it confers praise upon itself, by association. Commemoration returns it to the 
formative beginnings of the UN. This modality of representation conceives of it as 
malleable; denoting it under these imaginary conditions allows for greater signification, at 
a lower risk than simply speaking out at random. Rhetorically these commemorative 
events are powerful platforms.  
BRICS also tactically confers praise and blame on matters that are novel or are 
aberrations of what is perceived as standard. New developments provide opportunities to 
shape perception. The announcement and subsequent launch of its NDB and CRA are 
central examples where novel matters are praised in light of current problems141. Even 
before the launch of these instruments, they were lauded to “raise BRICS cooperation to a 
fundamentally new level” (BRICS, 2014e). The very launches of these institutions are 
signalled as successes, hailing the combined efforts of separate agencies in partnership. 
The true achievement lies in the principle of cooperation, not the fact of its realisation. 
The use of the epideictic is to charge this principle.  
BRICS presents itself as a leading advocate of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, “committed to continue to work towards the full implementation of the 17 
Sustainable Development Goals” (BRICS, 2016b). Its commitment is however to the spirit, 
not the deed, of achieving the programme. This is shown by all BRICS member states 
falling outside of the top 50 implementers of the SDGs while calling on “especially the 
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 It is in BRICS’ (especially Russia and China, as leading members) interest to represent the allied victory of 
the Second World War as a grouped achievement and not simply as the triumph of the West. In 2017 BRICS 
leaders expressed “their commitment to resolutely reject the continued attempts to misrepresent the 
results of World War II” (BRICS, 2017a). 
141
 “the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) has been established and will contribute to the 
stability of the international financial system in view of the increased volatility of the world financial and 
economic situation” (BRICS, 2015l); and the “NDB's potential to bridge the gap in financing infrastructure 
projects” (BRICS, 2016a).   
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developed countries, to fulfil their commitments and provide strong support for 
developing countries” (BRICS, 2016b; Sachs et al, 2017).  
RHETORICAL STYLING  
Style is central in understanding and utilising rhetoric. For language to achieve its strategic 
function it should suit purpose, setting and audience. Cicero, a master of style, said bluntly 
in his Epistulae ad familiars (Letters to Friends): “I don’t always adopt the same style. 
What similarity is there between a letter and an oration in court or at a public meeting?” 
(Cicero, 1891: 9.21.1). The language and figures of speech that may invigorate a partisan-
specific audience are unlikely to be effective in a newspaper of broad readership.  
The style that BRICS adopts through its communications has been discussed 
relationally throughout this dissertation. It has foremost been channelled into three 
analytical categories (programmatic, organic and opportunistic), which have then 
conceptually explored the strategic aspects of the methods of delivery that BRICS uses 
throughout its communications. BRICS styles its claims; addressing specific matters 
regarding power diffusion, accountability, legitimacy, etcetera. It uses the conventions and 
principles of established international relations to advance its ethos. 
Closer examination is now paid to how BRICS rhetorically styles its 
communications. Instead of a pure stylistic analysis, style is used to construct 
understanding, identifying general aspects of the texts. Hariman’s (1995) conceptions of 
style, particularly his republican and courtly styles, are considered as fitting modalities. 
While invention looks at what (the means), style addresses how (the ways) ideas are 
expressed and how arguments are presented; how common ground is territorialised. Style 
is central to all persuasive arguments and is of great importance in the study of BRICS. 
BRICS’ form has matched its style; mirroring the UN and showing forth its ethos. 
Style, as any technique, says Hariman, is “to displace any other kind of intelligence” 
(Hariman, 1995: 3). BRICS’ foregrounds leadership ethics as presence, transmitting a 
feeling through artistic gestures. By displaying itself as a leading regime it seeks to claim 
territory historically held by the West. BRICS leaders opportunistically express grief and 
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celebration; executing its agenda. Its territorialisation of the international order pursues 
the personification of intergovernmental networked order. 
BRICS’ documents create a distinct agency, grounded in emotions and ideals. These 
are not logical, abstract claims. Instead, they deal with specifics, pursuing first recognition 
and then motion in their chosen direction. BRICS’ choice of style gives dynamism to the 
values it espouses. It stimulates passions. Passions exceed the evocation of sympathy 
(pathos), driving the audience to act seemingly autonomously. To Aristotle passions 
provide the territory for conviction (Dow, 2015: 1), their evocation assures recognition. 
Passions inform the style, as it is through style that the rhetorical situation is shaped and 
through which common ground and displacement is sought.  
Style is not incidental but strategically details the design, how an argument is 
constructed. It is forward-looking, using the present to build into the future, executed 
through clarity and specific diction. BRICS’ insider status allows it to opportunistically 
recognise legitimacy, thereby situating its arguments within a greater territory. To that 
end BRICS employs courtly and intergovernmental styles, to move and inspire belief and 
influence at international fora.  
Mimesis is used together with the epideictic to amplify BRICS’ style. BRICS 
participates in a conversation that is rhetorically formed. Style relates to the conditions 
under which this conversation is held; the decided selection of vocabulary is how politics is 
styled. Polities such as BRICS employ styles to arrange, to illustrate meaning. BRICS’ style 
does not separate power from its communications; its argument remains greatly one of 
style. Hariman illustrates that style reflects “oratorical virtuosity for public performance”, 
it entails “an appreciation of verbal technique, a norm of consensus, the embodiment of 
civic virtue, and a doctrine of civility” (Hariman, 1995: 4). These features are constant 
across BRICS documentation and will be used to illustrate here. 
COURTLY STYLE 
BRICS’ overarching (outside-in) courtly style is on account of the insider status held by 
member states. The courtly style is used to locate BRICS in the international order or the 
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‘court’ of the UN; the foundation upon which modern internationalism stands, where 
common ground is built. Hariman advances the court to be empowered as the ultimate 
authority (Hariman, 1995: 51). His model of the courtly style is significant as BRICS 
enduringly commits to UN legitimacy. In the king’s court it is he who is elevated beyond all 
else, his word holds authoritative finality; the king is the embodiment of legitimacy. He 
forms the deep materiality, the physical presence of power. In its courtly style, BRICS 
directs all form of decorum to the UN, proposing it to be the legitimate arbiter of the 
global realm142. BRICS coordinates its rhetorical positions around the foundational 
principles of the UN, so as to remain inside of its realm, ensuring recognition and avoiding 
repudiation.  
The UN forms the outer layer to which BRICS fixes itself, its confirmation is a 
central claim advanced throughout. Hereby BRICS rebuffs any hegemonic formations. 
Through its courtly style, it remains within the ambit of a greater authority, making the 
pursuit of its own interests (when aligned to the UN) possible; style details the form. This 
style territorialises for an indirect purpose, achieving recognition not for itself, but for the 
broader UN system. By declaring its common ground, of UN centrality, it strategically 
serves to immobilise any charge of it soliciting the ‘crown’, “it closes off deliberation about 
the purpose, values, and direction” (Hariman, 1995: 94). In a similar fashion, the G20 
presents another layer of authority. BRICS Statements comment on the efficiency of the 
G20; though BRICS forms part of the G20 its critique advances its strategic position. The 
2015 G20 Statement primarily discusses matters of global concern, well beyond BRICS’ 
control or jurisdiction. In affixing itself to the greater domain it opportunistically absolves 
itself of responsibility, while still speaking out on matters of international concern143.  
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 Expanded on in chapters three and four.  
143
 The first lines of the 2015 G20 Statement read: “The Leaders strongly condemned the abhorrent terror 
attacks in Paris. They expressed their condolences to the families of the victims and extended their wishes 
for the speedy recovery of those injured” (BRICS, 2015l). 
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL STYLE  
BRICS’ narrow (inner) style advances networked intergovernmentalism. As legitimate 
members of the international system BRICS states have the capacity to cooperate freely; 
BRICS uses power to display power. Its re-animates the order based on the anxiety that 
the structure is ineffective or threatened by domination. Its deliberate engagement in the 
group rebuts hegemony and advances the shared judgment of member states of being 
denied their appropriate international agency. This performance tactically territorialises 
the international order as multilateral and equitable.  
This dissertation has demonstrated BRICS’ pursuit for greater multilateralism, 
actualised by sovereign states, cooperating in an intergovernmental manner. In this order 
state authority is re-centralised in global governance; the core-periphery model is usurped 
by networks among state-nodes. As such a fluid, multipolar or polycentric world egresses. 
This end, facilitated by common standards, authoritatively designed and maintained, can 
be seen as BRICS’ intergovernmental version of Pettit’s (2016) “globalized republican 
ideal” (Pettit, 2016: 22). This is a realm of negative liberty. Peoples organise freely in 
bodies (states), which in turn enjoy freedom from external agents, constituted in their 
affiliation with other such global bodies (Pettit, 2016: 48). State sovereignty allows distinct 
agency between them, establishing networked order. Freedom of states creates freedom 
for peoples and vice versa. Through the virtuous intergovernmental style displayed by 
BRICS it presents the order it desires. BRICS’ opportunism, therefore, persuades not 
through management, but through gesture: presenting an image, inspiring recognition.  
Working from the basis of the UN (the court), BRICS’ inner style approximates 
Hariman’s Ciceronian republican style to construct a version of republican 
internationalism. Internationalism forms the strategic ways of BRICS’ unfolding 
intergovernmental style. As the republican style does, BRICS’ intergovernmental style 
presents the state as a hands-on authority, not outsourcing to institutions, but allowing 
for direct correspondence among independent states.  
While each BRICS member state is a proclaimed republic, it does not assert its own 
distinct internal mechanisation on the collective, but instead collectively manifests global 
146 
 
governance, by pronouncing it so. Through the speech-act of regeneration or reform, 
BRICS articulates the form wherein it has agency. This agency allows it to have reciprocal 
power through its pursuit of “upholding a more inclusive, balanced, and open world 
economy, creating an enabling environment for the development of EMDCs...so that the 
benefits of globalization can be shared equally by all countries” (BRICS, 2017b). 
Cicero’s republicanism employs speech energy. So too BRICS’ texts animate 
passions, seeking to inspire belief. They do not actively drive; the text functions as a 
vehicle for its persuasion. The realist as a direct actor must know how not to fall into 
persuasive traps, “in the republican mind, persuasion is the essence of politics, rhetorical 
virtuosity is the surest sign of political acumen, and public speaking is the master art” 
(Hariman, 1995: 6). Intergovernmentalism counters international tyranny. Not through 
force, but through representation. It strategically uses style to return to the texts, to the 
laws and the ideals of organising principles. Intergovernmentalism functionally invokes 
reform through speech. Saying it makes it so. For example: “The political coordination 
between BRICS members has been and will continue to be undertaken without any 
element of confrontation with other countries” (BRICS, 2015k).  
BRICS’ grouped behaviour is to style, instead of enact. According to Hariman the 
“world of texts is not the world of princes”, as in Machiavelli’s republican realism 
(Hariman, 1995: 22). Whereas the realist prince inspires belief and faces challenges 
through his actions, in intergovernmentalism this happens through abstracted ideals. To 
BRICS members the state is formed upon domestic ideals emerging to form the sovereign, 
a configuration of res publica (the public thing). Republican-inspired internationalism 
maintains an inward authority (national sovereignty) and non-domination (externally). 
Avoiding tyranny, this order is an empire of law, not of men. This is an ideal notion where 
the law is embodied in virtues carried in speech and then executed by persuaded actors. 
The republic is composed of public performances of oratory and persuasion. The republic 
“stands on thin air…constituted in discourse”, it needs to be promoted and established 
through belief (Hariman, 1995: 111).   
Under the empire of law the republican style, versioned here as 
intergovernmentalism, presents the personification of political culture; giving form to 
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proper and virtuous ideals, through rhetorical performance. Cmiel discusses Ciceronian 
republicanism as “government by discussion as opposed to force of fiat. Speech was more 
important to a republic than to any other kind of polity” (Cmiel in Hariman, 1995: 107). In 
the realm of international law, of governance without government, BRICS has styled its 
polity in the form of an empire of law. Cicero embodies the republic, incarnating its 
authority through oration. So too BRICS textually re-animates the international order 
under the UN Charter. Similar to the republic, BRICS substantiates its regime through 
discourse. Its current Statements opportunistically mediate its previous ones. In a 
Ciceronian fashion, BRICS moves to become the medium through which to understand the 
status quo. As Cicero’s republic was a work in progress, so too BRICS embodies a 
fundamentally fluid modern international system.  
In the manner in which Cicero sustained the republic through his mediations, 
BRICS’ articulations buttress the ideals of the international system. Whereas “Cicero had, 
in fact, become the idea of the Roman Republic” identifying “harm to the state as harm to 
himself” and “harm to himself as harm to the state” (Habricht, in Remer, 2017:145), so 
BRICS’ goal is to revitalise the reformed international order. However, Cicero’s strategy of 
boasting his substantial ego, to justify his capacity, is not seen with BRICS, downplaying 
managerial responsibility. BRICS’ rhetorical embodiment means that it primarily points out 
issues from the inside of the UN or G20. It is to its advantage when issues roll over, 
advancing the need to reform. Avoidance of responsibility leads to doubts around interest 
and status, as posed by Remer’s question: “if the representative stands for the whole, 
then what room is there for the represented?” (Remer, 2017: 145).  
Cicero’s personalising of the international system meant that “there was no enemy 
of the republic who did not also declare war on Cicero” (Hariman, 1995: 115). BRICS’ 
personalising of the ideal, in the manner of Cicero’s republic, suggests that any attempt to 
the body of the international order is a direct injury to all those upholding it and therefore 
to BRICS and its member states. This ploy is to tactically integrate itself into the 
international, affording central agency and influence. Though unlikely, the maturing of this 
stratagem could lead to BRICS engaging active power. The embodiment of the system is 
thereby a means to power; inciting the ideal could be an attempt to transfer authority of 
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the greater whole onto the body. Embodiment “epitomizes the republican identification 
of politics and persuasion, for embodiment is a rhetorical accomplishment that in turn 
fuses speech and action, speaker and subject, technical artistry and political status” 
(Hariman, 1995: 116).  
Representation amplifies the ethos of the orator. Ideals that are represented are 
done so tangibly in space and time. BRICS situates its text in a greater, global conversation. 
Its current document or Statement always presents a reflection or capitulation of the 
previous year, thereby constituting a rolling timeline, seeking to create a broader 
narrative. The past is incorporated under BRICS’ agency in order to found the present and 
structure the future144.   
BRICS Statements are presented into a space that is already constituted and 
defined. The selection of what it discourses on comes out of this existing space, requiring 
less invention and more repetition. The audience is also predictable. Under these 
established conditions it can be shrewd in its choice of intervention, calling out issues 
purposefully and using events to restructure truths. With abundant choice, failures are 
also likely. BRICS’ obsession with the highest order of international persuasion, as with 
republican persuasion, facilitates an insiders’ game. It only really speaks to those already 
actively involved or in the case of the G20, to its select members. It is therefore limited to 
those it is already exposed to. 
BRICS moves to fill the space that is opened by regular structural changes in 
international affairs. The modern era’s changes under forces such as globalisation, 
digitisation and environmental degradation have opened further opportunities and 
challenges for composing the international order. BRICS’ Statements opportunistically 
move to be an active voice in capturing reality, defining the situation and thereby shaping 
the narrative. By expressing “concern about the reported practices of unauthorised 
interception of communications” BRICS leaders exploit the relatively novel, ambiguous yet 
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security and stability, including by upholding multilateralism” (BRICS, 2016b). 
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increasingly pervasive matter of cybersecurity as a threat to “national sovereignty” and 
thereby insisting a statist response (BRICS, 2013a).  
BRICS’ reaction to the topical issue of global environmental degradation illustrates 
how it endeavours to ensure the newly opened space is filled to its liking. In this case, it 
simply asserts its continued support for the United Nations Climate Change Conference. It 
does this by affirming “determination to adopt the Paris Conference protocol”, known as 
COP21, as an “agreed outcome with legal force...that is applicable to all Parties” (BRICS, 
2015l). Herein it assures that this broad and global issue is afforded differentiated 
responsibility. BRICS calls for COP21’s institutionalisation to be a “comprehensive, 
balanced and equitable agreement...attained in an open, transparent, inclusive 
negotiating process” (BRICS, 2015k). Its support is therefore for the adoption of the 
cooperative, mutually beneficial multilateralism that BRICS espouses. The fact that 
Chairwoman Christiana Figueres referred to COP21 as “multilateralism at its best” and 
“what we need in all other areas of the UN” ensures indirect animation, strategically 
supporting BRICS’ efforts without it having to sponsor and occupy the space itself 
(Figueres in Darby, 2016). 
The BRICS body arrives from a space of cooperation. As with the republican style 
BRICS’ consensus “culminates in a model of leadership that features personal embodiment 
of the civic culture” (Hariman, 1995: 102). Its united front is therefore not only directed 
towards greater interaction but is sine qua non enabled by it. As the embodiment of the 
international order is a constant throughout its texts, so too is BRICS’ embodiment of 
itself. It perennially manifests itself throughout its texts145. By illustrating cooperation 
BRICS documents convey an impression of consummate consensus between the states. 
Exhibiting reciprocal trust and benefit among member states presents the example for 
broader, international consensus. Its textual embodiment centrally displays an illustrated 
outcome, an ideal or even utopian end state.  
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A recent method to advance trust and benefit beyond its group has been touted 
under the BRICS Plus initiative. While it remains unclear what BRICS Plus will entail, its 
proposed expansion will, so some extent, incorporate other states into its regime, 
expanding its authority. Were it to achieve expanded interaction, it would increasingly 
ensure that the broader international conception is incomplete without BRICS’ presence.   
In the manner that Cicero works form a unified whole, with each document 
“always available as a resource for the other” (Hariman, 1995: 112), BRICS incorporates 
UN-sanctioned international agreements together with its own documents to form an 
integrated narrative. By increasingly echoing a call for implementing pre-existing 
accords146 it takes a coalescing form, ordaining and concretising itself in the functioning of 
the UN.  
In the republican style reputation is central. Cicero’s letters show that reputation 
“was the medium in which one’s principles and desires existed…the very means of 
personal integrity (and) the glue that held one together within the constantly shifting 
alliances” (Hariman, 1995: 139). In constructing a collective reputation BRICS has recently 
started greater consolidation. In 2014 a new modality for concluding the UNGA Statement 
emerged. In near verbatim fashion, a paragraph at or towards the end of the text confirms 
that Ministers have “discussed the possibilities of mutual support of their initiatives” at 
the “UN General Assembly” (BRICS, 2016b). These announcements align to the entreaties 
of recent BRICS Summits, for “further enhancing of our collective efforts” (BRICS, 2016c). 
They reveal BRICS’ increasing claim for, if not foreshadowing of, collective action at 
international platforms. Previous studies (Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire, 2016) have 
already proven that while there are correspondences between the behaviour of BRICS 
states at international fora, there is, however, no significant development in voting 
coherence at the UNGA. The exhibition of individual states fixed in consolidated operation 
will prove testing as this would transcend its textual existence and threaten its claim of 
not being an alliance. Under Hariman’s republican style influence stems from a careful 
balance between assertion and compliance (Hariman, 1995). It portends that BRICS will 
increasingly substantiate itself in the coming years, certainly affecting its reputation. 
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Through substantiated activity BRICS will not simply be able to comply with designated 
authority but will form an operational group, testing its strategies.    
According to Hariman the republic and by extension the intergovernmental 
network is “endangered by silence, for without the continuing discussion of public duties, 
virtue could wane” (Hariman, 1995: 111). BRICS’ maintenance of the order assures that it 
is not captured or revived from elsewhere, preventing other agencies from enacting it. 
BRICS’ opportunistic Statements and its use of the epideictic illustrate the conservative 
animation of the system it wishes to maintain, while its mimicry of established accords 
maintains the international form, impeding possible efforts to change or meddle with 
established polities.   
The intergovernmental style presents rhetorical dexterity; its exploitation of the 
means is not the result of the delivery (Hariman, 1995: 102). It is about the feeling that is 
created during the performance, the belief that is inspired. People are at the centre of the 
republic, therefore the role of the state is to have them feel empowered, while the state 
executes power. BRICS increasingly focuses on people-to-people tactics147. Such a form is 
only possible when world order “helps to define the sovereign liberties relevant to each 
state…and it helps to protect and perhaps resource individual peoples so that they can 
exercise and enjoy their sovereign liberties” (Pettit, 2016: 58). BRICS opportunistically 
performs this order at international fora. This contrasts Westphalian148 non-interference, 
which cannot hold in the hyper-globalised contemporary world. Instead, BRICS expands 
networked order. Through non-domination states cooperate in concert with other states, 
embodying, as BRICS has, a common space between grossly different states; abandoning 
the core-periphery model and substantiating a networked, yet differentiated modality. 
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BRICS’ opportunistic Statements are used to further its strategic goal of vitalising the 
intergovernmental network order, from the inside out. It does not create a new system 
but substantiates the existing collective, sovereign domain. It actively assures the global 
court, while reciprocally being assured by it. By adopting the intergovernmental style 
BRICS seeks to foster the evolving networked order.  
States have interests, not ethics. BRICS uses ethics opportunistically149. Its regime 
invigorates the intergovernmental network. By extolling the virtues of the UN it 
demonstrates it as fair and just. While display or mimesis is powerful BRICS remains 
circumscribed by its tactical inactivity; increased action would risk its neutrality.  
At present BRICS has neither the means nor the will to ‘walk’ its ‘talk’. Its decision 
whether to substantially expand and materialise or not will be determining; whether 
persuasive direct action joins or supplants its rhetoric. If it transcends being an inner layer 
and increasingly manifests itself, it will push from being a regime inside the broader 
network to becoming the network itself; the form that BRICS Plus assumes will be 
illustrative. BRICS’ future configuration will be discerned by whether or not it constructs 
consequential institutions. This looks unlikely within its current formation and might 
rather materialise through an alternative formation150, but if this happens it will 
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 The SCO (which includes China, Russia and India) increasingly appears a preferred ‘hands-on’ 
organisation, to BRICS’ ‘hands-off’ diplomatic approach. This is seen at its meeting in May 2018 where 






This dissertation has explored and described BRICS’ strategies of persuasion. Unpacking 
these strategies has in turn accorded direct discernment of the group. These 
understandings are significant as previous studies have primarily discussed BRICS in often 
limiting, rationalising and compartmentalising ways. These works have critically under-
explored BRICS’ rhetorical essence, deducing and abstracting meaning and substance from 
the member states and from the designated signification of Goldman Sachs, not from the 
regime, as a distinct entity.  
The dissertation has deliberately limited consideration of separate national 
approaches, using these only to background. BRICS’ communications have been analysed 
to discern the regime, per se. Instead of aggregating the divergent strategies of member 
states, BRICS develops its own strategy. The dearth of consolidated knowledge of its 
strategies has inspired this research to centrally focus on description, analysing BRICS 
through its own operations and artefacts. Any emergent prediction stems directly from its 
own descriptions. The exploratory basis has inferred understanding based on observation 
and the use of appropriate tools; descriptive components function as support. The 
dissertation has expediently taken from various fields and schools of thought. The thesis 
was considered against the examination of central texts. Due to its scope and focus the 
dissertation has not addressed broader critical aspects. It has set out to analyse, not 
critique BRICS’ strategies. This delineation offers a platform for expansion in a great 
number of directions. It serves as a basis for further explanatory and critical studies.   
This dissertation has indicated BRICS to be a significant instrument through which 
to discern the dynamics and progression of networked intergovernmentalism and global 
governance reform. The area of concern here is the share of power of member states in 
the overarching, global political arena. This geostrategic realm of governance, beyond 
legitimate sovereign government jurisdiction, ensures abstract, multi-structured and fluid 
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scope. In this domain projection and perception is central. The dissertation’s broader 
deliberation regards BRICS to be a regime through which to pursue the regional and global 
interests of member states. BRICS’ strategic focus and locus is the global governance 
framework. It is a tool used by its member states to persuade.  
BRICS is process driven, it brings together aspiring and emerging nations in an 
intergovernmental way, replicating and re-embodying the intergovernmental order. BRICS 
constructs itself as a rhetorical vehicle, driving across the belief that international relations 
are skewed, moving it toward reform. While certain aspects of global power, such as 
economic power, have clearly shifted, it holds that perception and influence precariously 
maintains a unipolar status quo. It is critical and expedient to examine how this alternative 
narrative employs persuasion to actualise rebalanced order. This dissertation has provided 
crucial discernment of how BRICS informs upon this framework. It has illustrated BRICS as 
a dynamic and kairotic rhetorical regime that paves the way between the contemporary 
moment and that which is to come. It has centrally innovated by assessing this realm 
through unpacking BRICS’ rhetorical strategies.  
REFLECTION OF BRICS’ STRATEGIES OF PERSUASION 
The BRICS intergovernmental regime serves a specific purpose; its rhetoric moves 
strategically. This study has explored BRICS’ signification through unpacking its tools of 
persuasion. It has discovered its specific rhetoric, assessing its communication instruments 
as ordered modes to employ and pursue its various strategies. These have contributed to 
delineating BRICS’ persuasive strategies, as well as its strategic persuasions. It is 
appropriate to conclude by using the formative conceptualisation of strategy as reflecting 
means, ways and ends.  
i) MEANS 
BRICS’ central strategic means are the appropriate principles and norms of legitimate 
international law and order. BRICS’ performance of sovereign independence, as well as 
cooperative interdependence, stem directly from this established international ethos and 
logos. It adopts this foundationally to set up and advance its positions. These means are 
155 
 
not exclusively to advance itself but to ensure and maintain international stability. Its 
purposed demonstration of established principles holds dominant powers to account 
while avoiding disorder and confrontation which it is not strategically capacitated to deal 
with. Application by BRICS ensures selective combination to re-appropriate substance and 
signification accordingly, advancing the interests of member states. BRICS systematically 
forms its ethos from the very resources proclaimed and apportioned under the UN and its 
Charter, the foundational international treaty. This is resourcefully used to claim 
legitimacy and common ground. BRICS strategically does not substantiate its texts with 
constructed or disparate ideals. This allegiance presents it as a brace for international 
governance, strategically advancing global reform while avoiding being seen as an 
alternative or threat; as advancing its own image. 
BRICS’ instrumental use of ideals and organising principles demonstrates 
governance, not a government. It furthermore uses specific events and cases of 
dereliction of duty as resources to advance this strategy. It draws upon statistics, 
international protocol, terror attacks, domination, wars, injustices, as well as deferred 
institutional reform, to assign blame and signify as negative examples. On the other hand, 
it praises the entrenched, normative international system, emerging states, as well as its 
own achievements and formations as exemplary positive examples. 
Each BRICS state, as a legitimate unit of sovereign power, is a means toward 
constituting the collective; the states are the components that perform multilateralism. 
BRICS’ utility of universal standards ensures a non-partisan platform through which states 
not only act and interact, avoiding forced alliance, but also extend influence beyond its 
format. Instead of negotiating and upholding formal treaties, BRICS states cooperate 
through political agreements that substantiate and advance decreed modes of operation; 
representing intergovernmental interaction through illustration. BRICS’ informal 
intergovernmentalism operates upon the empire of law as persuasive grounding; 
established laws and institutions define realities of discernment. BRICS does not greatly 
interpret and develop new structures; its regime is located within the broader, supreme 
intergovernmental organisation that offers continuous and stable institutionalisation. 
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Compounded by legitimate parts BRICS is at core a strategic instrument. It is a resource 
that advances the related, yet separate interests of member states.   
BRICS’ documentation explicitly conveys meaning, yet they are also tools. The 
select vocabulary of the documents materialise identity, stimulate passions, create 
distinction and re-define perception. The documents are tangible resources that direct 
pressure and translate meaning in a chosen direction. BRICS is manifested through its 
communication instruments; these are the resources that together form the conceptual 
whole. BRICS’ summit Declarations, agreements and Statements are the components that 
present and perform international legitimacy. Programmatic documents adopt and 
materialise principles, producing tangible means for movement. BRICS’ programmes, its 
meetings, working groups and other mechanisms are authorised collectively to constitute 
the appliances and products of intergovernmentalism. Organic documents offer a process-
driven reconstitution of meaning. Opportunistic documents seek interest by introducing a 
BRICS voice at international fora.  
BRICS’ ethos is not the result of each state combined. Instead, it is the singular 
collective product that advances an emboldened, re-embodied and therefore reformed 
governing framework. This embodiment and rhetorical advance assure that dislocated 
principles are encoded by BRICS, also supporting its ethos appeals. It performs this 
authority and credibility for the appeals they are. Legitimacy is a central means to BRICS. 
Through its collective demonstration, it tactically qualifies its design upon the legitimacy of 
the individual states; group signification is exhibited to strategically be consigned upon 
individual states. As an informal, networked structure BRICS provides an articulation of 
what will increasingly be a means of intergovernmental power.  
ii) WAYS   
BRICS’ network of legitimacy enables it to pursue its ambitious agenda. This forms an 
alternative, intergovernmental narrative, legitimated by the continued existence of the 
corresponding G7. The persistence of a distinct G7 indicates that the G20 is not the only 
authoritative protagonist. This allows for an additional voice. BRICS, in a similar fashion to 
the G7, consigns legitimacy to the G20, while advancing its own. This narrative carries 
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meaning. It presents and endorses a particular, critical version of affairs, a specific way to 
rhetorically function in international order. This collective claim of common ground is a 
testament to BRICS’ style. The introduction of an alternative narrative is an exercise of 
independence, a challenge to hegemony, but not to order. By producing an alternative it 
seeks to displace dominance.   
BRICS’ independence is its strongest appeal. Its autonomous narrative re-inspires 
intergovernmentalism through displaying sovereign authority, returning power to the 
centre of the state and by redefining international norms. It does so by transcending the 
domestic domain of each individual country. The separate states together present an 
intergovernmental modality which affirms the sovereignty of each. This exemplary 
expression approves functional intergovernmentalism, while in turn underscoring the 
present limited scope for independent movement. It explicitly uses international precepts 
of international law to illustrate this behaviour as exemplary, not aberrational.  
BRICS is itself a strategic concept or way, a cooperative effort among individual 
sovereigns. This embodied collective, premised upon diverse national interests, 
necessarily has a mixed strategy. It manages its image according to topical international 
issues, engaging that which suits its purpose. A number of ways are incorporated to 
conjunctively and fluidly advance its interests. It moves between internal and independent 
identity. Straddling this composite space grants it greater freedom to act. From here it 
charts its own course, setting an example for others to aspire towards its privileges and 
achievements. Central to BRICS’ strategic ways is its courtly and intergovernmental styles. 
These are the ways chosen to steer, arrange and illustrate meaning. BRICS rhetorically 
situates itself within the UN’s ‘court’. From within this realm, it advances 
intergovernmental networking between sovereign entities, vis-à-vis a unitary or 
supranational system.  
BRICS employs latent multi-institutionalism to enact the international order it 
aspires to. By remaining inside the UN ‘court’, operating through multilateralism, yet 
outside alliance, its narrative remains inclusive and non-coercive. Its formations and 
institutions primarily do not oppose but seek to complement. BRICS’ overarching 
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methodology is a direct evasion of great power rivalries (Thucydides Trap151). While BRICS 
is directed at reform, it pursues the maintenance of international stability, bandwagoning 
the traditional systems to gain power. Its entire strategy is based upon the preservation of 
the present, open international system. It cites its support for this in a mantra-like fashion, 
seeking recognition and influence through repetition. BRICS is enabled by the system in 
place; it exhibits the networked order in order to offer a brace for it. The fracturing of this 
comprehensive arrangement will not only have adverse effects for its aspired reform but 
upon its very ability to engage. It is perhaps indicative of greater synergy between BRICS 
and other states that the US as lone superpower is tactically reacting, altering or de-
stabilising the open international order, the formation allowing BRICS states’ ascendancy. 
This corollary practically opposes BRICS strategy, limiting its advance of calculated, open 
interaction.  
BRICS’ coherent and central strategic modality is formed as an informal 
intergovernmental organisation or regime. It is the form chosen to exhibit its ethos. 
Throughout its communication it reinforces its own expression of territoriality by 
performing the foundation, but also increasingly the evolution, of the networked order. 
While its strategy avoids progression into a narrow BRICS Consensus, its modes and means 
are steadily becoming more assertive, authoritative and ambitious. While its strategic 
hybridity ensures tactical performance it also creates obfuscation. The pragmatic 
intergovernmental regime pursues influence by demonstrating independence. It is formed 
through arrangement and illustration of meaning. While its voice consists of the combined 
member states, its regime, anchored in the logos of the UN ‘court’, is principally global 
and inclusive. BRICS tactically maintains a universal scope.  
It acts as a channel, an embodied guide towards an independent expression of 
international relations. The regime, however, maintains little official responsibility or 
obligation. It can be ambitious and candid. BRICS’ collective voice allows it to point out 
failures in the international order. BRICS is not only used to draw attention, member 
states also use it as a screen, desisting focus on them and avoiding culpability. Its 
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comments are not attributed to any individual country. It avoids direct confrontation. In 
order to preserve the space to act its regime avoids permanence and agency. It does not 
greatly institutionalise, nor does it move to enforce a new normative international 
foundation. 
The BRICS regime mimetically performs and affirms the international order. Both 
BRICS and the international order are brought forth through this display. Mimesis is not 
duplication, but the creative re-enactment of global order. BRICS’ reproduction presents a 
mediated view, it makes reality through demonstration. Its embodied narrative stimulates 
and delineates the broader narrative. Its narrative introduces new interpretation, ensuring 
re-articulation and seeking positive association. BRICS offers a disclosure of values; it 
shapes reality by displaying it. Its close relation to international order furthermore arouses 
pathos, suggesting an injury to it implying an injury to global order and vice versa.   
BRICS does not directly challenge or balance global hegemony, nor does it have the 
means to do so. The group advances legitimate sovereign independence and delegitimates 
dominance; soft balancing is a central strategic way to maintain stability and move 
towards greater power equivalence. BRICS’ rhetoric of resistance is to soft balance 
hegemony. It strategically leads by acting out this broad, non-partisan vision. Leadership is 
a central method through which it seeks to convince others to pursue the same 
intergovernmental network; developing international conformity. Building credibility is 
easier from within the group; BRICS does not instruct or manage, through hierarchy or 
coercion, but seeks influence by exhibiting and embodying shared values. In order to 
move others to action, it employs kairos to induce meaning. Its documentation often 
reacts to global exigencies, opportunely advancing proposals.  
Identification and recognition, while also relating to ends, are ways by which BRICS 
demonstrates a common appreciation for the principles and values of intergovernmental 
organisation. Situating itself in the UN ‘court’ affords it the perception of legitimacy. While 
member states are essentially apart, these approaches bring them together in common 
distinction and shared experience. Recognition and identification promulgate credibility 
and influence, both among BRICS states and with the broader international community. It 
allows internationalism to be reflected from state to state, in a fluid process of continuous 
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establishment of belonging. BRICS is, therefore, a network of recognition. Through 
collective membership, each state explicitly recognises and reciprocates the other. These 
are modalities through which space is created to reflect common perceptions. Through 
the process of rhetorical substantiation the group seeks to manufacture its chosen 
realities.  
BRICS’ advance of cooperative interdependence among sovereigns, in turn, 
delegitimates hegemonic behaviour. Its admonition of preferential treatment and its 
opposition to systematic control over international institutions tactically rejects Western 
dominance. Its discourse of resistance propounds the replacement of outsourced 
institutional power held by organisations with state-centric global governance. BRICS 
focuses its delegitimation campaign on specific concepts, such as abuse of control and 
dominance. This advances its push for greater diffused authority.  
Hybridity as a central approach is tactically process-driven and multi-dimensional. 
Hybridity is a functional description. It operates across dimensions, both within the 
international order (as individual states) and beyond (as regime). This both-and 
development illustrates a world both in and beyond international Consensus. BRICS does 
not produce a new Consensus but instead presents a way towards one. Such a clearly 
defined Consensus can only be occupied when there is a pervasive order.  
iii) ENDS 
This dissertation has illustrated BRICS’ central strategic ends to be reform within the 
global governance domain. However, before reform can be pursued the foundation of 
intergovernmental cohesion must be ensured. Stability in the international system is an 
ultimate condition and is antithetical to the idea that BRICS seeks to overthrow the 
intergovernmental arrangement. This is the primary reason why it moves slowly, why it 
does not impose. Any analysis of BRICS that does not take into consideration this 
rationality remains incomplete and will only serve as a partial illustration. BRICS is a 
purposed vehicle that maintains the stable order that its member states require to pursue 
their interests. It interdependently exhibits this formation to ensure that concepts and 
principles are not re-defined by others. It stands as indirect opposition to hegemonic 
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appropriation and contagion, what Chomsky referred to as the model of successful 
independent development152. In order to ensure durable grounds to act BRICS’ strategic 
reform is largely about dislocating or eroding (Western) domination, achieving greater 
agency for its member states in a re-embodied and re-constituted world order. 
BRICS’ strategic ends feature centrally throughout its communications. This is a 
method to achieving recognition, as an end; its rhetorical strategies can only succeed 
when they are being acknowledged. The ends of BRICS’ operations (summits, agreements, 
meetings, etcetera) are to claim territoriality from dominant states and institutions. BRICS 
demonstrates the realisation of mutual gain, equity, shared legitimacy and credibility, 
without the formation around a core leader or hegemon. This persuades that informal 
arrangements are strategically superior to fixed alliances. BRICS is grouped in a regime, to 
forestall hard alliances. 
It advances procedural relationships, where state cooperation does not require 
total consensus, allowing a perpetually emerging system. While formal arrangements 
construct instruments and institutions that occupy deployed power, such informal ones 
maintain state sovereignty at the core. These operate in a pragmatic manner, fluidly 
constituted and reformed. Presenting an ideal type where states do not have to contend 
with fixed hierarchies of privilege. For aspiring states this is attractive as the extant 
situation theoretically allows each the opportunity to project and claim power. The 
growth of these informal systems, whether treaty bound or not, will increasingly apply 
pressure to fixed, formal systems that function at the discretion of a core to a periphery or 
a hegemon to a hierarchy. BRICS’ strategic communications propound informal 
interactions and relations between states as superior, ensuring an improved balance of 
powers. Greater competition between powers implies increased multipolarity (multiple 
truths), indicating a shift from predominant neo-liberalism to neo-realism. 
Reform and multilateralism are presented as organic features that are 
organisationally decreed, but obstructed from manifestation. Such presentation maintains 
there to be a culprit at work, with BRICS as champion. It presents its actions as safeguards, 
                                                          
152
 See page 37.  
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rebuffing the obstructing forces. These ends are not its own, without its existence, these 
remain. BRICS introduces its value by expounding reform, describing the ways and means 
towards it and designing what it should look like. In this light it holds anti-hegemony as 
strategic ends.   
Reform that returns power to the ambit of the state will confine the power of 
institutions and dominant states. Though the UN will remain the legitimate core, such 
reform will affect its role and agency, altering it per se. This explains BRICS’ motive for 
stressing itself as regime within the prevailing order. In the context of BRICS as a vehicle 
towards intergovernmental networked order, it has been illustrated here that the longer it 
exists and the more it systematises, the narrower the distinction and the more blurred the 
line between BRICS as regime and order. While BRICS is cautious of establishing and 
promoting an emerging global Consensus, its embodiment of order is increasingly 
exceeding its communication. It remains unclear what will happen if and when BRICS 
achieves its specific reform goals. Its substantiation remains intentionally vague. Reform is 
a rolling project, it is intentionally fluid, its final goal not clearly defined. New specified 
targets are constantly added. The greater success of increased influence of member states 
would suggest the end of BRICS’ constituting reason to prevail. An ultimate practical 
accomplishment will be the territorialisation of power, increasingly incarnating authority 
in the order. 
BRICS’ hybrid structure has been shown to necessitate a negotiation between an 
international protagonist and informal structure. The BRICS regime is clearly not a final 
product, but a vehicle actualising the move toward the succeeding global power order. It 
is a collective (greatly rhetorical) tool employed by member states to utilise their window 
of opportunity to orchestrate the shape of things to come. Beyond this entity, as ways, the 
conception of BRICS Plus could develop to embody the true objective; incubating 
structural order, beyond regime. BRICS Plus is potentially an emerging illustration of an 
end, a 21st-century global Consensus, with China in an ostensibly leading position. This 
emerging Consensus illustrates BRICS’ movement beyond the focus on dominant systems 
and into expanded, participatory design. Establishing concrete manifestations, such as the 
envisioned BRICS Credit Ratings Agency and BRICS Local Currency Bond Market, continue 
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moving BRICS beyond cooperation around standards and into tangible substantiation. 
These possible movements will increasingly take BRICS from vehicle to end. Whatever its 
form, it increasingly embodies the order it desires. If this goes unchecked it will increase 
the potential risk of great power conflict. These are new, unfolding concepts. It is of 
pressing consequence to watch BRICS as it redefines itself, as it and its member states 
redefine global power relationships, to see whether these future movements can achieve 
co-option without coercion. 
It is apparent that BRICS wishes for organisational change. Yet, the diverging 
interests of disparate members largely prevent a clear model from emerging. This 
suggests a permanent state of strategic hybridity. Substantiation of emerging power 
dynamics is not the purpose of reform-seeking BRICS, yet achievement of its ends may 
imply this becoming contentiously implicit. The presence of an existential in-between, a 
scenario of both continued Western hegemony and global power diffusion (multipolarity), 
may prove to simply maintain global strategic inertia. Expressly, this would see the 
existing, solidified power structure remain intact, averting substantial reform. This exact 
strategic inertia is what brought BRICS into formation. By implication this may suggest 
strategic failure, the transcendence of a rhetorical contestation and the precipitation of 
the realist anxiety of the Thucydides Trap.  
FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
BRICS is a valuable entity through which to interpret the changing global power relations. 
These observations require continued investigation, especially because it, as well as the 
domain it operates in, is evolving. This affirms the need to continue examining and 
utilising it in contextual and theoretical research in a number of relevant areas, moving 
deeper into the 21st century. These include, but are not limited to, global governance, 
network sciences, regional leadership, multipolarity and power transition.  
This dissertation has explored BRICS as it enters its second decade. Its 
communications and operations should increasingly become telling as it develops further. 
These iterations will continue to modify it, and the world around it. BRICS’ development 
proposes an appropriate mode to interpret global change, a close examination of what 
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emerges under BRICS Plus will prove informative. Perhaps greater incorporation of or 
comparison to previous anti-hegemonic or aspiring groupings, such as NAM, will provide 
valuable historical insight to appraise BRICS. Correspondence to the G7 should also be 
illustrative. Furthermore, while BRICS seeks to disrupt Western power, it will be insightful 
to examine how these powers respond to BRICS. A direct, inverse viewing of Western 
strategies of persuasion will be highly elucidative.  
BRICS should be of special interest to strategic studies and disciplines. Hybridity, 
irregularity and asymmetry, similar and overlapping concepts, are key drivers in the 
evolution of contemporary studies of strategy. These approaches could prove useful in the 
study of BRICS’ development. It offers an indirect, informal, and evolving 
intergovernmental platform through which to assess the constituent states and their 
engagement. Beyond its strategic reasoning, it offers the tangible conceptualisation of the 
modalities that states use in networked globalisation. Formal and informal 
intergovernmental organisations will increasingly affect the international governing 
framework; these nascent platforms should be better understood through research, as 
they will directly bear influence on it. The growth of informal platforms, as indirect 
strategic tools for nation states to pursue their interests, will have a direct impact upon 
global authorities, including the structure and function of the UN. It is imperative to 
unpack how BRICS affects the authority and operations of the UN; what does BRICS want 
from the UN and how does it reconcile the strategic differences of member states at the 
UN?   
This study has used hybridity to describe BRICS strategically. It has suggested that 
BRICS may seek to avoid concrete formations of power, instead realising a permanently 
fluid balance of powers. BRICS employs and centrally uses the concept of multipolarity, yet 
it remains obscured in that it is strategic, vis-à-vis multilateralism, which describes policy. 
The significance of BRICS’ use of this term demands elucidation. While BRICS serves as a 
useful platform, it only partially portrays the international designs of emerging powers. It 
is of great importance that the strategies of the ever-growing plethora of international 
state and non-state actors are discerned. In an increasingly hybrid world, emerging bodies 
such as BRICS will play a substantial role in shaping the global balance of power.     
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These formations will employ myriad ways to pursue their interests and may drift 
from informal to formal agreements and anything in between. The greater their 
independent ability and capacity, the more these lines will become blurred, suggesting 
increased necessity to understand their agenda, to avoid confrontation. Within the 
prevailing domain of nation-states, complete independence is inconceivable as powerful 
states will always exact their influence upon weaker ones. It is therefore important for 
future studies to do what this study has not done and apply a comprehensively critical lens 
to BRICS as a potential elite formation seeking to subvert and co-opt influence towards 
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